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Abstract 
The use of third-party gametes in reproductive procedures has raised ethical 
questions about what responsibilities, if any, the providers of these gametes have towards 
the children they help to create.  Much of this debate has focused on the conditions under 
which individuals acquire parental responsibilities, and the manner in which these 
responsibilities can be ethically discharged.  Rather than taking parenthood as a starting 
point, however I focus on the conditions under which care-taking responsibilities arise 
more generally.  I defend the thesis that gamete providers acquire substantial inalienable 
care-taking responsibilities towards their biological offspring, but that these 
responsibilities do not amount to parental responsibilities. 
In the first chapter, I argue that because gamete providers freely and intentionally 
act to bring about the existence of children, they have care-taking responsibilities for the 
offspring that result from their gametes.  In the second chapter I draw a distinction 
between the transfer and delegation of responsibilities, and argue that gamete providers 
can only delegate their care-taking responsibilities.  In the third chapter I argue that the 
care-taking responsibilities gamete providers have do not amount to parental 
responsibilities, and that gamete providers are merely responsible for ensuring that their 
biological offspring have a reasonable chance at a desirable life.  In the fourth chapter I 
apply the threshold established in the preceding chapter to highlight specific duties 
possessed by gamete providers.  I argue that if gamete recipients cannot care for a gamete 
provider’s biological offspring and no one else is able to, then gamete providers have a 
special responsibility to provide financial or parenting assistance, depending on what 
  
iii 
 
would best serve the child’s interests.  A consequence of this view is that the state could 
reasonably require certain kinds of limited child-support from gamete providers.   
 
Keywords 
Reproductive Ethics, Gamete Donation, Parenthood, Reproductive Responsibility, 
Assisted Reproduction, Gamete Selling,  
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Introduction 
Background 
Many modern infertility treatments rely on the use of gametes (sperm and ova) 
that are sourced from individuals different from those intending to parent the children 
that will eventually result from the use of those gametes.  For instance, increasing 
numbers of individuals rely on gametes acquired from non-partners, either purchased or 
donated, for use in in vitro fertilization procedures.  This development has complicated 
reproductive ethics by expanding the cleavage between progenitors and parents.  Though 
the rise of these practices has generated debate in the ethics literature, this should not be 
taken to imply that the distinction between progenitor and parent is a novel creation of 
modern technology.  Many societies have, by design, separated the social performance of 
parenting from the biological process of creating children1, and adoption in various forms 
has a long history in Western society.  However, at least within the recent Western 
tradition, there is a strong presumption that, all things being equal, progenitors ought to 
parent their biological children.  This presumption is manifest in the scorn levied against 
men in one-night-stand cases who ‘abandon’ their genetic offspring, and the legal norms 
governing custody and child support.2  Though adoption stands as an exception to this 
general social attitude in that it permits progenitors to alienate their parental 
responsibilities, it is an example that highlights a tension in our intuitions about how 
responsibilities towards children are acquired and divested.  Complicated by our 
intuitions in these other contexts involving the rearing of children, a question that remains 
                                                 
1
 Consider communal child rearing on the early kibbutzim.   
2
 Genetic relatedness being a grounds for both the imposition of child support and claims to some form of 
custody. 
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to be settled in the bioethics literature is what responsibilities, if any, gamete providers 
have towards the children they help create. 
 This question is pressing for two major reasons.  First, there is no legal consensus 
yet on whether gamete providers are in any way legal parents.  To date, many of the 
judicial decisions on this matter have been inconsistent3, and some have relied on ad hoc 
justifications for departing from previously established legal norms.4  Though the law 
does not always strictly follow ethical findings, a thorough ethical analysis would help to 
provide a basis for crafting laws to deal with the complex issues raised by child custody 
and child support cases involving gamete providers.  Second, involving oneself or others 
in the creation of new life is a morally weighty decision. Individuals deciding to provide 
gametes to others, along with the individuals making use of those gametes, arguably 
ought to consider the moral implications of this decision so that they can proceed in an 
ethical manner.  In offering an account of gamete providers’ responsibilities, this thesis 
will aid potential gamete providers in determining whether offering their gametes to 
others is an activity they wish to engage in, given what responsibilities they acquire as a 
result.   
 In this thesis I will argue that gamete providers acquire substantial responsibilities 
towards their biological offspring, and that these responsibilities cannot be transferred to 
others.  Crucially, I argue that these responsibilities are not parental.  Though my focus 
will be moral responsibility, in a few places (especially the final chapter) I will highlight 
                                                 
3
 Boyd, Susan. "Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties, Intentionality and Responsibility." 
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 25 (2007): 63-94. p. 64. 
4
 For examples, see these cases: Susan L. Kesler v. Conrad E. Weniger. No. 471 WDA 99. The Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania. 7 January 2000.; Ivonne V. Ferguson v. Joel L. McKiernan . No. 1940 A.2d 1236. 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania . 27 December 2007. 
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what implications these responsibilities could have for law and policy governing 
reproduction aided by gamete providers. 
Thesis outline  
 In the first chapter I argue that gamete providers acquire responsibilities towards 
their genetic offspring.  This argument proceeds by first distinguishing between different 
kinds of responsibility, and second, establishing that in some circumstances individuals 
can acquire a certain class of responsibilities (care-taking responsibilities) non-
voluntarily.  I defend the claim that individuals acquire care-taking responsibilities when 
they freely and intentionally place innocent individuals in a state of extreme 
vulnerability, regardless of whether they voluntarily accept such responsibilities.  I 
present this criterion as a sufficient condition for care-taking responsibility, but not a 
necessary one.  Since gamete providers meet this condition, they acquire care-taking 
responsibilities when their gametes are used by other for reproductive purposes. 
 This argument is an important departure from other arguments that have been 
offered for similar conclusions.  Other authors have used the similarities between one-
night-stand cases and gamete provision as a basis for establishing that gamete providers 
have responsibilities towards their biological offspring.  They conclude, based on the 
strong intuitions we have about responsibility in the former case, that similar 
responsibilities must exist in the latter case as well.  However, on my view there is a 
stronger case for responsibility in gamete provision cases than in one-night-stand cases 
because gamete providers engage in a course of action where the creation of a child is the 
intended result.  My view is not that individuals who create a child through carelessness 
or accident do not also have responsibilities.  Rather, I contend that if we think 
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responsibilities arise when children are created unintentionally, then it would be odd to 
think that the opposite is true when the creation of a child is intentional. 
 In the second chapter I assess what Tim Bayne calls “the transfer principle”5, 
which is the view that moral responsibilities acquired by gamete providers can be 
transferred to the child’s intending parents.  Various authors have taken this principle to 
show that even if gamete provision is the kind of activity that results in moral 
responsibilities, this fact is largely of little consequence for gamete providers because 
they transfer any responsibilities they have to the intending parents along with their 
gametes. 
I argue that much of the support offered for the transfer principle rests on a failure 
to adequately distinguish between the delegation and transfer of responsibility.  Upon 
closer inspection, examples used to demonstrate the common place nature of the transfer 
of parental responsibility are in fact examples of the delegation of responsibility.  I 
further argue that there are strong reasons to doubt that gamete providers could ever 
transfer their responsibilities to others, though they can delegate them.  As a 
consequence, gamete providers have inalienable responsibilities towards their genetic 
offspring.   
In the third chapter, I outline what kinds of responsibilities gamete providers have 
towards their genetic offspring.  I argue that though they have inalienable care-taking 
responsibilities, these do not amount to a moral requirement to parent their genetic 
offspring.  In other words, the responsibilities are not parental.  Instead, I argue that 
gamete providers are responsible for ensuring that their biological offspring have a 
                                                 
5
 Bayne, Tim. "Gamete Donation and Parental Responsibility." Journal of Applied Philosophy. 20.1 (2003): 
77-85. p. 82. 
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reasonable chance at a desirable life, and that this responsibility can be fulfilled without 
gamete providers parenting themselves, so long as someone competently parents their 
biological offspring.  I argue that ‘a reasonable chance at a desirable existence’ is an 
appropriate middle ground between the very minimal responsibilities that some people 
might think are owed to children given certain conclusions that can be drawn from the 
non-identity problem6, and the extremely demanding requirements that might arise given 
arguments offered by Seana Shiffrin about harm and procreation.  Briefly, someone 
might think that the non-identity problem leads to the conclusion that gamete providers 
have not harmed their biological offspring so long as they have a life worth living.  By 
contrast, Shiffrin’s argument implies that gamete providers owe their biological offspring 
compensation for all of the minor harms that they encounter over the course of their life.  
The view I develop lies in between these two extremes.  Though meeting the moral 
standard that I set for gamete providers requires that their biological offspring are 
properly parented by someone, nothing about this requires gamete providers to do the 
actual parenting themselves.   
In the final chapter I look at what pragmatic consequences my view has for 
gamete providers, and the conditions that must be in place for gamete provision to be 
ethical. I argue that gamete providers must have reasonable grounds to think that the 
intending parents will be able to parent adequately.  Given the general lack of parental 
screening that currently takes place with gamete provision7, this means that the majority 
of current gamete provision is unethical.  I further argue that because gamete providers 
have an ongoing responsibility to ensure that their biological offspring have a reasonable 
                                                 
6
 Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Ch. 13. 
7
 This true with other forms of assisted reproduction as well. 
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chance at a desirable life, some process must be in place for gamete providers to gain 
information about how their genetic offspring are faring.   Furthermore, since 
intervention into the private family life of their genetic offspring could be very damaging, 
gamete provision is permissible only in societies where there is a reliable child welfare 
agency capable of determining when intervention into the private family life of gamete 
providers’ genetic offspring is warranted.  I also argue that gamete providers are 
responsible for providing material support to their genetic offspring if needed, but that 
this ought to take a different and likely less onerous form than current child support 
payments.  
Taken together, the arguments in each of these chapters will establish the central 
thesis of this work, which is that gamete providers acquire substantial and inalienable 
care-taking responsibilities towards their genetic offspring. 
Terminology 
Before turning to the argument, I want to first briefly discuss some of the 
terminology that I will be employing throughout this text, because some of it departs 
from the terminology predominantly used in the literature.  First, I will be using the term 
‘gamete provider’ to refer to individuals who make their gametes available for the 
reproductive use of other people, and who therefore do not act with the intention of 
parenting the resultant children themselves. In most of the bioethics literature these 
individuals are referred to as “gamete donors”, but this term is somewhat deceptive.  
Though many individuals do indeed donate their gametes, many also sell their gametes, 
even in jurisdictions where such transactions are prohibited by law.8  Since the arguments 
                                                 
8
 "Frozen Human Egg Buyers May Face Prosecution." CBC News 23 April 2012. Webpage. 5th November 
2014. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/frozen-human-egg-buyers-may-face-prosecution-1.1139563>. 
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presented in this thesis apply to both gamete sellers and donors, the term gamete provider 
is more accurate.  Second, throughout the thesis I will be using the terms ‘intending 
parent(s)’ to refer to the individual(s) employing the provided gametes for reproductive 
purposes.  In the literature these individuals are often referred to “commissioning 
parents”, but this is suggestive of a commercial arrangement.  Lastly, I will refer to the 
resulting children as “biological offspring” of the gamete provider or as the children of 
the intending parents.  For instance, I might say, ‘gamete providers have important 
responsibilities towards their biological offspring’. In some of the literature the term 
“biological children” is used instead, but this language can be confusing because use of 
the term “children” might be taken to imply that gamete providers are among the 
‘parents’ of these children.  In order to avoid this inference, I will use the phrase 
‘biological children’ rather than ‘their children’.  
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Chapter 1: Gamete Provision and Care-Taking Responsibility  
Introduction 
Much of the debate about whether gamete providers acquire responsibilities 
towards their biological offspring has focused on whether gamete providers are parents.  
For obvious ethical and legal/policy reasons, determining which individuals are the 
parents of which children is important, and so the concern with determining parenthood 
in gamete provision cases is well founded.  However, the singular focus on parenthood in 
much of the literature on gamete provision obscures the more general question of whether 
gamete providers have any special responsibilities for the children that they help to 
create.  Many non-parents—such as school teachers, nannies, and camp counselors—
have substantial special obligations towards children.  Focusing solely on whether gamete 
providers are parents ignores the possibility of non-parental forms of special obligations 
for gamete providers.  In this chapter I will show that gamete providers do indeed have 
special responsibilities for their biological offspring. The exact content of these 
responsibilities will be addressed in subsequent chapters. 
This chapter has two main sections.  In the first section I discuss ambiguities in 
the use of the term “responsibility” that potentially obscure the discussion about gamete 
provider responsibility.  Using Claudia Card’s taxonomy of responsibility, I argue that 
gamete providers can acquire care-taking responsibility for their biological offspring even 
if they exercise due diligence when providing their gametes.  The thrust of this argument 
is that negligence is not a necessary condition for acquiring care-taking responsibility for 
children created using one’s provided gametes.  In the second section I provide a positive 
argument for why most gamete providers do in fact acquire care-taking responsibility.  I 
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then distinguish my view from similar views proposed by Giuliana Fuscaldo9, Rivka 
Weinberg10 and James Nelson.11 
One distinction I would like to draw at the outset is between pre-provision and 
post-provision responsibilities.  I define pre-provision responsibilities as those that must 
be met for the act of gamete provision itself to be ethical.  These might include taking 
reasonable steps to ensure that the intended recipients of the donated gametes are capable 
of parenting, and avoiding producing children with severe genetic diseases.12  I define 
post-provision responsibilities as those that persevere after the gametes are donated, 
potentially until the child reaches maturity.  Introducing this distinction is important 
because, as will be discussed in subsequent sections, some authors think that if post-
provision responsibilities arise at all, they arise only when gamete providers fail in their 
pre-provision responsibilities.  In other words, under this view post-provision 
responsibilities arise for gamete providers only when they donate their gametes in an 
unethical manner.  In section two I will discuss this view more thoroughly under the sub-
heading “restitution views”.  A primary focus of this chapter is to show that gamete 
providers acquire care-taking responsibility for their biological offspring even when pre-
provision responsibilities are fulfilled – that is to say, even if we think that the initial act 
of gamete provision was done in a morally unimpeachable fashion.  I will discuss the 
content of pre-provision and post-provision responsibilities in subsequent chapters.   
1. Many Meanings of Responsibility 
                                                 
9
 Fuscaldo, G. “Genetic Ties: Are they Morally Binding?”. Bioethics. 20.2 (2006): 64-76. 
10
 Weinberg, Rivka.  “The Moral Complexity of Sperm Donation”. Bioethics. 22.2 (2008): 166-78.  
11
 Nelson, James. “Parental Obligations and the Ethics of Surrogacy:  A Causal Perspective”. Public Affairs 
Quarterly 5.1 (1991): 49-61.  
12
 Bayne, T. “Gamete Donation and Parental Responsibility”. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 20.1(2003): 
77-87. p. 85. 
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 The word “responsibility” can be used in many different senses and so the 
question, “who is responsible for some outcome X” is often ambiguous.  This point, 
made famous in H.L.A Hart’s postscript to Essays in the Philosophy of Law13, gave rise 
to a rich body of literature that distinguishes between different senses of the term 
‘responsibility’.14   
For instance, the way in which a principal is responsible for running a school is 
very different from the way in which a misbehaving student is responsible for disrupting 
a class.  When we say the principal is responsible for running the school, we are primarily 
pointing to the principal’s contractual authority and obligation to manage the school.  
When we say the misbehaving child is responsible for disrupting the class, we are 
pointing to the source of the disruption. In addition to the responsibility to manage 
something, and the responsibility for bringing something about, other forms of 
responsibility can also be drawn from this example.  For instance, the student could be 
responsible in the sense either that she is to blame for the disruption in addition to being 
simply responsible for causing it. 
These different senses of responsibility can arise independently from each other.  
Though an incompetent and disinterested principal may still have the authority and 
obligation to manage a school, the school may actually be managed by self-organized 
teachers.  In this latter case, the teachers are causally responsible for managing the school 
despite the principal’s contractual responsibility to do so.  This means that when asked 
the question, “who is responsible for managing the school?”, two different answers are 
                                                 
13
 Hart, H.L.A. Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968. p. 210. 
14
 Zimmerman, Michael. An Essay on Moral Responsibility. Totowa: Roman & Littlefield, 1988. 
p. 1. 
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possible depending on what meaning of responsible is invoked.  If the person asking is 
interested in who is actually doing the managing, then the teachers are responsible, while 
if the asker is interested in the person obligated to manage the school then the principal is 
responsible. 
The taxonomy of responsibility developed by Claudia Card in her book The 
Unnatural Lottery15 is particularly useful for the purposes of my argument, and for 
understanding the various different kinds of responsibility.  Card distinguishes between 
four different senses of responsibility: (1) the administrative sense, (2) the accountability 
sense, (3) the care-taking sense, and (4) the credit-taking sense.  I will use this taxonomy 
to help explain precisely in what sense I take gamete providers to be responsible for their 
biological offspring.  The key point I make is that care-taking responsibility (the 
obligation to take care of another) need not always be linked to credit-taking 
responsibility (blameworthy action) or voluntary assent.  I will do this by first explaining 
the different ways the term ‘responsibility’ can be used by drawing on the examples 
mentioned above, and then describing some of the different ways a particular subset of 
responsibilities, care-taking responsibilities, can arise. 
The administrative sense of responsibility involves conceiving of possibilities and 
then determining which ones to realize.  In the preceding example, the school principal is 
responsible in the administrative sense for organizing the school.  The accountability 
sense involves deciding to account for something or realizing that one is to account for 
something and seeing it through.  For instance, the teachers might see themselves as 
accountable for the education of their students and so organize themselves to make up for 
                                                 
15
 Card, Claudia. The Unnatural Lottery. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1996. p 28. 
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the principal’s deficiencies.  The care-taking sense involves a commitment to stand 
behind something, support it and make it good, or make good on one’s failure to do so.  
A camp counselor is responsible in the care-taking sense for the campers under her 
charge.  The credit-taking sense involves being the appropriate object of praise or blame 
for a particular action or outcome.  For instance, we might say that the principal is 
responsible for the school’s disarray because she is to blame for failing to do her job.16 
Another sense of responsibility that is important to mention is causal 
responsibility, which involves being a relevant cause of an event.  Returning to a previous 
example, we might say that the misbehaving student caused the class disruption.  
However, determining the causes of an event is fraught with theoretical difficulty, most 
notably in delineating in a non-arbitrary fashion what actions and agents are relevantly 
causally responsible.  For instance, should we include the person who drove the child to 
school as part of the cause of the disruption, or the genetic parents of the child, or the city 
administrator that drew up the school catchment areas?  Without any of those particular 
individuals, that particular classroom disruption would not have occurred.  Determining 
which individuals are causally responsible for a particular state of affairs in a morally 
relevant way, (i.e. that they have some-credit taking responsibility) is often determined 
contextually, and in everyday use we generally seem to have little trouble making this 
determination.17  For example, if someone asked who was to blame for the classroom 
disruption, the answer ‘the city administrator’ would clearly be inappropriate, even if the 
city administrator was an essential part of the chain of events that led to the disruption.  
                                                 
16
 It is worth noting that there is some overlap between the different kinds of responsibility.  For instance, 
the accountability sense of responsibility might give rise to care-taking responsibility.  See Card’s 
discussion about overlap between kinds of responsibility on page 30. 
17
 Nelson, op. cit. p. 54. 
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However, questions of causal responsibility are sometimes confused with questions of 
credit-taking responsibility.  For instance, if the child’s guardian knew that the child was 
apt to misbehave and could have made alternative plans, we might find the guardian 
responsible in the credit-taking sense, while not finding the same for the child, even 
though the child’s behavior is what most directly caused the disruption. 
Since I seek to establish that gamete providers acquire care-taking responsibility, 
it is important to look at the various ways in which care-taking responsibilities arise.  I 
have divided the possibilities into four categories: restitution cases, voluntary cases, non-
voluntary cases and quasi-voluntary cases.18  I want to show that by focusing on 
restitution cases and to a limited extent voluntary cases, other authors who have 
examined gamete provider responsibility have overlooked the possibility of quasi-
voluntary care-taking responsibility, and that gamete providers acquire this latter kind of 
responsibility.  A key feature I will focus on in discussing these cases is the differing 
ways ‘responsibility’ is used in each.  Next I will outline the different categories and 
discuss their relevance to gamete provision.    
2. Different Bases of Care-Taking Responsibility 
2.1 Restitution Cases 
In many circumstances, an individual might acquire care-taking responsibility 
because they have credit-taking responsibility (blame) for a particular state of affairs they 
have caused.  For instance, consider an individual who, while distracted by texting, runs a 
stop sign and strikes a pedestrian.  When determining who is responsible for the injury, 
we would find the driver responsible in three senses.  This driver is responsible in the 
                                                 
18
 This categorisation is likely non-exhaustive.  The purpose is merely to show that care-taking 
responsibility is not reliant on voluntariness or blame. 
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credit-taking sense because the injury to the pedestrian was caused by a blameworthy 
action – texting while driving.  The driver is causally responsible because of the essential 
role the driver played in causing the accident.  Beyond the general moral duty to stay at 
the scene of the accident and assist the pedestrian which we might think attaches even to 
a non-blameworthy counterpart19, the driver must also compensate the pedestrian for 
medical costs, lost wages, and other encumbrances arising from the blameworthy action.  
The driver thus has a responsibility to take care of the pedestrian, at least to the point that 
the pedestrian is returned to his pre-injury state.  This case highlights the intuition that 
care-taking responsibility generally arises when an individual harms another as a result of 
blameworthy actions, and that these responsibilities can be augmented beyond that which 
might attach to a non-blameworthy causal agent.  
   I will call cases in which individuals acquire care-taking responsibility as a result 
of their credit-taking responsibility “restitution cases”.  There are two authors, David 
Benatar and Tim Bayne, who seem to suggest that if pre-provision responsibilities are not 
met, and hence the provision of gametes is negligent and thus blameworthy, gamete 
providers have some resultant care-taking responsibility towards their offspring.  Their 
views also suggest that in the absence of blame, no care-taking responsibilities arise for 
gamete providers.  I will now turn to outlining their views.  Importantly, I will show that, 
contrary to their views, care-taking responsibilities can arise for gamete providers even in 
the absence of blame. 
In “The Unbearable Lightness of Bringing into Being”, Benatar argues that most 
gamete provision is unethical because gamete providers generally fail to adequately take 
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seriously their responsibility for their biological offspring.20 According to Benatar, there 
is a presumptive obligation to parent the children that arise from one’s gametes.  This 
responsibility stems from the fact that individuals generally possess “reproductive 
autonomy”, or control over how they use their gametes.  Since individuals are generally 
responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their free actions, they are responsible for 
the biological offspring that result from the free choices they make with their gametes.21  
Furthermore, Benatar argues that the care-taking responsibilities individuals have for 
their biological offspring are weighty, but these responsibilities can be transferred under 
certain stringent conditions.  According to Benatar, gamete providers can transfer the care 
of their biological offspring to intending parents if they ensure that the intending parents 
are capable of  parenting competently.  For instance, we would think it negligent for 
parents to hand over their children to the extended care of total strangers.  Since gamete 
providers have a presumptive duty to care for their biological offspring, the current 
structure of gamete provision is similarly negligent according to Benatar. Gamete 
providers hand over children for whom they have substantial care-taking responsibilities 
to complete strangers with very little oversight.  However, to reiterate, Benatar does think 
that if proper care is taken in selecting the recipients of one’s gametes, gamete provision 
is done ethically.22 
 On Benatar’s view, then, gamete providers possess substantial pre-provision 
responsibilities.  Gamete providers must take extensive measures to screen gamete 
recipients as a means of ensuring that they are capable of parenting children in an 
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acceptable manner.  If this is achieved, however, Benatar thinks that gamete providers no 
longer have any substantial post-provision responsibilities.  Benatar does not explicitly 
state what responsibilities gamete providers might retain if they fail to fulfill their 
extensive pre-provision responsibilities, but the implication of his view is that they retain 
their care-taking responsibilities.23 
 Though Bayne disagrees that there is a presumptive responsibility to parent the 
children that result from one’s own gametes24, he does think that there are general pre-
provision25 responsibilities that accompany gamete provision.  Bayne does not offer an 
exhaustive account of what these responsibilities include, but does mention taking 
reasonable steps to prevent providing gametes to known child-abusers and preventing the 
transmission of severe genetic diseases as examples.  Under Bayne’s account, the pre-
provision responsibilities that must be met for gamete provision to be morally permissible 
are significantly less demanding than those required by Benatar; however, under Bayne’s 
view, the negligent transfer of gametes is still possible.  Like Benatar, Bayne does not say 
what is required of negligent gamete providers, but the implication is that some post-
provision responsibilities may arise when procreative obligations are not met.  
 Bayne and Benatar have different views on what is required for gamete providers 
to avoid acting negligently, but both authors seem to suggest that if gamete providers 
fulfill their pre-provision responsibilities, then they are free from post-provision 
responsibilities, since neither author mentions the possibility of further responsibilities 
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 Bayne, op. cit. p. 79. 
25
 Bayne calls these “procreative responsibilities”. Ibid, p. 84. 
17 
 
 
 
once the pre-provision responsibilities are fulfilled.  This is perhaps an omission on their 
part, or perhaps an issue that lies outside the scope of their projects.  However, to the 
extent that someone might hold the above view, it seems to rest on the implicit 
assumption that in the absence of blame there is no basis for care-taking responsibility.  
Moreover, this assumption is not without some degree of intuitive plausibility.   
Consider a pilot who dutifully completes the proper pre-flight check, including 
checking the various components for wear.  Unbeknownst to the pilot, an evil trickster 
has replaced many of the bolts with heads that are glued in place and as a result the plane 
crashes on takeoff, injuring some of the passengers on board.  Beyond helping at the 
scene of the crash, it seems likely that the pilot has no ongoing responsibility to ensure 
that the passengers are returned to their pre-injury state.  If pressed to provide this kind of 
care, a reasonable response from the pilot would be that she is not responsible for the 
crash, and thus is not morally required to be responsible in the care-taking sense for the 
victims. 
 What Bayne and Benatar (or some hypothetical defenders of this position) assume 
is that a similar response is equally reasonable in the case of the cautious gamete 
provider.  Analogous to the pilot, gamete providers who take the necessary precautions to 
ensure that their biological offspring will have good lives (which surely includes being 
parented well) are not responsible in the credit-taking sense if things go awry for reasons 
outside of their control. And hence, like the pilot, are therefore not responsible in the 
care-taking sense for their biological offspring.   
This argument assumes that prior credit-taking responsibility is necessary for the 
imposition of care-taking responsibility.  Here the thought is that care-taking 
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responsibilities can be involuntarily imposed on an individual only when that individual 
is to blame for the state of affairs that has rendered the wronged individuals in need of 
care.   In response, what I will show in the following subsections is that there are multiple 
ways that individuals can become responsible in the care-taking sense, despite not being 
responsible in the credit-taking sense.  I will discuss the relevance of each in the context 
of gamete provision, focusing primarily on what I call quasi-voluntary cases. 
2.2 Voluntary Cases 
First, though not an imposition of care-taking responsibility, it is worth 
acknowledging that individuals can become responsible in the care-taking sense simply 
by voluntarily agreeing to take on that role. Consider a camp counsellor who finds that a 
camper has been injured in a tussle with a bunkmate.  Assuming no negligence on the 
part of the counsellor, she is not responsible for the injury in the credit-taking sense since 
she is not the appropriate object of blame.  However, the counselor is responsible for 
attending to the situation by providing care to the injured camper and taking the 
appropriate disciplinary measures.  In this circumstance the counsellor’s care-taking 
responsibility was acquired voluntarily when the camp counselor agreed to take on the 
job.  Care-taking responsibility thus can arise out of the more general norm of promise 
keeping.  Adoption, at least initially, likely falls into this category.  Prior to the formation 
of a relationship with the child, what grounds the adoptive parent’s parental 
responsibilities is their agreement to do so.26  However, once a parent-child relationship 
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has formed, the relationship itself is likely the overriding source of the parental 
responsibility, rather than the initial agreement to parent.27 
Within the context of gamete provision, gamete providers whose agreement 
includes involvement in the lives of their biological offspring have some care-taking 
responsibility arising from the agreement.  This need not be parental, and many times 
these relations are compared to that of an aunt, uncle, or close family friend. 
2.3 Non-voluntary Cases 
It also seems plausible that care-taking responsibility can arise without blame or 
voluntary agreement; familial obligation fits into this category.  Many philosophers think 
that individuals have responsibilities towards parents, grandparents and siblings despite 
not voluntarily agreeing to these responsibilities or acquiring these responsibilities 
because of some blameworthy act.  Common justifications given for the existence of 
these responsibilities include gratitude and friendship.28   However, neither of these 
accounts seem to support responsibilities for gamete providers towards their biological 
offspring. 
For instance, both the gratitude and friendship accounts of familial obligations 
have their basis in past sacrifice.29  Roughly speaking, the argument is that obligations of 
either debt or gratitude (depending on the form of the argument) arise as a consequence 
of the sacrifices made by family members that promote the beneficiary’s wellbeing.  The 
case of children and parents is paradigmatic of this kind of obligation.  Since parents 
make many sacrifices, like time and money, to promote their children’s wellbeing, by 
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some principle of reciprocity children in turn have an obligation to help their parents.  
However, in case of gamete provision, there is no sacrifice made by biological offspring 
that gives rise to debt or gratitude.   
Another account of familial obligations, offered by Diane Jeske, suggests that it is 
the intimate relationships that form amongst family members that gives rise to special 
obligations.30  Under this view, even if the intimate relationships that develop are not 
entirely voluntary (e.g. children do not choose their parents or siblings), it is these 
relationships that ground special responsibilities to family members, and not mere genetic 
relatedness.31  Since gamete providers generally do not have intimate relationships with 
their biological offspring, this account also fails to establish that gamete providers have 
special care-taking responsibilities towards their biological offspring. 
 Care-taking responsibilities also sometimes arise non-voluntarily as a 
consequence of the general duty of beneficence.  Many have argued that beneficence 
creates a responsibility to help others in an emergency when doing so poses little or no 
threat one’s own wellbeing.32  Consider the survivor of an airplane accident who finds 
herself on a desert island alone with an infant survivor.  Assuming that it would not put 
her wellbeing in peril, intuitively she has some care-taking responsibility towards the 
infant.  There may be cases in which the duty of beneficence requires gamete providers to 
care for their biological offspring.  However, in so far as this duty arises from general 
beneficence, it applies only accidentally to gamete providers.  For instance, if the crash 
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survivor happened to be the infant’s progenitor by means of gamete provision, then the 
gamete provider would have some care-taking responsibility, but only accidentally.  
There is nothing in virtue of being the infant’s progenitor that explains this responsibility.  
Alternatively, we could imagine a scenario in which, along with the infant, there are two 
adult survivors: the gamete provider and an unrelated party.  If gamete providers have a 
special obligation to care for their biological offspring, then the provider would, all other 
things being equal, have a stronger obligation to care for the child than the stranger; it is 
this kind of special obligation that I believe exists. 
In sum, though familial obligations give rise to non-voluntary care-taking 
responsibilities, none of the major accounts I have considered (gratitude, friendship, and 
intimate relationships) support the conclusion that gamete providers have special 
responsibilities towards their biological offspring.  Additionally, though the general duty 
of beneficence sometimes give rise to a non-voluntary responsibility to care for others, it 
does not give rise to a special responsibilities for gamete providers to care for their 
biological offspring. 
2.4 Quasi-voluntary cases 
However, there is another kind of case in which individuals can acquire care-
taking responsibility despite not taking on this responsibility voluntarily or acting in a 
blameworthy manner.  Consider a person who agrees to look after a friend’s child until 
six in the afternoon, but instead of returning to pick up the child, the friend goes out to a 
movie that ends at midnight.  Though the babysitter promised to take care of the child 
only for the afternoon, intuitively it would seem wrong for the babysitter to put the child 
out or stop watching the child after the friend fails to return at the agreed upon time.  In 
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this case it seems that the babysitter has a responsibility to care for the child despite not 
acting wrongly or explicitly entering into an agreement to take care of the child until 
midnight.  This case is different from the non-voluntary cases because, unlike in those 
cases, some voluntary action is required on the part of the agent for the responsibility to 
exist.  Part of what gives force to the friend’s responsibility to continue to safeguard the 
child’s wellbeing is that he voluntarily agreed to babysit.33 
Someone may object, saying that the babysitter has no special obligation towards 
the child because any able person would be obliged to temporarily care for an abandoned 
child.  After the time has elapsed, the babysitter has the same care-taking responsibility as 
any individual who comes across the abandoned child.  What is at work here is not a 
special obligation, but some manifestation of the general duty of beneficence, as 
highlighted in the desert island case.   
I am inclined to agree that individuals to whom it would pose no extreme hardship 
have a general responsibility to temporarily care for abandoned children (again, as in the 
desert island case) but in this case it seems that the babysitter has a stronger obligation 
that a mere stranger would to care for the child.  It seems worse to abandon a child one is 
babysitting because her parent failed to show up than to fail to help just any abandoned 
child.  To make this special responsibility more apparent, consider more closely the 
difference in responsibility involved in a case involving a stranger.  Imagine that at a 
shopping centre person A spots a distressed child who appears lost.  Person A starts 
walking towards the child, but soon notices another shopper stop, speak to the child, and 
then lead the child towards a shopping centre employee.  At this point it seems perfectly 
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reasonable for person A to continue on with their day, without having to press further to 
ensure the wellbeing of the lost child.  In this circumstance it seems that the intervention 
of an unknown stranger relieves person A of her care-taking responsibility towards the 
lost child.  However, in the babysitting case, the intervention of a stranger does not seem 
sufficient.  If the babysitter were to place the child in the care of a complete stranger after 
the child’s parent failed to return, we would find this behavior negligent.  We expect the 
babysitter to exercise some diligence by placing the child in the care of someone he has 
reason to believe will be trustworthy if he is not able to care for the child until the parent 
returns. This higher burden of diligence demonstrates that if the parent fails to return on 
time, the babysitter’s responsibility is not equivalent to that merely arising from the 
general duty of beneficence.  
 The babysitting example shows that individuals can acquire special care-taking 
responsibilities even when they do not consent to these responsibilities or act in a 
blameworthy manner.  This means that care-taking responsibilities are not constrained to 
restitution cases, and so the satisfaction of pre-provision responsibilities need not 
preclude post-provision responsibilities.  If gamete provision is relevantly similar to the 
babysitting case, then it is possible for gamete providers to have care-taking 
responsibilities even when they have taken great care in choosing the recipients of their 
gametes.  Next I will discuss why quasi-voluntary care-taking responsibilities arise in 
gamete provision cases. 
3. Gamete Provision and Quasi-Voluntary Care-Taking Responsibilities  
 Quasi-voluntary care-taking responsibilities arise whenever individuals have care-
taking responsibilities as a result of a freely chosen action, despite not agreeing to take on 
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care-taking responsibility or acting in a blameworthy manner.  As discussed above, 
continuing to babysit a child after the agreed upon pickup time has elapsed is one 
example, but there are others.  For instance, a person may become responsible for getting 
an inebriated friend home safely after a night of drinking simply by virtue of agreeing to 
go out with the friend.  After repeated instances of excessive drinking, an individual may 
decline to go out with the friend because she “doesn’t want to be the responsible one at 
the end of the night”.  Similarly, people sometimes avoid going on outings with people 
known to cause trouble because they “don’t want to get roped in” if things go awry, even 
if they do not actively participate in the troublemaking themselves.   Though there may 
not be guilt by association, these intuitive responses support the claim that there can be 
care-taking “responsibilities by association”.  These arise in circumstances where that 
activity itself is not blameworthy (like going for a drink after class) and no agreement 
was made beforehand to be responsible.   
 In this section, I argue that gamete provision for reproductive purposes is the kind 
of activity that gives rise to quasi-voluntary responsibilities.  My objective is not to 
provide a complete list of necessary and sufficient conditions for this kind of 
responsibility, but merely to show that gamete provision is an activity in which surely 
responsibilities arise.  In this vein, my strategy is to provide a set of strong sufficient 
conditions for quasi-voluntary responsibilities while remaining agnostic as to whether 
any subset of these conditions is itself necessary or sufficient.  The position I defend is 
similar to views put forward by Archard, Fuscaldo, Nelson, Porter, and Weinberg.  The 
key feature that differentiates my view from theirs is that the strong sufficient criteria I 
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propose for quasi-voluntary responsibilities better resolve certain theoretical challenges 
about causal responsibility put forward by Bayne, or so I argue.   
This section proceeds in three main parts.  First, in order to establish its 
plausibility, I show that the concept of quasi-voluntary responsibility is consistent with 
our general intuitions about care-taking responsibility in less technologically involved 
cases of reproduction than gamete provision.  I then discuss the objections Bayne raises 
to extending similar kinds of responsibility to the gamete provision case.  Finally, I 
demonstrate why attempts made by other authors to overcome this objection do not 
succeed, and why my view offers a more promising solution.  
3.1 Quasi-Voluntary responsibility and reproduction  
The idea that procreators acquire non-voluntary obligations as a result of their 
blameless reproductive activities is by no means a novel position.  There is near universal 
acceptance34 that unintending fathers in one-night-stand cases have an obligation to help 
support their biological offspring regardless of the measures taken to prevent a pregnancy 
from occurring.  For instance, the extremely unlikely possibility that multiple methods of 
birth control will fail (including sometimes even vasectomies and tubal ligation) seems to 
have little impact on the responsibility acquired by the male progenitor.  Since consensual 
sexual activity is not blameworthy, and use of highly reliable birth control seems far from 
negligent, it seems that neither negligence nor blame are necessary for responsibility in 
reproduction cases.  If anything it seems that our general intuitions are that merely being 
                                                 
34
 One notable exception is Elizabeth Brake. See Brake, E. “Fatherhood and Child Support: Do Men Have a 
Right to Choose?”. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22.1 (2005): 55–73. 
26 
 
 
 
a willing35 participant in sexual activity is sufficient for care-taking responsibility in these 
kinds of cases. 
 As noted by various authors, intuitions about the impermissibility of child 
abandonment by one or both genetic parents in cases where pregnancies arise 
unintentionally is the major counter-example to intentionalist36 and voluntarist37 accounts 
of parenthood, which downplay or deny the moral significance of engaging in consensual 
sexual activity.38  For instance, Fuscaldo states, “if parental obligations 
are determined according to intent then why do we pursue and label ‘recalcitrant’ men 
who never intended to be fathers and who refuse to pay child support?”39  Similarly, 
Weinberg’s argument that gamete providers have parental responsibilities rests largely on 
the analogy she draws between procreation via gamete provision and procreation that 
occurs unintentionally as a result of one-night-stands.40  Nelson also draws on an analogy 
to one-night-stands when defending his causal account of parenthood in gestational 
surrogacy.41  Underlying all these arguments is the view that individuals can have care-
taking responsibility (in this case of the parental variety) despite not acting wrongly, nor 
intending or volunteering to take on that responsibility.  Furthermore, a feature shared by 
all of these authors is that individuals acquire parental responsibility only when they act 
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freely, and thus no care-taking responsibility arises for individuals who have their 
gametes stolen for example.42 These arguments then fit into what I have categorized as 
quasi-voluntary caretaking responsibility because the relevant responsibilities occur 
despite the absence of wrongdoing or voluntary commitment and as a consequence of a 
freely chosen action.   
 Despite the requirement for voluntary action, the above accounts are often called 
“causal accounts”43 of (care-taking) responsibility because what grounds individuals’ 
special responsibility is the kind of causal role they play in bringing about a certain state 
of affairs (the existence of a child), regardless of their intentions or the blameworthiness 
of their actions.  As Archard puts it, “the central idea motivating the causal account is that 
it is reasonable to hold liable for the provision of care those who have brought it about 
that there is a child in need of such care.”44  However, because of the need for voluntary 
action, these views are better described as ‘quasi-voluntary’ accounts of responsibility 
than simply ‘causal’ accounts of responsibility, because the latter term implies that 
simply being part of the causal chain is sufficient for care-taking responsibility.  
Though on the face of it, the central motivating idea espoused by Archard might 
seem straightforward, an important question it raises is what activities constitute 
‘bringing about a child’ in the manner in which care-taking responsibilities arise. Upon 
reflection, individuals are not responsible for all the consequences of their voluntary 
actions.  On this point, Bayne argues that there is no non-arbitrary way to differentiate 
between causally involved individuals who acquire responsibility and those who do not.  
Though Bayne’s arguments are about difficulties with causal accounts of parenthood, 
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they equally apply to care-taking responsibility in general.  In the following sub-section I 
will outline Bayne’s arguments and explain why I do not think they are as devastating as 
he takes them to be for the view defended by Archard and others.  However, I do think 
his arguments demonstrate the need for a more refined view than has yet been provided, 
and the account of quasi-voluntary responsibility I provide is intended to fill that gap.  
3.2 Bayne’s Criticism of Causal Views 
 Bayne divides causal45 accounts into two broad categories: “but-for” causation 
and “cause-who” causation.  The concept of “but-for” causation is that “X causes Y if Y 
wouldn’t have happened but for X”.  Bayne’s criticism of but-for causation is that it is 
overly broad for determining parenthood.  For instance, an individual’s parents, and great 
grandparents, the medical team and many other individuals could all be but-for causes for 
a particular child yet we not think any of them are parents.  The second way to interpret 
causation is the “cause-who” sense.  Under this view, gamete providers have parental 
responsibilities because they are the cause that establishes the identity of the child.  For 
instance, imagine X has a child using gametes provided from Y.  Though it may be true 
that X would have still had a child from other provided gametes if Y had not provided her 
gametes, it would not have been the same child.  The particular identity of the child is 
thus in part determined by Y, and so the causal theorist might attribute Y care-taking 
responsibilities on this basis.  However, Bayne also rejects this view because it is still 
overly broad.46  A gamete provider’s genetic ancestors all are cause-who causes, yet we 
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do not consider them parents.  In fact, any individual whose actions influence the specific 
gametes that come together to from a zygote satisfies the definition of a “cause-who”.  
This includes individuals who seem to be only tangentially involved in a particular act of 
reproduction, and who may not even be aware that they are exercising any influence over 
the creation of a future person. For instance, a construction worker controlling the flow of 
traffic on the route travelled by a sperm provider to the sperm bank will influence the 
exact time the provider arrives at the clinic (say five minutes late for an appointment that 
he would have otherwise been on time for), which influences the exact time the provider 
makes his deposit, which in turn determines the set of possible gametes available to form 
a zygote.  In this circumstance the construction worker may well be essential in 
determining the specific identity of the future child; however, it seems absurd to attribute 
any special care-taking responsibilities to the worker on this basis.   
From this analysis Bayne concludes that care-taking responsibility cannot be 
attributed to gamete providers on the basis of causation because both of its plausible 
interpretations are over-inclusive.  Without some additional principle, excluding 
individuals such as grandparents and traffic controllers while including gamete providers 
seems arbitrary.   
However, though Bayne’s criticism of causal accounts of parenthood highlights 
an important theoretical difficulty with the view, by attributing the problem of over-
inclusiveness to authors who defend the causal view, he straw-mans their position.  For 
instance, though Bayne attributes the problem of over-inclusiveness arising from “but-
for” causation to Nelson, Nelson himself notes that this account of causation is “clearly 
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too weak”47 and agrees that some other principle that has eluded articulation and/or 
general acceptance must be at work.  Lacking a strong principled account, Nelson instead 
relies on our everyday intuitions about causal responsibility and extends them to gamete 
provision.48  As a more concrete suggestion, Nelson points to causal proximity and joint 
sufficiency as a combination of features that support including gamete providers amongst 
the causal actors who acquire responsibilities.49   
As a brief aside, it is worth noting that this attempt to provide criteria in addition 
to “but-for” causation is not strong enough to establish responsibility in gamete provision 
cases.  Nelson is unclear about what he means by ‘proximity’, though he seems to 
suggest that an agent is a morally relevant proximate cause if his free action occurred 
close to the terminus of the causal chain, and were part of a set of jointly sufficient 
conditions for the outcome in question.50  This, however, leads to a problem of 
vagueness: it is unclear what degree of proximity is necessary for responsibility to arise. 
Causal proximity is a concept that has garnered much discussion in the legal literature as 
a means of delineating mere “but-for” causal actors from those with legal responsibility, 
but it is fraught with theoretical challenges.51 Since there is no settled account of 
proximate causality, Nelson is offering an explanation of the obscure by means of the 
more obscure.  Furthermore, procedures like IVF and the ‘gate-keeper’ role played by 
fertility clinics involve many intervening agents that are necessary for the creation of a 
new life, but operate outside of the direct influence of gamete providers.  This fact 
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challenges the causal proximity of gamete providers because most accounts of causal 
proximity treat the presence of necessary and independently acting interveners as 
exclusionary or mitigating factors for antecedently occurring causes.52 Though a provider 
who gives sperm directly to a friend who then impregnates herself with it unaided might 
be a proximate cause, most gamete provision53 involves a third party that exercises 
control over the gametes and decides whether to create a new life.54  Views similar to 
Nelson have more recently been defended by Lindsey Porter and David Archard, though 
they are equally vague in providing clear principles for distinguishing mere causes from 
morally relevant causes.55   
Given that the view Bayne attacks is not held by the individuals who defend 
causal views of responsibility56, he does not show that they rely on a theory that is overly 
broad. However, Bayne does demonstrate that developing principles to distinguish mere 
causal actors from causal actors who also acquire care-taking responsibility is important 
for causal views to be taken seriously.  My view, endorsing quasi-voluntary 
responsibilities, is a variation on what have been called causal views, and for it to 
plausible it must also provide a means for appropriately delineating morally relevant 
causal actors.  
Part of why additional principles are necessary is that, though we have strong 
intuitions about care-taking responsibilities in one-night-stand cases, there are important 
disanalogies between that case and gamete provisions that make it unclear whether the 
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intuitions about the former equally apply to the latter.  For instance, with gamete 
provision, the process is driven by an individual or individuals who wish to parent a 
child, and so someone might think that responsibility to care for any children who result 
from this process lies solely with the intending parent(s).  Without clearer criteria for 
responsibility, there is plenty of room for disagreement about whether gamete providers 
are the kind of causal actors who acquire responsibilities. 
In the literature there have been two main attempts at developing refined 
principles for showing more conclusively that gamete providers acquire care-taking 
responsibility for their biological offspring.  Giuliana Fuscaldo defends a view that she 
calls “Candidate Parenthood”, while Rivka Weinberg defends the “Hazmat” approach to 
reproductive responsibility.  In the next two subsections, I will examine both these views 
and show that neither is strong enough to establish that gamete providers acquire care-
taking responsibility.  In particular, I will argue that the “Candidate Parenthood” view 
suffers from the problem of over-inclusiveness highlighted by Bayne, and that the 
“Hazmat” view either fails to include gamete providers or suffers from the problem of 
over-inclusiveness.  Following this discussion, I will then present my own account of 
how quasi-voluntary responsibilities arise. 
3.3 Fuscaldo’s View 
Fuscaldo’s account, called “Candidate Parenthood”, relies on the addition of two 
limiting conditions, freedom and foreseeability, that when present together differentiate 
mere members of a causal chain that results in a new life from people who acquire care-
taking responsibility.  Her account stems from a discussion of what she calls ‘the 
standard account’ of moral responsibility, which she argues employs these two criteria.   
33 
 
 
 
First, according to the standard account of moral responsibility, as described by 
Fuscaldo, for an individual to have moral responsibility for the outcome of an action, the 
action itself must have been freely chosen.  Granting that the concept of freedom itself 
requires a lengthy treatment, Fuscaldo stipulates that for the purpose of her discussion a 
free act is one in which either the actor could have acted differently or, in the case where 
a certain action is unavoidable, the actor owns and reflectively endorses the action taken.  
In the case of gamete provision, Fuscaldo specifies that “in the absence of force, 
begetting or donating gametes are usually actions free enough to generate moral 
accountability”.57  Second, Fuscaldo states that the standard account of moral 
responsibility requires that the outcome of the action be reasonably foreseeable. She takes 
reasonably foreseeable consequences to mean that “a reasonable person would have 
reason to expect that they might occur”.58  Fuscaldo then stipulates that, in the context of 
procreation, when individuals meet these two criteria, they acquire parental 
responsibilities59 for the children that result from their actions.60          
One advantage of Fuscaldo’s criteria is that they avoid including as morally 
responsible individuals who haphazardly become part of a causal chain, while still 
holding individuals who freely partake in actions with foreseeable injurious consequences 
morally responsible for the outcome of their actions.  For instance, a person who 
accidentally triggers a bomb in a classroom by flicking a sabotaged light switch avoids 
responsibility while the person who set the trap does not.  This is because under normal 
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circumstances, it is not reasonable to expect light switches in classrooms to trigger 
bombs.  Despite the fact that the bomber did not flick the switch herself, the bomber is 
correctly held responsible on this account because it is reasonable under normal 
circumstances to expect someone to flick a classroom light switch.  Note that the 
intentions of the bomber are irrelevant.  Even if the bomber did not intend anyone to get 
hurt, since a reasonable person would foresee injury as a potential consequence, she 
would be responsible for any injury that arises.   
In the case of gamete provision, the criteria offered by Fuscaldo are clearly met.  
In general, gamete provision is done without coercion or force and the creation of a new 
person in need of care is a foreseeable consequence of the provision. On Fuscaldo’s 
account then, gamete providers have care-taking responsibilities towards the vulnerable 
beings they help bring into existence.   
However, there are still reasons why someone might reject Fuscaldo’s argument.  
First, it is clearly foreseeable that one’s biological offspring may themselves procreate.  
Since an individual’s children’s progeny are a foreseeable consequence of procreation, 
we end up with the same problem of overbroadness that Bayne highlights.  Fuscaldo’s 
criteria give us no more reason to hold gamete providers responsible for their biological 
offspring than to hold the gamete providers’ parents, grandparents, etc. responsible. Since 
Fuscaldo’s “foresight” criterion cannot draw the line in the causal chain at gamete 
providers, it seems arbitrary on her view to exclude gamete providers’ ancestors.  
Secondly, there are many circumstances in which we do not want to hold individuals who 
meet Fuscaldo’s criteria responsible for the outcomes of their actions.  For instance, 
being mugged is a foreseeable consequence of walking home alone late at night, yet it 
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seems perverse to attribute to victims of a mugging responsibilities arising from being 
robbed.61  
Thus, though Fuscaldo’s criteria exclude individuals who haphazardly become 
part of a causal chain, her view is still overly inclusive, giving room for skepticism about 
whether gamete providers should be included as individuals with care-taking 
responsibilities towards their biological offspring.  I think it is likely that a full picture of 
causal care-taking responsibility would include both of Fuscaldo’s criteria, but as it 
stands the account needs further refinement.  Next let me consider Weinberg’s view. 
3.4 Weinberg’s View 
Weinberg offers what she calls the “hazmat theory” of why gamete providers 
acquire parental responsibilities.  On this view, individuals who exercise control over 
hazardous material are liable for the harms caused by that hazardous material regardless 
of the precautions they take.  Her view relies on something similar to the legal concept of 
“strict liability”, meaning liability without fault62, or to use Card’s terminology, care-
taking responsibility without credit-taking responsibility. Since the consequences of 
improper gamete use can result in great harms, Weinberg thinks it is appropriate to 
consider them hazardous materials.  Weinberg motivates the hazmat approach to gametes 
by arguing that it best explains why we think men in one-night-stand situations acquire 
care-taking responsibility.63  Though these men might take precautions and do not want 
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to procreate, since they freely exercise control over hazardous material (sperm) they are 
responsible even if we do not consider their actions blameworthy.   
The analogy Weinberg uses to support her argument is the case of an individual 
who keeps a caged pet lion.  Even if the owner takes great precautions to keep the lion 
restrained, the owner still acquires care-taking responsibility if the lion escapes and 
harms someone.  Furthermore, if the lion were to escape and the owner was able, the 
owner would have the responsibility to prevent the harm before it arose.  Since gamete 
usage can result in great harm, gamete providers have care-taking responsibilities towards 
their biological offspring to ensure that these harms do not arise.  According to Weinberg 
then, gamete providers are required to care for their biological offspring in order to 
minimize the harms they might otherwise suffer as a consequence.  It is this potential for 
harm that gives rise to gamete providers’ parental responsibilities.64 
 Weinberg’s argument is attractive for a few reasons.  First, the argument 
distinguishes (using different terminology) care-taking responsibility from credit-taking 
responsibility.  Though the lion owner takes the appropriate precautions and so is 
blameless, she still has care-taking responsibilities.  This is in keeping with the previous 
discussion of how non-voluntary care-taking responsibilities can arise in circumstances 
other than resitution cases. Also, the hazmat theory points to vulnerability and potential 
harm to innocents as important factors that generate care-taking responsibility.   
 Despite its attractive features, a problem that looms large for the Hazmat account 
is whether it is plausible to consider gametes hazardous material.  Weinberg does not 
provide specific criteria for what makes a material hazardous, but here I will consider 
what I take to be two plausible accounts, and will show that on neither would gametes 
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count as hazardous.  First, we could think that what makes material hazardous is that 
slight carelessness poses a high likelihood of severe harm to others. Call this the volatility 
view.  Radioactive materials would be an example of this kind of hazardous material 
since failing to keep these substances properly contained poses a risk to others that is 
high and difficult to avoid.  Gametes certainly do not fit into this category.  Literally 
billions upon billions of gametes are regularly released with relatively low incidents of 
harm innocent people.  Gametes become potentially hazardous to innocents in the manner 
described by Weinberg only when used in very specific and intentional ways – i.e. when 
they are brought into contact with other gametes.  Furthermore, if gametes meet the 
‘volatility’ threshold, then it is unclear why things like knives do not, since they also have 
the potential to cause severe harm when used in particular ways.  However, ascribing 
strict liability to individuals who exercise control of things like knives seems implausibly 
over-inclusive, at least in normal circumstances.  For instance, we do not hold the owner 
of a knife store liable if a criminal steals a knife and harms someone with it.   
Alternatively, it might be that what makes something a hazardous material is that 
it poses a highly unusual or novel risk of severe harm, even if the risk itself is not terribly 
high.  Here an example would be an undocumented and rare side-effect of a prescription 
drug.  However, since the vast majority of people possess gametes and are fully aware of 
the potential consequences of their use, there is nothing unusual about the risk they pose.   
Another way to understand Weinberg’s argument might be that it is certain 
activities done with gametes that meets the hazard threshold rather than the gametes 
themselves.  Without some further constraints however, this seems to collapse into a 
causal view similar to Fuscaldo’s.  What is doing the work in this reading of ‘hazardous’ 
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is not some special feature of gametes, but the freely chosen activity that has foreseeably 
weighty consequences.  In the absence of further constraints, this ‘hazardous action’ view 
will suffer from the same over-inclusion problems as Fuscaldo’s account.  
 Though both Weinberg and Fuscaldo highlight important features in addition to 
mere causation that are helpful in delineating individuals who are merely part of the 
causal chain from individuals who also acquire care-taking responsibilities, neither 
argument is strong enough to show conclusively that a conscientious gamete provider has 
care-taking responsibilities towards her biological offspring.  In Fuscaldo’s case, since 
the net is cast too wide, picking out gamete providers as individuals with responsibilities 
seems arbitrary, while including everyone who satisfies her criteria seems too counter-
intuitive to be plausible.  In Weinberg’s case, the concept of hazardous material is ill-
defined so that even if we accept strict liability in some cases, it seems unclear why we 
should accept it in the gamete provider case.  Furthermore, even after providing plausible 
criteria for identifying hazardous materials, it still seems that there are good reasons to 
exclude gametes and therefore reject Weinberg’s view as a basis for ascribing care-taking 
responsibilities to gamete providers.   
 So far I have shown that there are strong reasons to reject previous accounts of 
care-taking responsibilities for gamete providers.  In the next section I will attempt to 
overcome the shortcomings of these accounts by providing a positive argument for why 
gamete providers have quasi-voluntary credit-taking obligations.  I this this the “danger 
to innocents” account.   
3.5 Danger To Innocents Account 
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 As has been shown, one of the major problems that causal accounts of care-taking 
responsibility face is the charge of arbitrariness.  This is because causal theories tend to 
be over-broad.  This over-breadth results in an absence of principled ways for delineating 
responsible members of the causal chain from non-responsible ones, and hence the 
skeptic can always just disagree with where the line is drawn.  In order to skirt this 
Sorities-like paradox, my goal is intentionally to develop an account of quasi-voluntary 
responsibilities that is too narrow to capture all cases where we think these 
responsibilities arise, but broad enough to show that all gamete providers do in fact have 
care-taking responsibilities towards their biological offspring.  The idea is that if an 
overly restrictive set of criteria shows that gamete providers have care-taking 
responsibilities, then any reasonably restrictive account of must as well.  The account 
provided here will therefore exclude many individuals whom we might think have quasi-
voluntary care-taking responsibilities, but this is not a defect since the criteria are overly 
narrow by design.  The basis of my narrow account is that making innocent individuals 
vulnerable to great harm gives rise to care-taking responsibilities. 
 I think that part of the appeal of Weinberg’s hazmat theory lies in the intuition 
that imposing risk on others carries with it responsibilities.  Indeed, the fact that 
reproduction renders a person vulnerable to harm is one of the justifications traditionally 
offered in defence of the legal obligation procreators have in common-law to care for 
their offspring.  Roughly speaking, the idea is that since the act of procreation puts an 
individual who did not consent to being put in harm’s way (the resultant child) at risk of 
tremendous suffering, those individuals whose actions place the child in that precarious 
position have an obligation to support the child through the period of their vulnerability.  
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Invoking the 17th-century jurist Samuel von Pufendorf, Sir William Blackstone, in the 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, says:  
 “The [legal] duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of 
their children is a principle of natural law; an obligation, says 
Pufendorf, laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own 
proper act, in bringing them into the world : for they would be in the 
highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave the children 
life, that they might afterwards see them perish. By begetting them 
therefore they have entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavour, as 
far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be 
supported and preserved. And thus the children will have a perfect 
[legal] right of receiving maintenance from their parents[.]”65 
 
 Since Blackstone’s Commentaries, reproduction has become much more complex 
and the properties that define a child’s begetters and parents are likely not as clear now as 
they would have been in the minds of 18th-century legal theorists.  However, the general 
view that placing non-consenting individuals in harm’s way gives rise to special 
obligations to reduce that harm still carries much weight.  As stated earlier, since 
causation simpliciter is insufficient for settling precisely who acquires these 
responsibilities, the question of which individuals are the morally relevant causes that 
have this care-taking responsibility is not clear.  The overly-narrow criterion I propose is 
that individuals acquire care-taking responsibilities when they freely and intentionally66 
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place or help others place non-consenting innocents at risk of great harm.  While there 
are likely many cases in which quasi-voluntary care-taking responsibilities arise in the 
absence of this criterion being met, it seems implausible that an individual could meet 
this criterion and not have any care-taking responsibilities. 
 This principle makes sense of the babysitting example.  Though the friend only 
agreed to babysit up until a certain time, ignoring the child or kicking the child out would 
place that child, through no fault of her own, at risk of great harm.  This would require 
the babysitter to mitigate this new harm by taking care of the child again, making simply 
ignoring her or kicking her out impermissible.  Note that while the babysitter cannot 
place the child in harm’s way, he does not need to care for the child himself.  The 
babysitter could for example, take the child to a trusted family member, or place the child 
in the care of the state (in an extreme case).  The point is that the responsibility to ensure 
the child is cared for does not simply end once the contract with the parent ends if the 
parent has not returned at the agreed-upon time. 
 Admittedly, it is difficult to come up with non-reproductive cases where this 
narrow criterion is met, and where blame, and hence restitution, does not arise.  This is 
because in most cases it is morally impermissible to place unconsenting innocent people 
at risk of harm.  Despite the dearth of examples, I think my criterion is reasonable since it 
seems highly counterintuitive that individuals should be able to place others at risk 
without any moral consequences. In the gamete provision case, the provider is generally 
aware that gamete recipients seek the gametes for the creation of a person and that this 
nascent person is in an extreme state of need.  It seems reasonable then that the gamete 
                                                                                                                                                 
as a victim.  By contrast, a willing gamete provider whose genetic material is used to create a child is not a 
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provider bears some care-taking responsibility because of the state of need that the 
gamete provider knowingly helps create.   
As a possible objection to this modified argument, one could imagine a gamete 
agency stating that provided gametes would be used for either research or reproductive 
purposes.  In this circumstance, because the gamete provider does not know the intention 
of the gamete bank with respect to a particular provision of gametes, if the probability 
that the gametes will be used for reproduction falls below some threshold of 
foreseeability then it appears as though the gamete provider escapes responsibility.  This 
conclusion seems to follow because in this circumstance the criteria for the acquisition of 
moral responsibility presented above are not satisfied: we might think that the gamete 
provider only intended his gamete to be used for research purposes.  However, this 
counterexample rests on an ambiguity in the use of disjunctions.  Upon reflection it 
seems that the gamete provider actually agrees to support both possible intentions the 
gamete bank might have and therefore acquires responsibility if the gametes are used to 
produce a child.   
Consider a logician parent who gives a child fifteen dollars with the condition that 
the money must be used either for groceries or for a movie.  The child goes to a movie 
instead of buying groceries and, upon returning home, is punished for wasting the money 
on entertainment.  The child protests, claiming that the parent had granted permission to 
spend the money on a movie.  The logician parent explains that permission was actually 
given to spend the money on groceries and, by the rule of disjunction introduction (if A is 
true, so is AvB regardless of the content of B), stating that the money could be spent 
either on groceries or a movie was therefore true.  However, this is not what is normally 
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meant when permission is given for multiple uses of an item.  As this example 
demonstrates, normally when permission is given in the form of a disjunction, the 
permission-granter assents to all potential options presented.  In the gamete provider 
transaction above, the bank is asking ‘can we use the gametes for research?’ and ‘can we 
use the gametes for reproduction?’ and by providing gametes, the gamete provider is 
agreeing to support whichever intended use is adopted by the gamete bank.  Though it 
may be true that neither the bank nor the gamete provider knows what the intended use of 
the sperm will be at the time of deposit, by giving advanced permission for both, the 
gamete provider is stating a willingness to freely support whichever intended use the 
bank adopts, including the production of children, and thus is responsible for any 
reproductive consequences. 
Another possible criticism of this argument for gamete provider responsibility is 
that it casts the net too wide and includes the members of the medical team involved in 
the procedure as agents who acquire moral responsibility for the resulting children.  The 
medical team acts freely, and a child is the intended consequence of the procedure.  The 
medical professionals thus clearly meet the criteria presented above.  Though the 
inclusion of medical practitioners as individuals who inherit responsibilities might be 
considered a criticism, I am willing to accept this consequence because it appears to be 
consistent with the general principles of moral responsibility developed so far.  Thus, 
according to the criteria I have presented, members of the medical team do have care-
taking responsibilities towards the children they help conceive.  I would also like to note 
that this consequence arises for Fuscaldo’s position as well because the two criteria she 
develops are also satisfied by health care professionals.  In her paper Fuscaldo responds 
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to this possibility by claiming that “no one is suggesting that IVF scientists or clinicians 
have duties for all the children they help to bring about”.67  This may be an accurate 
representation of Fuscaldo’s view, but it does not explain why these individuals are to be 
excepted from responsibility, especially give the criteria the she herself endorses.  
Though it may be unsettling, accepting that reproductive professionals acquire duties for 
the children they help bring about is consistent both with the criteria for moral 
responsibility that Fuscaldo takes as uncontroversial, and the account I have presented 
above.  I think that the resistance to this conclusion arises in part because people may 
think that the responsibilities acquired would be parental.  In a later chapter, I will 
develop an account of what these responsibilities amount that shows they are not 
parental.  Hopefully, this will at least partially alleviate some of the concerns that 
individuals may have with an account that ascribes care-taking responsibilities to both 
gamete providers and the medical team.   
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have shown that gamete providers acquire quasi-voluntary care-
taking responsibility for any children that result from their voluntary and intentional 
actions.  First, I demonstrated that care-taking responsibility can arise independently of 
credit-taking responsibility.  This means that even where gamete provision is not 
negligent, one could still have care-taking responsibilities.  I then showed that indeed, 
even in the absence of negligence, individuals do acquire care-taking responsibilities.  
Though my justification for care-taking responsibility is similar to accounts that have 
been put forward by other authors, it avoids the problem of over-breadth, and thus avoids 
the charge of arbitrariness implied by Bayne in his criticism of causal views.  So far I 
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have said little about what the content of these care-taking responsibilities is, except that 
they are not necessarily parental responsibilities.  In chapter three, I argue that their 
content is decidedly not parental.  However, before turning to that issue, in the following 
chapter I will look at whether gamete providers can transfer their responsibilities to 
others. 
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Chapter 2: Transfer and Delegation 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I argued that gamete providers acquire care-taking 
responsibilities towards their biological offspring.  This conclusion alone does not 
establish that gamete providers are bound to fulfill these responsibilities themselves, for 
as many authors have suggested68, any care-taking responsibilities that might arise could 
be transferred to others.  According to this view, gamete provision can be treated like 
adoption, whereby the responsibility to care for a child is transferred to other willing 
individuals.  In this chapter, I argue that despite its seeming plausibility, gamete providers 
cannot transfer their care-taking responsibility to others.  In making this argument I 
accept that gamete provision and adoption can be relevantly similar, and argue that in 
cases where the relevant similarities obtain, neither adoptive parents nor gamete 
providers can completely alienate their responsibilities. However, I will show that not all 
cases of adoption are like this.  In order to assuage any early concerns, I want to 
emphasise that although in my view care-taking responsibilities in gamete provision 
cases are inalienable, these do not amount to parental responsibilities, as I will show in 
the following chapter.  
The conclusion I reach about the impermissibility of transferring responsibility is 
similar to that argued for by Archard69 and Porter70, but I augment their account in two 
important ways.  First, I show why the specific arguments made by other authors in 
favour of the transferability of responsibility in gamete provision cases fail.  Second, I 
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provide a more complete account of the structure of the responsibilities that exist 
amongst the involved parties.   
 Despite the importance of the transferability of responsibility to a whole host of 
questions in applied ethics, the bioethics literature currently suffers from a lack of 
discussion about how we ought to think about this concept in general terms.  I will focus 
on the arguments presented in the literature on gamete provision, but will supplement 
them with concepts borrowed from contract law and what I take to be common-sense 
intuitions about forward-looking responsibility.71  In the first section, I will defend what I 
consider to be a plain language distinction between the transfer of responsibilities and the 
delegation of responsibilities.  In the second section, I will analyze the current debate in 
the gamete provision literature, and argue that distinctions drawn by Fuscaldo and 
Weinberg do not track this plain language distinction appropriately.  I will further argue, 
in part by appeal to related legal concepts, that gamete providers’ care-taking 
responsibilities can only be delegated, but not transferred.  In the third section I will 
address possible counter-examples to the schema I develop in the second section.  Most 
importantly, I will address the analogy to adoption that many authors appeal to when 
arguing that gamete providers can transfer their responsibilities to others.  I will argue 
that in some cases, adoptions are not as similar to gamete provision as many authors seem 
to assume.  I will further contend that in the cases that are suitably analogous, individuals 
who relinquish their biological offspring for adoption only delegate their responsibilities 
and do not transfer them. 
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at a future time.  For instance, on Sunday night a parent has a forward-looking responsibility to ensure that 
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1. Plain Language Delegation and Transfer 
 Delegating and transferring are two ways of assigning responsibilities to an 
individual that were, at least initially, possessed by another individual.  To illustrate what 
I take to be the common-sense distinction between the two, consider the following 
example.  Peter and Mary are both executive members of a student government; Peter is 
in charge of internal academic affairs and Mary is in charge of communication.  The 
student government meets in order to review the different portfolios, and everyone agrees 
that it would be better for the internal academic officer (Peter) to take over production of 
the weekly newsletter to members, allowing the communications officer (Mary) to focus 
on external communication. Peter then solicits a volunteer, Charlie, to produce the page 
layout for the October newsletter. 
 In this example, both a transfer and a delegation of responsibility have occurred.  
Using a plain-language description, we would say that the responsibility for producing 
the weekly newsletter was transferred from Mary to Peter, and the job of creating the 
page layout for the October issue was delegated to Charlie.  This is not just a semantic 
difference, for it reveals important underlying features of the structure of the 
responsibility in each case.  Following the reconfiguration of the responsibilities attached 
to each portfolio, we do not think that Mary has any responsibility to ensure that the 
weekly newsletter gets produced.  For instance, if Peter shirks his responsibility and fails 
to produce the newsletter, we do not think that Mary should be blamed, nor do we think 
that she has any obligation to ensure that the newsletter gets produced.  By contrast, we 
think that Peter might be to blame if Charlie fails to produce the page layout – for 
example, if there was good reason to distrust Charlie’s commitment to the task and more 
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competent volunteers were available.   However, regardless of whether Peter is to blame, 
if Charlie does not complete the task, then we do think that Peter has a responsibility to 
either complete the page layout himself or find someone else to do it on his behalf.  
Furthermore, Peter seems responsible to ‘make right’ any negative consequences that 
arise from Charlie’s poor performance.  For instance, Peter might have to apologize to a 
company whose advertisement gets cut, or an author whose submission gets postponed to 
another issue. 
 When transferred, the person initially bound by the responsibility no longer has 
any trace of it; when the responsibility gets transferred from Mary to Peter it is as if Mary 
never had the responsibility in the first place.  By contrast, when a responsibility is 
delegated, the individual initially bound by the responsibility still has the obligation to 
ensure that the responsibility gets fulfilled.  Note that in the case of delegation, we might 
think that so long as the delegator had good reason to think the delegatee will complete 
the assigned task, she is not responsible in the credit-taking sense if things go awry 
(which might occur, say, if Charlie could not complete the task due to an illness).  
However, the delegator still retains some forward-looking responsibility to ensure that the 
task gets completed, and/or to make up for whatever negative consequences arise due to 
the delegatee’s failure.   
2. Transfer of responsibility in parenting 
 For the moral consequences of gamete provision, much hangs on whether gamete 
providers can transfer all of their responsibilities for the children that result from their 
actions.  If those responsibilities are transferable, then gamete providers can completely 
divest themselves of their care-taking responsibilities.  This would make gamete 
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provision far less weighty, morally speaking, than it might otherwise seem, given the 
argument made in chapter 1.  In an attempt to demonstrate that transfers of responsibility 
are morally unproblematic in the context of procreation and parenthood, many authors 
point to examples that they claim show that transfers of responsibility are in fact 
commonplace.  However, these arguments often fail to adequately distinguish between 
transfer and delegation, and on closer analysis the examples provided suggest that it is the 
delegation of responsibility that is commonplace rather than the transfer of responsibility.   
As evidence that authors often fail to properly distinguish between transfer and 
delegation, consider Fuscaldo’s assessment of the transferability of care-taking 
responsibilities following gamete provision.  She states, “in support of the claim that 
parental duties are transferable, we already recognize and accept the transfer of at least 
some of our parental duties, for example to nannies, tennis coaches, doctors and teachers.  
In fact we regard as negligent in many cases a parent who fails to delegate some of their 
parental duties to someone who could do a better job.” (emphasis in bold added).72 This 
passage employs transfer and delegation interchangeably; Fuscaldo seems to suggest that 
putting a child in the temporary care of others can equally be described as either the 
transfer or delegation of responsibility.  In a discussion of “begetters” responsibilities 
more generally, Onora O’Neill similarly fails to clearly differentiate delegation from 
transfer. O’Neill states, “Begetters and bearers have at various times delegated or 
transferred some or all of their tasks to wet nurses, relations, tutors, servants, foster 
homes, and schools including boarding schools.  Provided that they take reasonable steps 
to ensure that their children will be adequately reared, they do not breach but transfer 
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their parental obligations or some part of those obligations”73 (emphasis in bold added).  
Here O’Neill is unclear about which of the examples are examples of delegations, and 
which are examples of transfers.  Additionally, since the conclusion that O’Neill draws 
from these examples refers only to transfer, it is unclear whether she thinks the 
distinction is important for determining what responsibilities begetters maintain when 
they rely on others to perform care-taking duties for their children.    
2.1 Fuscaldo on the Permissibility of Transfer 
 Since Fuscaldo argues that the care-taking responsibilities acquired by gamete 
providers are completely alienable74, what she must have in mind is that these 
responsibilities can be transferred rather than merely delegated.75  However, the examples 
she provides in support of her claim that transferring responsibilities is commonplace and 
unproblematic do not in fact support this conclusion at all.  Upon closer analysis, these 
examples suggest that what is commonplace is delegation, not transfer.  Consider the 
following example.   
 A parent hires a babysitter for an evening.  A few hours before the parent had 
arranged to return, the babysitter calls to say that she has decided to leave early and go to 
a party instead.  In this circumstance, it is quite clear that the parent cannot simply stay 
out and leave her child unattended.  If the parent did stay out and the child suffered some 
misfortune, it would be no defence to claim that care-taking responsibilities had been 
transferred to the babysitter for the period of time when the harm occurred.  Even while 
the child is under the care of the babysitter, the parent remains responsible for ensuring 
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that the child is properly cared for, and so when it becomes apparent that the babysitter is 
no longer looking after the child the parent must return to take care of her child or make 
arrangements for another person to watch the child.  Since responsibility, even for the 
duration of the babysitting agreement, is never completely alienated, the situation is 
better described as one of delegation rather than transfer.  This is in keeping with the 
plain language distinction discussed previously.  The parent is more like Peter, who must 
ensure that the newsletter gets published, than Mary who has no such obligation. 
The same holds true for the other specific examples offered by Fuscaldo, 
including putting a child in the care of teachers and doctors.  If it becomes clear that a 
doctor or a teacher is incompetently providing for the child, the child’s parent(s) have a 
responsibility to find other people to fulfill the child’s needs, or fulfill them themselves if 
possible. These examples show that the complete transfer of responsibility that is said to 
be possible for gamete providers cannot be justified on the grounds that it is 
commonplace for parents to transfer their responsibilities to others.  In the case of 
parenting, responsibility is normally delegated, not transferred.  It is worth emphasizing 
here that the focus of the preceding discussion is on care-taking responsibilities.  So long 
as parents take reasonable steps to ensure that those to whom they delegate 
responsibilities are likely to fulfill them, they are not responsible in the credit-taking 
sense if things do not go as intended.  Nevertheless, they remain responsible in the care-
taking sense. 
That Fuscaldo is wrong to claim that transferring responsibilities is commonplace 
in parenting does not show that transferring responsibilities, including parental 
responsibilities, is not possible at all.  The above arguments merely show that the 
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permissibility of transferring responsibility cannot be established by pointing to the 
examples Fuscaldo provides.  I will turn now to another account in the literature, offered 
by Weinberg, which purports to show that gamete providers cannot transfer their 
responsibilities.  Her argument rests on a particular framework for determining when 
responsibilities can be transferred, and when they can be delegated.  Though I agree with 
her conclusion, in the following subsection I will show why her framework does not 
correctly capture our intuitions about when care-taking responsibility is retained.  I will 
then propose my own account. 
2.2 Weinberg on Transfer and Delegation 
According to Weinberg, what determines whether a responsibility is delegated or 
transferred is whether the identity of the person who is to fulfill that responsibility makes 
a meaningful difference to the manner in which it will be fulfilled.  In cases where 
responsibility holder’s identity matters, responsibility is transferred; in cases where the 
responsibility holder’s identity does not matter, responsibility is delegated.  To illustrate 
the difference between delegation and transfer, Weinberg asks us to contrast having the 
responsibility to teach a class with having the responsibility to bring cups to a party.  In 
the case of the cups, it makes very little difference who brings them to the party.  Because 
almost anyone could discharge this responsibility in an equivalent fashion, it is plausible 
for one person to ask another to fulfill this responsibility on their behalf. According to 
Weinberg, this makes it an example of delegation.  By contrast, the way two people 
would teach a class differs greatly, even if both are competent. This is quite easy to 
imagine.  For instance, one person might employ a more traditional lecture style while 
another might employ teaching techniques that involve lots of student interaction, such as 
54 
 
 
 
small group discussions.  Weinberg argues that in these kinds of cases, responsibility is 
transferred rather than delegated.76  Presumably, this is because the substitute teacher is 
not merely standing in for the initial teacher, but is completely taking over the task of 
teaching by doing it in her own unique way. 
Weinberg’s argument against the transferability of responsibility in the case of 
gamete providers rests on her claim that the identity of a particular person can be 
essential to a responsibility being properly fulfilled.  Otherwise put, sometimes no one 
else but the original bearer of the responsibility is capable of fulfilling it.  Weinberg takes 
the responsibility to love one’s children as a paradigmatic case of a non-transferable 
responsibility77 – a person cannot discharge of this obligation by hiring someone else to 
do it on their behalf.  Since Weinberg thinks that gamete providers have parental 
responsibilities, which include the responsibility to love their biological offspring78, the 
transfer of responsibility is not possible for gamete providers.  In the following chapter, I 
will argue that gamete providers do not in fact have parental responsibility, but for now it 
is worth mentioning that Weinberg’s argument about transfer has an air of plausibility to 
it.  For instance, if I hire a famous musician to play a concert, it does not seem like the 
musician could permissibly transfer her responsibility to perform to another musician.  
The audience is not simply interested in a musician, but bought tickets to see that 
particular musician.  This can be contrasted with the teacher case.  Though perhaps the 
substitute teacher might have a different style, and so responsibility is transferred rather 
than delegated, what is important is that the students learn the material.  So long as the 
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substitute teacher is equally effective, we might think that transferring responsibility in 
this circumstance is not morally problematic.   
Weinberg’s proposal for distinguishing transfers from delegations fails, however, 
because it does not track our intuitions about when responsibility is retained by the 
person initially bound by it.  There are many cases that fit into the category of transfer on 
Weinberg’s view, but where responsibility is not alienated in the way expected given the 
normal understanding of transfers of responsibility.  Almost any example where a parent 
relies on the expertise of others to fulfill certain parental responsibilities satisfies 
Weinberg’s criteria for transferring responsibility, yet it seems clear that the parent 
retains some care-taking responsibility.  For instance, a parent might choose a public 
school over homeschooling for his child because he thinks the public school teachers will 
do a much better job of teaching than he would.  However, if the parent discovers that the 
school is failing in its responsibility to educate his child, there is a strong intuition that 
the parent has a responsibility to find another school or to take on the task of teaching 
himself.  The parent cannot simply claim that he had transferred the responsibility of 
educating his child to the school, so no further intervention is required on his part.  This 
intuition shows that, in some cases, even when the performance of a task meets 
Weinberg’s criteria for transfer, some forward-looking responsibility is retained.  Given 
that the retention of forward-looking responsibility is characteristic of delegation, 
Weinberg’s distinction is not consistent with our common-sense notions of delegation 
and transfer. 
 More plausibly, examples like the famous musician show that in certain 
circumstances neither delegation nor transfer are permissible.  This conclusion follows 
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neatly from the same conditions Weinberg lays out for when transferring responsibilities 
is impermissible.  If a task cannot be fulfilled by another person because the identity of 
the person performing the task in question is necessary for the responsibility’s 
fulfillment, then it is simply not possible to have another person ‘stand in’ and complete 
it on behalf of the initial bearer of the responsibility.  This makes both delegation and 
transfer impermissible.   
 So far I have shown that Fuscaldo’s claim, that it is possible for gamete providers 
to transfer their responsibilities to others, rests on a failure to properly distinguish 
delegation from transfer. Fuscaldo’s argument supports the permissibility, in some 
situations, of delegation, and not transfer.  I have also shown that Weinberg’s argument 
against the transferability of responsibilities by gamete providers rests on criteria that do 
not capture basic intuitions about when responsibilities are transferred and when they are 
delegated.  In the following section, I will provide a positive argument for why gamete 
providers cannot transfer, but can only delegate, their responsibilities.  I will also outline 
the implications this has for the structure of responsibility between gamete providers and 
intending parents. 
3. Permissibility of Transfer and Delegation 
 As outlined in the first section of this chapter, the key difference between 
transferring responsibilities and delegating responsibilities concerns whether the initial 
person bound by the responsibility retains any obligations.  In the case of delegation, the 
delegator is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the responsibility is fulfilled, while in 
the case of transfer, all responsibility is alienated by the transferor, and the person to 
whom the responsibility was transferred is solely responsible for its fulfillment.  In this 
57 
 
 
 
section I will argue that in gamete provision and analogous cases, care-taking 
responsibilities can only be delegated.  This view entails that intending parents have their 
care-taking responsibilities delegated to them, at least in part, by the gamete provider(s).  
This view might initially seem problematic because it could be interpreted as implying 
that the responsibilities of intending parents are derivative of those of gamete providers.  
For instance, it would be troubling to think that intending parents have parental 
responsibilities only because these have been delegated to them by some gamete provider 
that has had no contact with the child.  I will address this worry by arguing that there are 
multiple sources of parental responsibilities, and that intending parents also acquire care-
taking responsibilities, including parental responsibilities, through means other than 
delegation. 
 3.1 Responsibilities and Third Parties 
Often when an individual has responsibility to or for another person, this 
responsibility cannot easily be transferred to a third party.  Consider the following 
example.  Sam has a library book that is due in an hour at a nearby library.  As she is 
about to leave to return it, her brother James asks her for a favour.  Sam agrees on the 
condition that James return her library book, which James consents to do.  Though James 
is normally very reliable, this time he drops the book in the mud.  He nevertheless returns 
it the library, which determines that it is unsalvageable and charges Sam’s account the 
cost of replacing the book. 
It seems implausible that Sam could protest the charges on the basis that she had 
transferred responsibility for the book to James.  Since Sam entered into an agreement 
with the library to be responsible for the book, the library can rightfully seek 
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compensation from her.  The fact that she engaged other people to help her fulfill this 
responsibility seems to have no effect on the obligation she has to the library.  
Additionally, since the library entered into the agreement with Sam, it seems wrong that 
they now be required to seek compensation from James.  To permit this kind of transfer 
would amount to permitting the unilateral alteration of a promise, and this seems deeply 
problematic.  In this example, Sam can only delegate to James the responsibility of 
returning the library book, not transfer it. 
The preceding example demonstrates that transferring responsibilities we have to 
a particular person is not always simple.  However, there are various disanalogies 
between this case and gamete provision that might bring into doubt whether the intuitions 
from the library example apply to gamete provision.  For instance, gamete providers 
generally provide gametes only on the condition that someone else will be responsible for 
the needs of any resulting children; in the library example, Sam took out the book 
independently of any prior agreement with James to return it.  Also, in the case of the 
library, there was a pre-existing agreement that made Sam responsible for the book; while 
in gamete provision there is no such agreement.  Even when we create a case that shares 
these features of gamete provision, however, it still does not seem like responsibility can 
be transferred.  Consider the following example. 
My friend Bob wants to play a prank on our colleague Michelle by deflating the 
tires on her bicycle.  Bob does not know which bicycle is Michelle’s, nor does he know 
how to deflate a bicycle tire, so he asks me for assistance.  At first I protest, arguing that 
this might cause Michelle a great inconvenience, and refuse to participate.  To assuage 
my worries, Bob promises to take care of any harms that befall Michelle as a 
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consequence of the prank.  Since I know Bob is trustworthy, I agree.  I deflate the front 
tire while Bob deflates the back tire.  Unbeknownst to us, Michelle has a very important 
meeting to get to, and she does not have a bicycle pump with her.  The only way for her 
to get to her meeting on time is to take a cab, but she does not have her wallet with her.  
Instead of helping Michelle as promised, Bob uncharacteristically runs off leaving me 
behind.  Though I have money on me, I tell Michelle that I transferred the responsibility 
to take care of any harm that arose from the prank to Bob, and so I do not have to help.  
Instead, I encourage her to run after Bob.   
Intuitively, this response seems very morally problematic.  It is implausible to 
suppose that an agreement I enter into with a third party (Bob) can absolve me of my 
responsibility to help my colleague out of the state that I have helped put her in.  The case 
against the transfer of responsibilities in such cases is strong.  But notice that the case 
against transfer in the reproductive context is even stronger.  In the reproduction case, the 
gamete provider knows that the intention of the other parties is to create a dependent 
being in need of care.  If we adjust this example involving the bike to reflect this prior 
knowledge, it seems to only enhance my responsibility to assist Michelle.  Consider how 
we would feel about my response following the prank if Bob had stated at the onset that 
his intention was to disable Michelle’s bicycle on the same day that she has an important 
meeting immediately after work. 
One might object to this analogy on the grounds that the gamete provider does not 
create the dependent child in the same manner that I inconvenience Michelle.  The 
gamete provider merely provides the material while the physicians and intending parents 
create the child.  However, even if we tweak the example to make the analogy even 
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closer it still seems that I cannot transfer my responsibility to help Michelle.  Imagine that 
Bob tells me his plan, then merely asks me to describe Michelle’s bicycle to him and 
explain to him how to deflate a bicycle tire. Even with this less direct contribution to the 
prank, it still seems that I have a responsibility to alleviate the ill effects that Michelle 
would otherwise suffer. 
The library and the bicycle examples are not intended to show that the transfer of 
responsibility is never possible.  A key factor that drives the intuition in the bicycle case 
is that I create a new vulnerability, the risk of being late, that Michelle did not consent to.  
My argument is that in these kinds of cases responsibility cannot be transferred.  
However, in cases where responsibilities arise in different ways, transfer of responsibility 
might be possible.  For instance, recall the example of the lost child in the shopping 
centre discussed in the previous chapter.  It seems that if no one else intervenes and so I 
am required to assist the lost child, then I can transfer the responsibility to try to locate 
the child’s parents to the shopping centre’s security personnel.  Once the child has been 
transferred to their care, nothing more can reasonably be required of me;  it seems 
implausible that I could be expected to take care of the child if the security personnel 
cannot locate the parents, or that I would be required to assist in the effort to find the 
child’s parents.  Thus, I can completely transfer my responsibility for the child.  The 
important difference in this case is that my intervention is an attempt to reduce the child’s 
current state of vulnerability, not create new vulnerabilities.   The bicycle example thus 
does not show that the transferability of responsibility is never permissible, but only that 
it is not transferable in cases where individuals act to intentionally place a non-consenting 
individual at risk of harm.  
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 Though it does not seem possible in the library and bicycle cases for an individual 
to alienate her moral responsibility, it is possible for her to delegate it.  For instance, if 
instead of refusing to help Michelle, I instead have another reliable friend (other than 
Bob) agree to pay for Michelle’s cab ride on my behalf, I do not seem to behave 
immorally in any way.  Furthermore, if the friend fulfills the responsibility she has been 
delegated, I have no further responsibility to Michelle.  Michelle does not seem to be 
wronged in anyway by having a third person do all the ‘work’ to ensure that she is not 
left harmed by my joint actions with Bob.  This conclusion about the permissibility of 
delegation in the bicycle case has important consequences for individuals who provide 
gametes for assisted reproduction.  Since, like pranksters, gamete providers can delegate 
their responsibilities, they are responsible for providing assistance to their biological 
offspring only in the event that those who agreed to take on care-taking responsibilities 
fail to do so.   
 A question that has so far been left somewhat open is whether the care-taking 
responsibilities that arise through gamete provision are the kind of responsibilities that 
can be delegated at all.  Various authors, including Weinberg and Nelson, are of the 
opinion that these responsibilities cannot be delegated.  Their arguments rest on the 
correct claim that certain kinds of responsibilities that depend on an emotional bond 
between individuals cannot be delegated to others.  For instance, I cannot delegate to my 
friend the responsibility of having dinner with my partner on her birthday.  In subsequent 
chapters, I will address this issue and argue that gamete providers do not in fact have a 
responsibility to form the kinds of emotional bonds with their biological offspring that 
would make the delegation of certain responsibilities impossible.   
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 The argument up to this point demonstrates that gamete providers cannot 
completely alienate the care-taking responsibilities they acquire towards their biological 
offspring; however, they can delegate them.  This argument rests on looking at 
circumstances where responsibilities cannot be transferred, but can only be delegated.  As 
highlighted by the bicycle case, when individuals place non-consenting people as risk of 
harm, they acquire a non-transferable responsibility to mitigate those harms.  In the 
following section I will look at some possible counter-arguments to this analysis of 
transfer and delegation. 
4. Objections to My Account of Delegation and Responsibility 
A possible worry arising from the bicycle case, especially the later version in 
which the parties know that Michelle has a meeting, is that it might appear that Bob 
escapes responsibility for his actions because I am left to fulfill all of the responsibilities 
that we jointly have towards Michelle.  Even though Bob also participated in the prank, I 
am still responsible for ensuring that Michelle gets to her meeting after he flees, despite 
having delegated to Bob the responsibility to ensure Michelle’s wellbeing.  However, 
once I have paid for the cab, there is nothing left for Bob to do. It thus appears that by 
fulfilling the responsibility I delegated to Bob, I necessarily relieve Bob of his 
responsibility.  This raises a potential problem of fairness.  It might seem unfair that I am 
on the hook for Michelle’s damages even though Bob was also an active participant and 
even though Bob promised to be responsible for any harms that arose.  
 However, my view does not entail that Bob has no care-taking responsibility for 
the harms suffered by Michelle, but only that both Bob and I are both responsible for 
ensuring that she is not left suffering from ill effects from our prank.  Though it is true 
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that if I pay for Michelle’s transportation costs, Bob will no longer owe her anything, this 
does not mean that both of us were not initially fully responsible for ensuring Michelle’s 
welfare.  To give a different example, in a two-parent home, the fact that one parent feeds 
their child dinner does not mean that both were not equally responsible for ensuring the 
child did not go to bed hungry.  It is perfectly possible for multiple individuals to be fully 
responsible for ensuring that the same responsibility is fulfilled.79   
Furthermore, the fact that I cannot transfer my responsibility to Bob does not 
mean that the promise Bob made is of no consequence.  Bob’s promise to take care of 
any harm that befell Michelle requires that he compensate me for any costs that I incur 
while fulfilling my obligation to her, even though the promise does not diminish my 
responsibility to the Michelle.  Consider the library book example again.  Though James’ 
promise to return the book cannot free Sam of her responsibility to the library, it does 
require him to compensate her for any costs accrued as a result of his carelessness with 
the book.   
 My analysis of the bicycle case reveals three different moral responsibilities that 
arise in these kinds of cases.  Both Bob and I independently have responsibilities to 
ensure that Michelle is restored back to her pre-prank state.  These responsibilities arise 
as a consequence of our actions.  In addition, as a result of his promise, Bob has an 
obligation to me to ensure that Michelle’s needs that arise as a consequence of the prank 
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are fulfilled.  Bob’s responsibility to me does not alter my responsibility to Michelle, but 
might give me recourse against Bob if he fails and I am required to step in.  For instance, 
I could reasonably ask Bob to compensate me for the cost of the taxi.  This shows that 
Bob has not been completely freed of responsibility even if I provide for Michelle’s 
needs. 
 This structure of delegation that I am proposing, where both Bob and I retain 
responsibility, has a close parallel in one in tort law.  In tort law, in circumstances where 
multiple individuals are differentially responsible for damages, a plaintiff can recover 
complete damages from any one of them, leaving it up to the group to sort out more fine-
grained damages amongst themselves.80  Consider a case where two people jointly break 
into a house.  Criminal A steals a laptop and criminal B steals a very valuable piece of 
art.  Under the principle of joint and several liability, the victim can recuperate damages 
for both the laptop and the painting from criminal A, even though A only stole the laptop. 
However, A can recuperate from B the portion of the damages paid to the victim as 
restitution for the loss of the artwork. The important similarity here is that the affected 
person (the victim of the theft) can recuperate damages from either offending party, but 
the other offender is nevertheless not absolved of responsibility. 
When delegating responsibility in gamete provision, there is a strong case for 
adopting something similar to joint and several liability because the gamete provider is, 
along with others, responsible for the state of vulnerability the child finds itself in.  
Nothing from my account of gamete provider responsibility diminishes the fact that the 
intending parents who use the gametes to create a child are also responsible for the 
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vulnerable state of the child because they also act with the intention of creating a 
vulnerable child.  However, as a condition of receiving the gametes, the intending parents 
have also agreed to provide for the future child’s needs.  This means that if the gamete 
recipients promise to take care of the child and fail, they have failed in their responsibility 
to both the child and gamete provider.  Furthermore, like in the bicycle case, gamete 
providers would have grounds for complaint against those to whom they delegated 
responsibility, if those individuals fail to fulfill their responsibilities. 
This structure of responsibility preserves the idea that it is the intending parents 
who have primary care-taking responsibility for the children created using provided 
gametes.  Though gamete providers retain their responsibilities towards their biological 
offspring – on my view, they only delegate these responsibilities – they are required to 
act on their responsibility only when the child’s parents fail in their care-taking 
responsibilities.  Gamete providers are thus second actors who are required to step in only 
when the parents cannot or do not fulfill their responsibilities.81   
This way of thinking about delegation may seem odd, given how the term 
‘delegation’ is often used.  For instance, when a supervisor delegates a task to a 
subordinate, the subordinate becomes responsible for the task on the basis that it was 
assigned to her by her supervisor.  A natural way to describe this situation is that the 
supervisor is primarily responsible for completing the task and only because of the 
supervisor’s choice to delegate does the subordinate also become responsible for 
completing the task.  However, what makes the case of gamete provision different is that 
the provider enters into the reproductive arrangement only on the condition that the 
intending parents will fulfill the child’s needs.  It is this antecedent promise that 
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differentiates gamete provision from the supervisor-employee case, and explains why the 
intending parent has primary responsibility.  Normally, in a supervisor-supervisee 
relationship, the supervisor does not take on a responsibility on the condition that the 
supervisee has given his assurance that he will fulfill the responsibility in question.   
My use of “delegation”, therefore, does not commit me to describing the parent’s 
responsibility as subordinate to that of the gamete providers.  The individuals who 
commission the gametes have independent bases for responsibility aside from being 
delegated responsibilities: first because they also meet the criteria established in chapter 
one, and so have quasi-voluntary care-taking responsibility themselves; second, because 
they have promised to raise their child; and third, because of the intimate relationship that 
develops between them and their child as they parent.82  My use of “delegation” describes 
the way in which gamete providers remain bound to their biological offspring, but does 
not describe the sole manner in which intending parents become responsible for their 
children.  An analogy that better captures the kind of relationship I have in mind between 
gamete providers and the intending parents is the division of labour in a partnership.   
Imagine that a friend and I jointly decide to babysit a child for a day.  After jointly 
entering this agreement with the child’s parent, we decide to divide the day into shifts: I 
will look after the child for the morning shift and my friend will look after the child for 
the afternoon shift.  In this circumstance, since we jointly entered into an agreement with 
the parent, we are both responsible for ensuring the child is looked after for the entire 
day.  Each of us also delegates to the other the responsibility of looking after the child for 
one shift.  In this example, it is not the delegation that gives rise to my friend’s 
responsibility to look after the child in the morning, since my friend promises the child’s 
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parent that he would ensure the child is cared for all day.  Delegation in this case allows 
me to rely on my friend to look after the child for a period of time, but does not create a 
new responsibility for my friend.  Similarly, in the case of gamete provision, the 
intending parents are not responsible for the care of the child merely because the gamete 
provider delegated to them this responsibility.  Delegation explains why it is not wrong 
for the gamete provider to rely on others to care for the child, but since responsibility is 
over-determined for the intending parents, delegation does not fully explain the source of 
their responsibility. 
In summary, my view is that there are three important ‘arrows’ of responsibility in 
cases of gamete provision.  The intending parents have responsibilities towards their 
child arising from their use of provided gametes with the intention of creating a child.  
The gamete provider has responsibilities towards her biological offspring arising from 
her decision to participate in the project of helping the intending parent(s) create a child. 
Lastly, the intending parents have a responsibility to the gamete provider to provide for 
the needs of her biological offspring, since that was a precondition of entering into the 
reproductive arrangement.  Furthermore, since it is the intending parents who induce 
gamete providers into the arrangement with the promise of providing for the resultant 
children, it makes sense to consider them primarily responsible.  The purpose of this 
discussion has been, in part, to show that the intending parents do not merely have 
secondary care-taking responsibilities for their children.  Given that they act to create a 
vulnerable child, they have a basis for care-taking responsibilities that is independent 
from the gamete provider’s delegation of responsibilities.  Furthermore, as they engage in 
raising their child, the intimate relationship that forms provides an additional basis for 
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their care-taking responsibilities that is also independent from the gamete provider’s 
delegation of responsibility. 
A possible counterexample to this argument is adoption, where it seems that the 
biological parents retain no post-adoption responsibilities for their offspring.  In the next 
subsection section I will discuss what implication my view has for adoption. 
4.1 Delegation and Adoption 
 There are two possible criticisms of my view that are raised by adoption.  The 
first is that it seems problematic that individuals who put their children up for adoption 
retain care-taking responsibilities for them.  One reason individuals put children up for 
adoption is to relieve themselves of responsibilities they do not want or cannot fulfill.  
Making it impossible for individuals to relieve themselves of the burden of caring for 
children, even after they have found competent individuals willing to parent their 
children, might seem like an implausibly heavy burden to place on individuals.  The 
second criticism raised by adoption is that, since adoptive parents are not causally 
involved in the creation of the children they adopt in the same manner as individuals who 
employ provided gametes, the responsibility the former have for their adopted children is 
entirely derivative, like with the supervisor-subordinate case discussed above.  Since 
adoption cannot be described in terms of a partnership, this leaves open the possibility 
that the responsibility adoptive parents have exists entirely because it has been delegated 
to them by the child’s progenitors or legal guardians.  As mentioned previously, this view 
seems inappropriate for describing parental responsibilities.      
 Turning to the first criticism, my response is that not all parents who put their 
children up for adoption will meet the criteria that I have argued give rise to quasi-
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voluntary care-taking responsibilities in the first place.  As discussed in chapter one, my 
account is restricted to individuals who freely and intentionally place innocent 
individuals in circumstances of extreme vulnerability.  Individuals who become pregnant 
unintentionally do not necessarily not fit in this category.  For instance, individuals who 
become pregnant accidentally because of failed contraception, and who are unable to 
terminate their pregnancy do not meet the criteria for quasi-voluntary responsibilities set 
out in chapter one.  Furthermore, as will become clear in the following chapter, the 
responsibilities these individuals possess are not parental and if the adoption process 
functions properly little will likely be required of these individuals.  So while I accept 
that a subset of individuals who seek to put their biological offspring up for adoption 
might retain some moral responsibilities towards them, I do not think this conclusion 
undermines the plausibility of my view.  Only those who intentionally sought to create a 
child cannot completely alienate themselves of their care-taking responsibilities, and the 
care-taking responsibilities retained are much less onerous than the responsibilities 
associated with parenthood.   
It is worth mentioning that I am not alone in thinking that individuals who put up 
children for adoption retain some moral responsibility for their welfare.  For instance, 
Lindsey Porter argues on the basis of a causal account of parenthood that individuals who 
put their children up for adoption retain care-taking moral responsibilities towards 
them83, as does Daniel Callahan.84  Also, the fact that many individuals who give up their 
children for adoption choose open adoption arrangements might be evidence that these 
individuals feel some ongoing responsibility towards their biological offspring.  
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 The second criticism, that my account of delegation trivializes adoptive parents by 
making their responsibility derivative, falsely treats delegation and causation as the sole 
source of possible parental responsibility for a child.  Though unlike those who use 
provided gametes, adoptive parents do acquire parental responsibilities in ways other than 
delegation.  For example, the voluntary agreement to care for a child is also a source of 
responsibility.  Furthermore, the close intimate ties that develop through the process of 
parenting are also independent sources of care-taking responsibility.  As in the case of 
provided gametes, delegation is but one source of responsibility.  Hence, adoptive 
parents’ responsibility is not derived solely from the fact that they have been delegated 
responsibility from their children’s biological parents. 
Conclusion  
 In this chapter I have argued that authors who have looked at whether gamete 
providers can transfer their responsibilities to others have often failed to properly capture 
the common-sense distinction between the transfer and delegation of responsibilities.  In 
the case of delegation, some responsibility is retained by the delegee, while in the case of 
transfer, responsibility is completely alienated by the transferor.  Using this distinction, I 
have shown that the examples other authors use to demonstrate that care-taking 
responsibility can be transferred are actually instances where only delegation is possible.  
This shows that the alienation of responsibility is not as commonplace as some authors 
suggest.  I have further argued that the same conditions which give rise to quasi-
voluntary care-taking responsibility in gamete provision – intentionally placing an 
innocent individual in a vulnerable state – make those responsibilities inalienable.  As a 
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consequence, this shows that though gamete providers may delegate their care-taking 
responsibilities to others, they cannot transfer them. 
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Chapter 3: Gamete provider Responsibilities 
Introduction 
 In the preceding two chapters, I argued that gamete providers acquire substantial 
care-taking responsibilities for their biological offspring, and that these responsibilities 
cannot be transferred to others.  In this chapter, I will propose a general framework for 
determining the content of these responsibilities.  I will argue that gamete providers have 
a responsibility to ensure that their biological offspring have a reasonable chance at a 
desirable life.  This argument will proceed in three stages.  First, I will argue that gamete 
providers do not have a responsibility to parent their biological offspring.  Second, I will 
propose a modified Millian approach for determining the minimum welfare that children 
are owed, and will argue that this level of welfare informs the content of gamete 
providers’ responsibilities.  Lastly, I will show why other competing accounts fail to 
show that gamete providers owe substantially less or substantially more than they do 
according to the view I propose.   
1. Gamete providers and Parenthood 
 Before delving into the general framework for gamete provider responsibilities, a 
question that requires some comment is why, on my view, gamete providers are not 
parents, with all the associated responsibilities.  Given the conclusions drawn in the first 
two chapters, viewing gamete providers as parents might appear to be natural; after all 
non-transferable care-taking responsibilities for children seem to be the stuff of 
parenthood.  In order to address this issue, I will first show that ‘parenthood’ can be used 
to signify many different kinds of relationships, and argue that the relevant conception at 
play in gamete provision is what I call “moral parenthood”.  I will then argue that no 
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existing theory of parental responsibilities adequately establishes that gamete providers 
are moral parents.  Though it is possible that some defensible view of moral parenthood 
will include gamete providers, I think this is unlikely.  Additionally, to conclusively show 
that gamete providers are not moral parents would require that I develop a comprehensive 
account of moral parenthood that clearly excludes gamete providers and this project lies 
outside the scope of this work.  Instead, I take it to be reasonable to proceed under the 
assumption that gamete providers are not moral parents given that no current theory 
successfully shows that they are indeed moral parents.   
1.1 Moral Parenthood 
In this section, I argue that there are good reasons to be skeptical of the claim that 
gamete providers have parental responsibilities, in the sense that generally comes to 
mind when we think of parenthood in its colloquial use.  These responsibilities are 
generally thought to be quite extensive, and include nurturing, preserving, and socializing 
one’s children.85  Though these responsibilities are perhaps what comes to mind when we 
initially think about parenthood, the designation “parent” itself is somewhat ambiguous.  
As Margaret Little points out, the term “parent” can refer to different kinds of adult-child 
relationship, most notably legal, biological, and social relationships86.  Legal parents are 
the individuals whom the state recognizes as having special rights and/or responsibilities 
towards specific children.  Biological parents are the individuals whose biological 
material is used to create a child.  This includes the individuals from whom the child’s 
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genetic material is derived, as well as the individual who gestates the child.  Gamete 
providers fit into this second category. Lastly, social parents are the individuals who care 
for, and develop deep relationships with, the children in their charge.  Importantly, these 
different kinds of parenthood can arise independently.  For instance, legal rights and 
responsibilities might arise regardless of any direct social or biological connection to a 
child.  In many jurisdictions, the partner of a woman who gives birth is considered by 
default to be the legal parent of that child regardless of whether the partner is biologically 
related to the child87, and despite the absence of any direct social relationship with that 
child.  Similarly, an adoptive parent can become a legal parents of a child without being a 
biological parent or without having any prior social relationship with a child.88  Being a 
biological parent also does not necessarily make an individual a legal parent, or reflect an 
existing social relationship with a child.  For instance, currently in many jurisdictions 
gamete providers are not legal parents, and have no social relationship with their 
biological offspring.  Lastly, individuals can become social parents without being a legal 
or biological parent.  For instance, consider a person who enters into a serious 
relationship with a parent who has custody over the children from a previous relationship.  
If the new partner develops close ties with the children through care-taking activities, the 
new partner can become a social parent, merely through building the appropriate kind of 
relationship.  Often courts use the existence of a new social parenthood relationship as 
justification for shifting legal parenthood from a biological parent that was also a legal 
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parent, but was not a social parent, to a non-biologically related individual who has 
developed social parental ties.89   
 To these established categories of parenthood I wish to add a fourth: moral 
parenthood.90  I take moral parents to be the individuals who have a moral obligation to 
form and/or maintain a social parenthood relationship with particular children. Moral 
parenthood is importantly different from the other kinds of parenthood discussed, in part, 
because the latter describe existing relationships between adults and children.  For 
example, the term ‘social parent’ is normally used descriptively91 – it describes an actual 
relationship – and does not specify which individuals are under a moral obligation to 
enter into this kind of relationship.  For instance, fathers in one-night-stand cases who fail 
to initiate a deep relationship with their biological offspring are not social parents; 
however, this descriptive statement says nothing about whether they ought to be social 
parents.  If we think that this failure warrants sanction, then the presumption is that 
fathers in these circumstances have a moral responsibility to become social parents, and 
that the failure is blameworthy because they have not fulfilled this responsibility.  Under 
my account, such a view would amount to including fathers in one-night-stand cases 
amongst a child’s moral parents.   
Though someone might object to the term ‘moral parent’ because it can apply to 
individuals who do not already have an established relationship with a child, it does 
capture the way ‘parenthood’ is used in the one-night-stand case.  When we criticize 
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recalcitrant biological fathers in one-night-stand cases by calling them ‘bad parents’ we 
are not criticizing their biological relationship with the child, or their failure to behave 
appropriately within an existing intimate social relationship.  Rather, we are commenting 
on their failure to establish a relationship, which we think they are obligated to do.  This 
view about fathers in one-night-stands might rest on a presumed connection between 
biological parenthood and social parenthood – someone might think that all biological 
parents are also moral parents – but the two are conceptually separable.  In the second 
section of this chapter, I will argue that biological accounts of moral parenthood do not 
succeed. 
Whether gamete providers are moral parents is a pressing question, because if 
they are, the practice of gamete provision in its current form would be brought into 
question.  For instance, when Nelson faults gamete providers for failing to fulfill their 
parental responsibilities, it is presumably because he thinks that gamete providers are 
moral parents.92  In response to this concern, my goal in the next section will be to defend 
the claim that gamete providers are not moral parents, and thus do not have parental 
responsibilities in virtue of their biological contribution to the existence of a child.  The 
strategy of focusing on moral parenthood in order to show that gamete providers do not 
have parental responsibilities may be thought to be problematic, since legal parenthood 
might also be thought to give rise to parental responsibilities.  Though I think that an 
analysis of legal parenthood and its derivative legal responsibilities is a worthwhile 
project93, the focus of this thesis is the moral responsibility.  Given these considerations, I 
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think that rejecting moral parenthood and putting aside the question of legal parenthood 
is sufficient for the purposes of this thesis. 
1.2 Moral Parenthood and Parental Claims  
Before delving into an examination of whether gamete providers are moral 
parents, I first want to clarify the relationship between an individual’s status as a moral 
parent and their ability to make a claim to become a social parent. An initial thought may 
be that a person who is not a moral parent has no claim to become a social parent.  
However, the question of whether gamete providers are moral parents can be 
distinguished from the similar question of whether gamete providers have a claim to 
become the social parent of a child.  The former question asks whether gamete providers 
do wrong by not parenting their biological offspring, while the latter asks whether gamete 
providers are wronged by being denied the ability to become social parents.  Upon 
reflection, it seems quite plausible that someone could have the right to make a parental 
claim without having the responsibility to do so.  Consider the following scenario from 
the surrogacy literature.  Two people contract with a woman to gestate a child derived 
from their gametes.  At the end of the pregnancy, the woman who was contracted to 
gestate the child decides she would like to parent the child she has gestated, but is unsure 
how to proceed ethically.  In assessing this scenario, we could ask whether surrogates are 
moral parents, and thus whether respecting the contract would violate the surrogate’s 
responsibilities.  We could also ask whether the surrogate has a claim to become the 
child’s social parent that ought to be respected through sole or shared legal custody, 
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despite the terms of the contract agreed to at the outset of the pregnancy.94  The second 
question is independent from the first in that we could think that the surrogate has a claim 
to become the child’s social parent even if we think the surrogate does nothing wrong if 
she instead decides to give up the child to the contracting parents.  Many scholars in the 
legal literature hold the view that surrogates have the right to bow out of surrogacy 
contracts and keep the child if they so choose, yet do no wrong if they choose to give up 
the child as initially agreed upon.95 
 This same distinction is relevant in the case of gamete provision.   We can 
similarly distinguish the right to socially parent a child from the responsibility to do so.  
There very well may be reasons to think that gamete providers have some claim to parent 
the children that are the products of their gametes.   For instance, in their paper, 
“Towards a Pluralistic View of Parenthood”, Tim Bayne and Avery Kolers argue that 
there are multiple sources for valid claims to becoming a child’s social parent and they 
include being a gamete provider as one.96  Though determining the strength of gamete 
providers’ claim to have the opportunity to become a social parent is an important 
problem deserving of philosophical attention, I am interested in what responsibilities 
gamete providers have towards the children they help to create by virtue of their 
involvement in the reproductive process, not which responsibilities they ought to be able 
to acquire given their contribution to procreation.  This restricts the scope of my 
discussion to the question of moral parenthood. It is worth emphasizing that people who 
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are not a child’s moral parents might still have strong claims to be that child’s social 
parent.  Though I think that individuals whose sole contribution to a child’s existence is 
the provision of gametes have only a very weak claim to become that child’s social 
parent97, this conclusion is not supported in the argument made in this thesis.  
1.3 Gamete providers and Moral Parenthood 
Now I will look at whether there is a strong case for including gamete providers 
in the category of ‘moral parent’.  Establishing that gamete providers are moral parents 
would require showing that this kind of responsibility generally98 arises as a consequence 
of gamete provision.  In question here is whether moral parenthood can be derived from 
some combination of genetic relatedness, voluntariness, and intention to participate in the 
creation of child.  One strategy for determining whether gamete providers are moral 
parents is to look to analogous circumstances outside of gamete provision, where we have 
intuitions that moral parenthood arises.  However, doing so reveals that social attitudes 
about when moral parenthood arises in situations comparable to gamete provision are 
divided.  For instance, as remarked by various authors99, biological fathers in one-night-
stand cases are often criticized if they fail to establish strong emotional ties and/or remain 
largely uninvolved in the lives of their biological offspring.  This suggests that biological 
ties are often thought to establish moral parenthood, barring circumstances in which 
biological relatedness arises in extreme and troubling circumstances like rape.100  By 
parity of reasoning, gamete providers ought to also be moral parents, and therefore do 
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wrong by failing to form parental relationships with their biological offspring.101  In fact, 
in a recent interview with the Irish times, David Velleman stated, “I think a sperm donor 
is a kind of deadbeat dad who creates children and then doesn't care for them.”102   
However, there are also circumstances where biological ties are not thought to 
establish moral parenthood.  For instance, putting one’s biological child up for adoption 
is permissible, and perhaps even laudable, if the circumstances suggest that adoption is 
firmly in the best interest of the child.  Permission to alienate parental responsibility 
exists even when pregnancies arise due to recklessness, or are intentional but due to 
changes in circumstances, the progenitors no longer wish to parent the child.  This shows 
that even when features that normally augment moral responsibility, like voluntariness 
and intentionality, are present, moral parenthood does not necessarily follow from 
biological parenthood.  Attitudes towards adoption thus run contrary to attitudes towards 
disinterested biological fathers in one-night-stand cases, and suggest that biological 
parenthood does not necessarily result in moral parenthood.  Given that we have 
contradicting intuitions about the importance of biological ties in establishing moral 
parenthood, a mere extension of our intuitions from cases similar to gamete provision 
will not resolve the question of whether gamete providers are moral parents. 
Instead of appealing to intuitions alone for determining whether gamete providers 
are moral parents, another option is to look to theoretical accounts of parenthood.  Four 
accounts dominate the literature: gestational, intentional103, genetic and causal.104  These 
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accounts are often used for determining which individuals fit into the various categories 
of parenthood (legal, biological, social, and moral) discussed previously, since these 
categories are largely descriptive rather than normative.  My focus will be to determine 
whether any of these accounts successfully show that gamete providers are moral parents.  
Authors often fail to explicitly state whether they take these theoretical accounts to 
ground claims to become moral parents, moral parenthood, or some other understanding 
of parental rights and responsibilities; however each of these accounts has been offered to 
support moral parenthood at least tacitly.  For instance, Brake105 argues that the intention 
to become a parent is what grounds an individual’s obligation to become the social parent 
of a child, while Nelson suggests that causing a child to come into existence brings about 
this responsibility.   
 Gestational accounts place moral parenthood primarily with the person who 
gestates the child, with other people deriving moral parental status from either their social 
relationship with the gestational mother or a social relationship with the child that 
develops after birth.106  Since the focus of this thesis is gamete providers (and not 
surrogacy arrangements107), gestational accounts of parenthood are not relevant.  Though 
some gamete providers may become moral parents on a gestational account of 
parenthood, in these cases gamete provision is accidental to acquiring parental status.  
For example, consider a woman who provides an ovum to her lesbian partner who then 
gestates a child. In this example, if the gamete provider acquires parental status on a 
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gestational account of parenthood, it is because of her relationship to the gestational 
mother and not because she provided gametes. If the gametes had come from a third 
party, then she would still be a parent according to gestational accounts that 
accommodate non-gestational partner(s).   
Intentionalists hold that moral parents are those who intended to parent children, 
but as with gestational accounts of parenthood, such accounts also fail to establish that 
gamete providers are necessarily moral parents.  Most gamete providers do not intend to 
become parents, and for those who do, like in the lesbian partnership example above, 
gamete provision is accidental to parenthood on the intentionalist account.  The woman 
who provides an ovum to her lesbian partner with the intention of becoming a parent 
would be a parent under the intentional account if she had instead intended to parent a 
child resulting from a third party’s gametes.  Gestational and intentional accounts of 
parenthood therefore do not establish that gamete providers are moral parents. 
This then leaves causal and genetic accounts of parenthood.  Causal accounts 
ascribe moral parenthood to individuals who play a certain kind of causal role in creating 
a child, whereas genetic accounts ascribe moral parenthood on the basis of genetic 
relatedness.108   Causal and genetic accounts both suffer from one or both of two kinds of 
problems that makes them implausible for attributing moral parenthood to gamete 
providers.  The first (as discussed in chapter 1) is that they have difficulty differentiating 
in a principled manner between individuals along the causal chain who have parental 
responsibility from those who do not.  The second is that causal theories have difficulty 
explaining why mere causation or genetic relatedness results in the rich and intimate 
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responsibilities normally thought to be associated with parenthood.109  Given the 
arguments made in chapter one, one might think that causation and/or genetic connection 
along with intentionality and voluntariness might suffice for moral parenthood; however I 
will show in the following paragraphs that, even when these features, which generally 
improve the case for responsibility are present, causal and genetic accounts fail to 
establish that gamete providers are moral parents. 
Consider individuals who favour geneticism, and who argue that individuals 
become moral parents of their biological offspring because they are derived from their 
genetic material.  If successful, this theory would imply that gamete providers are the 
moral parents of their biological offspring.  In one prominent account, Barbra Hall 
defends a form of geneticism on Lockean grounds.110  Hall argues that since gametes are 
owned by the individuals from whom they are sourced, those individuals also have claims 
to the products of their gametes.111  One problem with this view, as highlighted by 
Archard, is that it is predicated on individuals’ inherent self-ownership; but if self-
ownership is inherent to all people, then children must have it as well.  Since children 
inherently own themselves, it is unclear how parents could own their children, given 
Hall’s Lockean starting point that takes self-ownership as basic.112  Another problem with 
this view is that it is unclear whether Hill’s Lockean labour view of parenthood would 
consider the genetic parents to be the owners at all. Though the genetic code provides the 
organizational plans of development, the work of actually creating a child is done by the 
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individual who gestates him or her.113  It seems that a Lockean labour account provides a 
stronger case for gestationalism than it does for geneticism.  
Although Hill’s view identifies which individuals acquire moral parent status, it 
suffers from the further problem of failing to explain why parental duties arise.  If 
children are relevantly similar to property, it is unclear why genetic parents would have 
any extensive duties towards them, since property rights are generally taken to grant the 
holder broad authority and exclusion of interference from others in the use of their 
property.  This means that though a property rights account might ground parental 
authority and exclusive control over children, it fails to explain the source of the 
responsibilities that constitute moral parenthood.  
Perhaps this takes the analogy to property too literally, or construes property too 
narrowly.  For instance, pets are considered to be property in many respects but this does 
not mean that owners have unlimited authority in how they treat their pets or that they do 
not have specific positive duties towards them.  However, recognizing that owners do not 
always have unlimited authority over their property and that ownership is sometimes 
accompanied by positive duties does not fully vindicate the Lockean approach, because it 
still does not show why children are a special case of property that come with 
responsibilities.  It also does not explain why moral parenthood arises rather than a 
simple claim to become a social parent.    
To illustrate this point, consider the following example.  Under a Lockean 
account, a woman hired to gestate a child might have a claim to parent the child grounded 
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in her gestational labor, but it is unclear why a Lockean account would require her to 
exercise that claim.  For instance, I might have an exclusive property right to the 
silverware I made, but this does not require me to retake my silverware if it is stolen, nor 
does it prevent me from giving it away.  In order to establish that moral parenthood arises 
from genetic ties, the proponents of the property view would have to explain why genetic 
parents do wrong if they alienate their bundle of rights and responsibilities to others.  
Furthermore, though we could take a broader view of property that includes 
responsibilities as in the pet case, the Lockean view provides no reason why 
responsibilities would arise in the case of biological offspring and not in other property 
contexts.  Since the inability to abandon one’s children to others, and the duty to care for 
them are the weightiest elements of moral parenthood, the property view of geneticism is 
explanatorily inadequate.   
Another way to put this point is that an account that requires an individual to 
exercise property rights over an object, and includes extensive responsibilities packaged 
in with those rights, ceases to be an account grounded in property theory, since the 
framework of rights and responsibilities differs greatly from those normally associated 
with property.  If anything, this analysis shows that parental rights and responsibilities 
cannot appropriately be described in terms of property. 
Geneticism has also been defended on the basis that the chromosomal makeup 
that is determined by the contributions of the genetic parents determines the identity of 
their biological offspring.114  Since gamete providers provide the biological material that 
sets the identity of their biological offspring, on this view they would be moral parents.  
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Empirically however, this view is contestable.  Though it is likely that if a person had a 
different genetic code, their personal identity would be importantly different115, it is less 
clear whether genetic determinism is true because it assumes that an embryo’s genetic 
code is capable of producing only a single personal identity.  Developments in 
epigenetics continue to demonstrate the importance of environmental factors in gene 
expression. Though a particular genetic inheritance might limit the range of possibilities 
available, interaction with the environment plays an important role in determining the 
being that actually develops.116  The importance of epigenetics to biological development 
extends beyond gestation.  Hence social parents and the environment they create for their 
children may also be determining features of personal identity, even at the level of gene 
expression.  This means that to the extent that geneticism rests on genetic determinism, it 
likely is empirically false.  Social parents likely play an important role in determining the 
personal identity of the children they rear even at the level of gene expression, and so if 
the establishment of an identity continues to take place after birth, social parents might be 
better candidates for parenthood on this view. 
Putting empirical questions aside, this form of geneticism suffers from both 
theoretical problems mentioned at the onset of this section: over-breadth and an 
explanatory gap.  Even if we take genetic determinism to be true with respect to personal 
identity, this view seems to suffer from a problem of over-inclusion.  Anything that 
would impact the timing of sexual intercourse or the timing of gamete provision would 
alter the particular gametes employed in conception, thus impacting the particular genetic 
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code of the resulting child, which in turn fixes the child’s identity on the above account.  
This means that the work crew controlling traffic in a construction zone travelled through 
by a sperm provider on the way to a clinic to donate sperm plays a role in determining the 
identity of the child by affecting the precise timing of the sperm deposit.  One could 
argue that the construction crew simply alters the distribution of possible zygotes 
produced, but does not in fact set the precise sperm that will form the zygote.  Though 
this may be true, it is unclear how this is any different from ‘setting the identity’ in 
ordinary sexual intercourse or in sperm provision where gametes are not specifically 
selected by any individual.  In either case fertilization is accomplished via the shot-gun 
approach, without the sexual partners intentionally selecting one particular gamete over 
another.  All they do is establish the set of possible zygotes and then let circumstance 
determine which particular one is realized.  This problem of over-inclusiveness makes the 
theory untenable and suggests that merely playing a role in setting the identity of a child 
is insufficient for being a moral parent. 
The second problem faced by this theory is that it fails to explain why establishing 
a child’s identity makes someone a moral parent.  There seems to be an explanatory gap 
between setting the identity of a child and having the responsibility to socially parent a 
child.  To give an example, it seems unlikely that an individual who provides a child with 
a transformative experience gains the responsibility to be that child’s social parent 
because the child has now become a different person in some important sense.  Also, as 
discussed earlier, in many circumstances, adoption seems unproblematic even though 
adopted children are generally not parented by their genetic parents.  Given the over-
inclusiveness of the theory and its inability to explain why moral parenthood arises, this 
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form of geneticism fails to convincingly demonstrate why gamete providers are moral 
parents. 
The final family of views I will consider here are causation arguments, which 
claim that individuals who cause children to come into being are responsible for 
parenting them.  As discussed in chapter one, most of these views suffer from problems 
of over-breadth and the associated lack of principled ways for distinguishing relevant 
causal actors who have responsibilities from those who do not.  For instance, if we think 
a father in a one-night-stand case is a moral parent to his biological offspring because he 
plays a necessary causal role in creating her, it is unclear why the child’s grandparents are 
not moral parents as well, since their role is equally essential.  However, as I argued 
previously, the difficulty in drawing the line does not mean that no one acquires 
responsibility on causal grounds.  Given the principle I outline in  chapter one, that 
intentionally and willingly helping someone put another in a vulnerable state gives rise to 
care-taking responsibilities, it seems plausible that gamete providers acquire some 
responsibility for the children that result from their gametes.  I have argued that gamete 
providers have such responsibilities.  However, the question that remains is whether these 
responsibilities amount to moral parenthood.  As in the cases discussed above, it does not 
seem that moral parenthood follows from the causal framework used to identify the 
responsible agents. 
As discussed in chapter one, the justification for parental responsibilities in causal 
accounts of parenthood is generally the vulnerability of the individuals brought into 
existence by the actions of their progenitors, and the harms they will likely face if they 
are not parented.  The general principle invoked is something like: “when individuals are 
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made vulnerable or are put in a position where they will suffer harms if there is no 
intervention, those who helped put them in that position have a duty to mitigate those 
harms”.  However, this principle does not seem to require those causally responsible to 
parent the child.  Harms and vulnerability can be mitigated, perhaps even better 
mitigated, by third parties in many circumstances.  If protecting the vulnerable and/or 
mitigating the harms one has caused is what motivates responsibilities in these cases, then 
it seems implausible that the individuals who cause the vulnerability and/or harm are 
necessarily responsibility to do the ‘nitty-gritty’ of care-taking themselves.  Consider the 
car accident example discussed in chapter one, where a distracted driver causes an injury 
to a pedestrian.  Having a responsibility to ensure that the pedestrian is taken care of does 
not mean that the driver must provide the medical treatment personally, even if she were 
able to do it.  For instance, if the driver happened to be an orthopedic surgeon on her day 
off, she would have no responsibility to sacrifice her holiday to set the pedestrian’s 
broken bone, assuming there was another capable person willing and able to do so, and 
she ensured that the pedestrian would in fact be treated properly.  Theories that attempt to 
derive moral parenthood from the requirement to mitigate harm confuse having to ensure 
that harms are taken care of with having to perform the tasks that directly mitigate the 
harm.117  Given this distinction, though it seems that some causal agents do acquire 
responsibility towards the children they create, it does not seem that this responsibility 
amounts to moral parenthood. 
I have shown that our intuitions about when moral parenthood arises are 
inconsistent, and that none of the current theories of parenthood seem able to include 
gamete providers as moral parents.  Therefore, it seems plausible, at least provisionally, 
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to exclude gamete providers from the category of moral parents.  Much of this argument 
rests on the distinction between having a claim to become a moral parent and being 
required to become a moral parent.  Though many of the theories I have discussed 
provide reasons for thinking that certain individuals have claims to become moral 
parents, none of them show that gamete providers do wrong by failing to become social 
parents.  This does not mean, however, that gamete providers have no responsibilities 
towards the children they have helped create.  In the following section, I will develop a 
general framework for determining the content of these non-parental responsibilities.    
2. Reducing Vulnerability 
 As I have argued, it seems likely that gamete providers do not have a 
responsibility to become the social parents of their biological offspring, and so are not 
moral parents. All the same, however, they do seem to be responsible for reducing the 
potential harms their biological offspring face as a result of the vulnerable state they find 
themselves in.  Two authors, Porter and Archard, similarly imply that gamete providers 
have some responsibilities towards their children, but that these responsibilities do not 
amount to moral parenthood.  In this vein Archard states, “if I cause a child to exist then I 
am under an obligation to ensure that this child is cared for but the obligation is 
discharged if the care is provided by someone who is willing to care for the child”.118  On 
Porter’s closely related view, gamete providers have an obligation to “make it the case 
that the child is cared for (or more broadly, to make the child content with her condition, 
in so far as one is able), and this will imply a pro tanto duty to do the caring oneself.”  
Porter continues by arguing that this pro tanto responsibility will normally be 
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“outdone”119 by the intending social parents whose rights and commitments shift the 
parenting responsibility to them.  Porter also endorses the view that in the event that a 
gamete provider’s offspring is not being adequately cared for, the gamete provider is 
responsible for intervening.   For instance, if the intending parents became unable to be a 
social parent due to some tragic accident and no one else was able to fulfill this role, the 
responsibility would fall to the gamete provider. 
 I am in agreement with this general conclusion; however I believe it lacks much 
detail.   Neither Porter nor Archard develop in detail the circumstances in which gamete 
providers are required to intervene, the kinds of interventions they must make, or what 
social structures gamete providers ought to ensure are in place to enable them to fulfill 
their responsibilities.  Though they acknowledge that other responsibilities in addition to 
having to parent their biological offspring extreme circumstance, might arise, their 
discussion of specific post-provision responsibilities is largely limited to the 
responsibility to parent if no one else is able to. I will not be able to offer a 
comprehensive list of all of the responsibilities that might arise for gamete providers, 
however, I will advance the discussion in two important ways.  In the following section I 
will outline a general framework for determining gamete providers’ responsibilities and 
in the following chapter I will apply this framework to outline various pre and post 
provision responsibilities that gamete providers have towards their biological offspring. 
2.1 Framework for Responsibility 
 To begin with, it is clear that procreation places children in a very vulnerable 
state, and that without sufficient care, nurturing, and material support they will suffer 
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greatly, not just during childhood but into their adult years as well.  As argued previously, 
by placing their offspring in this state of vulnerability, gamete providers acquire 
responsibilities for their biological offspring.  However, determining just what is required 
to adequately reduce the harms arising from a child’s vulnerability is much less clear.  
For instance, it seems implausible that even parents are required to make great sacrifices 
of their well-being to make minor advancements to the well-being of their children.  
Though parents have a duty to educate their children, depleting their retirement savings 
and re-mortgaging their home in order to pay for expensive private schools and tutors so 
that their children receive the best possible education is beyond what is required of 
competent care-givers.  This seems true even if the increased education would lessen that 
child’s vulnerability by helping her develop more refined skills.  This example shows that 
using “the best interest of the child” as the sole guiding principle for determining the 
extent of responsibilities parents and others120 have towards children is overly onerous.121 
At the same time, merely providing basic literacy and numeracy seems insufficient, 
especially given the higher intellectual demands of our society.  Determining the 
adequate level of material and non-material support children are entitled to requires 
balancing the interests of caretakers122, the broader demands of justice123, along with the 
interests of the children themselves.  On these matters, there is no firm consensus in the 
literature. 
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 As a way to make inroads into this question, I will adopt a suggestion from John 
Stuart Mill for determining what is owed to children.  In On Liberty, Mill offers a 
somewhat vague suggestion for balancing the liberty of adults with the needs of the 
children they create. He argues that children are entitled to “an ordinary chance of a 
desirable existence”.124  More recently, this principle has been endorsed by Michael 
Parker in response to arguments for perfectionism put forward by Julien Savalescu and 
others.125  The principle seems to designate an appropriate middle ground between 
demanding too much or too little of individuals with care-taking responsibilities, and 
given the state of the unsettled state of the literature on this issue, is a reasonable place to 
start in outlining a view about what is minimally owed to children.   
Though Mill’s principle has intuitive appeal, it suffers from a possible defect 
arising from ambiguity in the claim that children have the right to “an ordinary chance of 
a desirable existence”.  If the term “ordinary chance” refers to the chance a hypothetical 
average child would have at a desirable life in a given society, and that chance was 
abysmally low, then according to Mill’s principle, children would be entitled to very 
little.  Taken to its extreme, this means that according to Mill’s principle, it would be 
permissible to unnecessarily maintain a child at a standard where she would likely have a 
life so terrible that it could be considered not worth living, so long as that child’s chance 
of a decent life were on par with that society’s norm.    For instance, we could imagine a 
society where the majority of children born suffer from some debilitating illness, and so 
the average chance at a desirable life is very low.  Despite the generally poor prospects 
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children have in this society, a small number of lucky children are born free of the illness.  
Given how common the illness is, it may be that if a parent were to neglect a healthy 
child, this child would still have an ordinary chance at a desirable life, since the general 
prospects are very low.  However, permitting neglect seems problematic – surely neglect 
does not become acceptable just because most children in a particular society are likely to 
have a very low standard of life.126  Alternatively, by “ordinary chance” Mill could have 
been referring to a child’s prospect of a desirable life in Mill’s own society, one in which 
children had much better prospects than in my dismal hypothetical example.  However, 
taken as referring to some rigidly defined probability of having a decent life based on 
Mill’s own society, this interpretation suffers from the charge of arbitrariness. 
 Though perhaps not exactly what Mill had in mind, I think the more plausible 
way of understanding “an ordinary chance at a desirable existence” is that it involves an 
absolute standard as well as a societally relative standard for determining the kind of life 
that individuals ought to ensure for their offspring.  The purpose of the absolute standard 
is to set out the standard that must be met, regardless of how poor the prospects are for 
the hypothetical ‘average child’ in a particular society.  The societally relative standard 
captures the intuition that children ought to be entitled to a share of the benefits of society 
that are currently widely available to others.  Consider the following example.  A child’s 
primary care-giver decides that taking her sick children to see the freely-available doctor 
is too much of a hassle and decides instead to take care of her children’s needs herself at 
home using a 19th-century medical textbook.  Her son falls ill with a painful disease, so 
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the care-giver dutifully and correctly diagnoses and treats the disease in accordance with 
the information in the antique textbook.  Unfortunately, the concoction of herbs, heavy 
metals, and noxious liquids only makes matters worse, and the child succumbs to his 
illness.  In the face of mounting criticism for her medical decision, the care-taker 
responds that the child had the same prospect of dying from his disease as a child born in 
the 19th century, and since exposing children to the prospect of that disease did not make 
that level of caretaking unethical then, exposing them to the same risk now should not 
either.   
 The care-giver’s response is clearly inadequate, and there is a very strong 
intuition that by depriving the child of access to healthcare, she has failed in her 
responsibility towards him even if behaving this way at a time when no effective cure 
was available would have been permissible.  This example shows that what one must do 
to ensure that a child’s prospects for a desirable life are good enough is determined in 
part by the society in which the care-giver and child find themselves.  A minor and 
friendly reformulation of Mill’s principle that I propose is that children must be ensured a 
‘reasonable chance at a desirable life’, where reasonable includes both an objective and 
societally relative standard.  Given that gamete providers are likely not moral parents, but 
must ensure that the possible harms their biological offspring might face that arise from 
their vulnerable state are adequately minimized, in general terms they are responsible for 
ensuring that this combined standard is met. 
 There may be a worry that my view suffers from a pernicious form of social 
relativism because the extent of a gamete provider’s responsibilities rests to a certain 
degree on the society in which the provision occurs.  This means that a wealthy gamete 
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provider creating a child in society A, in which most children have access to a rich array 
of resources, has a heavier burden than if she had provided gametes to a person in more 
impoverished society B.  This is true even if providing what is required in society A to 
the child created in society B would not be a great imposition on the gamete provider.  
Though the diachronic medical case discussed above seems to suggest a relative standard, 
this synchronic case results in the seemingly repugnant conclusion that the gamete 
provider owes more to a child who is created in rich society than in a poor society.   
 To this problem I can only offer some remarks, and acknowledge that it remains a 
challenge for my view.  First, it is unclear whether arguing the converse, that the gamete 
provider owes children in both society A and B the same level of support, is any more 
just.  If we think that the entitlement comes from the fact that the gamete provider can 
provide the resources to her biological offspring with little burden to herself, then this 
creates a kind of hereditary entitlement to wealth that itself seems problematic.   Consider 
a billionaire who provides gametes to a friend whose wealth is in the millions.  In this 
case, it seems absurd to claim that the child is somehow not getting what she is entitled to 
because she does not have access to the billions of her progenitor.127  If, on the other 
hand, we argue that children in both society A and B are entitled to the level of resources 
necessary for “a reasonable chance at a desirable existence”, determined by appealing to 
the standard of society A regardless of who their genetic/social parents are, we are faced 
with another problem.  Appealing to the welfare standard of society A places an 
enormous burden on the average procreator in society B for whom meeting this standard 
might not be possible even if great personal sacrifices are made.  This risks condemning 
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parents in poor societies for not adequately providing for their children on the basis that 
more is available to children in richer societies, and this too seems unjust (assuming that 
children’s prospects in society B are not terrible).  These considerations seem to force us 
back towards some single non-relative standard which, as discussed above in the illness 
case, also seems problematic.   
Another consequence of my dual-standard view that might also seem problematic 
is that it raises concerns about the permissibility of the global gamete market.  Due to 
lack of availability, high costs, or legal prohibition, an increasing number of individuals 
are turning to less developed nations as a source of gametes (especially ova) for 
reproductive purposes.  This creates a different problem from the billionaire example: a 
gamete provider might be able to meet both the absolute and societally relative standards 
in their own society, but would lack the resources to maintain her biological offspring to 
the level required in the society where she will be raised by her social parents.  As will 
become clear in the following chapter, depending on the policies in place in the society 
where her biological offspring resides, providing gametes might still be permissible.  
However, the gamete provider likely runs the risk of putting herself in a position where 
she will have responsibilities that she will not be able to fulfil.  As a consequence, the 
global gamete market might be unethical not just because of concerns about 
commodification and exploitation128, but because the gamete providers are themselves 
acting irresponsibly.  Individuals in the global south who provide gametes to individuals 
in the global north may be putting themselves in a position where they would be unable 
to fulfill their responsibilities towards their biological offspring. 
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 Despite these difficulties, I think there are good reasons to take the societally 
relative standard seriously.  For one, there is strong empirical evidence that individuals’ 
wellbeing is impacted greatly by how they see themselves relative to their peers and their 
ability to fulfill the social expectations placed on them.129  What might be pure luxury on 
an absolute poverty scale might be essential for a desirable life in a particular society 
when social and psychological factors are taken into account.  Adam Smith expresses this 
point well:   
By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably 
necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it 
indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen 
shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and 
Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably though they had no linen. But in the 
present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would 
be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be 
supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty which, it is presumed, 
nobody can well fall into without extreme bad conduct.130 
 A similar point is also made by Rawls when he defends the primacy of equality of 
opportunity over social efficiency.  Rawls states that equality of opportunity is not 
important solely because of the external rewards that accompany certain social positions, 
but also because people who are denied equal opportunity are wronged by being 
“debarred from experiencing the realization of self which comes from a skillful and 
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devoted exercise of social duties.”131  In this quotation Rawls highlights the importance 
of the ability to perform social duties to one’s sense of wellbeing.  Clearly, the external 
goods required to fulfill social duties will vary from society to society.  For instance, 
though internet access is clearly not a necessity of life, in North America it has become 
almost impossible to engage in many expected or required social activities (paying bills, 
applying to schools, staying in contact with friends and family) without at least some 
limited access to the internet.  Undoubtedly, someone completely lacking internet access 
would have greatly reduced opportunities, and would not be able to function well given 
the norms and expectations of North American society.  It seems plausible that internet 
access might be a necessity in societies that assume its ubiquity and rely on it heavily as a 
means of communication, while not at the same time being a necessity in less 
technologically dependant societies. 
As I have shown, large disparities in wealth between societies create serious 
problems for how to think about the basic level of goods children are entitled to.  While a 
solution to this problem lies outside the domain of this thesis, nevertheless, I still think 
that the modified Millian approach I have developed provides a reasonable way to move 
the discussion forward.  In the next section, I will look at alternate views that suggest 
different models for what children are minimally owed, and will show why these views 
do not succeed.  
 3. Competing accounts of responsibility  
 There are two other views that might be interpreted as offering more compelling 
accounts of what procreators owe their children. Derek Parfit’s “non-identity problem” 
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might be thought to support the conclusion that gamete providers need only ensure that 
their biological offspring have a life that is minimally worth living.  By contrast, Seana 
Shiffrin’s argument in favor of extending the bounds of “wrongful life” cases suggests 
that gamete providers might have much more extensive responsibilities towards their 
biological offspring than the ones I have suggested.  In the following subsections, I will 
first discuss Parfit’s view and argue that the non-identity problem is in fact orthogonal to 
the question of care-taking responsibility.  I will then discuss Shiffrin’s view and argue 
that it rests on a slippery distinction between her account of harm and what she calls 
‘pure benefit’.  I will also argue that Shiffrin’s view fails to adequately distinguish 
between harms and wrongs.  
3.1 Responsibility and the non-identity problem 
 The non-identity problem132 has been taken to show that an individual cannot be 
harmed when brought into existence in non-ideal circumstances, if the individual’s very 
existence necessarily depends on those non-ideal circumstances.133  Consider Parfit’s 
example.134 A fourteen year old girl chooses to have a child, but because of her age, lacks 
the resources she would otherwise have had if she had delayed her pregnancy.  However, 
if the girl would have waited before having a child, a different child would exist because 
different gametes would have given rise to the pregnancy. Given that the child would not 
have existed at all if his mother had not chosen become pregnant when she did, Parfit 
concludes that the child has no grounds to claim that he has been harmed by his mother’s 
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decision.  For Parfit, this conclusion holds even if the mother’s lack of resources results 
in considerable hardship for the child. 
 Someone might rely on an analogous example involving a gamete provider to try 
to show that gamete providers owe very little to their biological offspring. For instance, 
we could imagine a sperm donor who decides to provide gametes in conditions that make 
him unable to provide any support to his biological offspring.  This inability to provide 
support might arise due to the gamete provider’s lack of resources, or because he 
provided gametes in a way that render him unable to have any knowledge about the 
identity and circumstances of his biological offspring. Furthermore, we could imagine 
that the gamete provider’s biological offspring suffers from a severe lack of resources 
that could have been avoided if the gamete provider would have been diligent when 
making his gametes available to others.  In this case, if we accept the conclusion of the 
non-identity problem, we cannot say that the gamete provider has harmed the child since 
the child would not have existed if the gamete provider would have acted differently.  
This result might be taken to imply that if a gamete provider helps create a child under 
conditions that make it impossible for him to ensure his biological offspring has 
reasonable chance at a desirable life, he does not harm the child.  This seems to provide a 
way out of the more onerous responsibilities required by the modified Millian account I 
outlined previously.  
 However, this argument gets the relationship between harm and care-taking 
responsibilities for gamete providers backwards.  In chapter one I argued that because 
gamete providers freely and intentionally help to create vulnerable individuals, they are 
responsible for taking certain steps to ensure that harms do not befall their biological 
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offspring. Determining whether coming into existence under certain conditions is itself a 
harm is not the relevant question.  Rather, what is important is whether gamete providers 
have a responsibility to prevent certain harms from coming about.  Consider the camp 
counselor example from chapter one.  The responsibility to intervene in a fight between 
campers does not arise because the counselor has herself brought harm about, but because 
she stands in a certain kind of care-taking relationship to the campers under her care.  
Similarly, it is perfectly consistent to think that gamete providers have care-taking 
responsibilities for their biological offspring even if we do not think these responsibilities 
derive from some harm they themselves have wrongly caused.   
By providing gametes under conditions that make it impossible to provide 
resources to their biological offspring, the gamete providers put themselves in a position 
that renders them unable to fulfill their responsibilities, and this itself is morally 
problematic.  Though a gamete provider could claim that he did not intervene to help his 
biological offspring when appropriate because he did not know that intervention was 
needed, clearly certain forms of ignorance are themselves blameworthy and do not 
mitigate the wrongfulness of one’s actions, but may in some circumstances even augment 
it.135 
Considerations arising from the non-identity problem might provide reasons for 
doubting that gamete providers harm their biological offspring if they provide gametes in 
circumstances that make it impossible to provide future support if the need arises.  
However, my argument demonstrating that gamete providers have responsibilities does 
not rest on the claim that they owe restitution for harm.  Because my argument does not 
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rely on the claim that gamete providers harm their biological offspring, the theoretical 
issues raised by the non-identity problem have no bearing on my claim about gamete 
providers’ responsibilities.  
3.2 Shiffrin’s Wrongful Life Argument 
The preceding argument demonstrated that even if gamete providers do not harm 
their biological offspring by placing themselves in a position where they cannot provide 
future care to them, they still have care-taking responsibilities.  However, if it could be 
shown that bringing human beings into existence in fact causes them great harm then 
gamete providers might in fact owe their biological offspring more than what I have 
suggested they owe.  This is because causing harm is also a basis for acquiring care-
taking responsibilities, as in the restitution cases discussed in chapter one.  These 
responsibilities grounded in restitution might be more extensive than the quasi-voluntary 
responsibilities I have discussed so far.  In her paper, “Wrongful Life, Procreative 
Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm”, Shiffrin argues that procreators in general 
(including gamete providers) do harm their offspring by bringing them into existence, 
and thus have very extensive responsibilities to compensate them.136  If Shiffrin is right, 
then the approach to gamete provider responsibility I have provided might be inadequate.  
In this subsection I will outline Shiffrin’s view, and show why her account fails to 
establish that gamete providers have extensive responsibilities towards their biological 
offspring stemming from the harm caused by being brought into existence.  
 Shiffrin begins by considering the comparative view of harms and benefits, which 
takes these two states to be different regions on a continuous metric.  Under this view, 
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harms and benefits can be modeled by positive and negative integers along the number 
line where benefits are “positive” and harms are “negative”.  As with numbers, harms and 
benefits can simply be summed together to determine the net effect of a certain event.  
This model is endorsed by Feinberg, because he thinks it best explains our overall 
intuition about harm and benefit in situations where both desirable and undesirable 
outcomes arise.  The example used by Feinberg is the case of a rescue137.  Imagine a 
person pinned down under a fallen beam in a burning building.  The attending firefighter 
decides that there is insufficient time to move the beam, and that the only way to save the 
trapped person is to free them by breaking their arm.  Here the firefighter both inflicts an 
undesirable state on the person she saves—the pain of a broken arm—while also 
providing the trapped person with a large benefit, safety from the fire.  Feinberg argues 
that even though the rescued person suffered an injury, it would be wrong to say that the 
firefighter harmed the trapped person, or that the firefighter owes the person she saves 
compensation for the broken arm.  The reason, suggests Feinberg, is that the benefit 
provided by the firefighter greatly outweighed the harm done, and so the result is a net 
benefit.  Similarly, so long as a life is worth living, coming into existence is a net benefit 
and therefore parents do not owe their children compensation. 
 Shiffrin’s response is to deny that harms and benefits can be compared in this 
way, and to provide an alternative explanation for our intuition in the rescue case.  
Shiffrin asks us to consider the example of Wealthy, who decides to share his fortune 
with people on a nearby island.  Lacking the ability to set foot on the island due to 
governmental squabbles, he decides to fly over the island in his plane and drop cubes of 
gold, each worth millions of dollars, for the benefit of the people on the island.  Though 
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the people of the island have a decent standard of living, Wealthy is confident the cubes 
of gold will make their lives better.  While the plan generally goes well, one of the blocks 
of gold strikes Unlucky, breaking his arm.  Though Unlucky can have his arm treated for 
much less than the value of the gold he receives, and admits that his life has improved 
from the remaining gold, he is unsure whether he would have consented to having his 
arm broken in exchange for the monetary benefit he gained and is even less sure whether 
he would have consented to the risk of severe injury that the block of gold might have 
caused.  Shiffrin claims that under these circumstances Unlucky is owed an apology from 
Wealthy and is entitled to compensation for the broken arm, despite having on balance 
gained from the episode.  For Shiffrin, what grounds this intuition is that “dropping 
bullion at all was morally wrong, all-things-considered, because it risked and inflicted 
serious harm on nonconsenting individuals but was not in the service of a suitably 
important end.”138  
 In so far as our intuitions align with Shiffrin’s, this example shows that harm and 
benefit are not comparable in the additive manner suggested by Feinberg.  We do want to 
say that Unlucky was harmed by Wealthy’s actions and is deserving of compensation 
even if the incident resulted in Unlucky’s net gain. Contrary to Feinberg, Shiffrin argues 
that harm is categorically different from benefit.  Shiffrin describes harm as “the 
imposition of conditions from which a person undergoing them is reasonably alienated or 
which are strongly at odds with the conditions she would rationally will”.139  Harms make 
an individual’s “lived experience like that of an endurer as opposed to that of an active 
agent” and “forcibly impose experiential conditions that are affirmatively contrary to 
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one’s will”.140 Additionally, Shiffrin introduces the concept of ‘pure benefit’, which 
connotes an improvement in a person’s condition without the removal a state of harm, as 
exemplified by the intentions of Wealthy.  Wealthy’s goal was not to remove a state of 
harm, but to enhance the lives of the islanders. 
In order to make sense of the rescue case, Shiffrin argues that what grounds our 
intuition about the rescuer is not the net benefit provided to the pinned person, but the 
reduction in harm.  This follows since having a broken arm makes one less of an 
‘endurer’141 than being burned alive.  The core conclusion Shiffrin reaches from this 
discussion is that harms should be inflicted non-consensually only when they are inflicted 
in order to decrease overall harm, and not when they merely produce pure benefit.  This 
principle makes sense of our seemingly inconsistent intuitions in the rescue case and in 
the Wealthy case.  Since Wealthy harmed someone for the purpose of pure benefit, he 
owes the injured party compensation whereas the firefighter acted to reduce harm so she 
does not owe compensation. 
 Shiffrin argues that this analysis has stark consequences for procreators, since 
bringing individuals into existence causes them to experience (and be at risk for) many 
harms without their consent and, unlike in the rescue case, this action is not done in order 
to prevent greater harms.  This means that even if individuals created judge their lives to 
be worth living, procreation is like the Wealthy case and so compensation is owed.  
According to Shiffrin, procreators are therefore liable for all the foreseeable harms of 
coming into existence.  And she takes these harms to be quite extensive: 
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By being caused to exist as persons, children are forced to assume 
moral agency, to face various demanding and sometimes wrenching 
moral questions, and to discharge taxing moral duties. They must 
endure the fairly substantial amount of pain, suffering, difficulty, 
significant disappointment, distress, and significant loss that occur 
within the typical life. They must face and undergo the fear and harm of 
death. Finally, they must bear the results of imposed risks that their 
lives may go terribly wrong in a variety of ways.142 
 
Notice that if Shiffrin is right about the extent of the harms caused by procreating, 
then the modified Millian approach I have suggested is inadequate.  Even if the life of a 
gamete provider’s biological offspring goes well, then on Shiffrin view, the offspring 
would still be entitled to compensation for the normally expected harms of existence.  
However, I think there are a few reasons to question the strength of Shiffrin’s argument. 
 First, Shiffrin’s non-comparative model rests on a sharp distinction between pure 
benefit and the lessening of harm, and this distinction is at best slippery (though I think 
that more likely it collapses entirely).  This is because it seems possible to describe what 
Shiffrin would ostensibly want to call pure benefit in terms of the lessening of harm.  
Consider again the Wealthy case.  Presumably the reason why Wealthy thinks that 
providing the islanders with gold will be a benefit is because it will enable them to fulfill 
desires that would otherwise go unsatisfied; if the islanders were completely fulfilled in 
their current situation it is unclear how gold would be of any use to them.  The fact that 
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gold will be of benefit to the islanders indicates that they are experiencing some degree of 
dissonance from their current situation (though perhaps of a very minor sort).  Given that 
disappointments and frustrations count as harms on Shiffrin’s view, it seems reasonable 
to include unfulfilled desires as a kind of harm.  This means that Wealthy’s philanthropy 
could be described as an attempt to relieve the harm of having unfulfilled desires, rather 
than an attempt to provide pure benefit.  Though perhaps some cases of pure benefit 
might exist, upon reflection it seems that many of the types of cases Shiffrin wants to 
consider pure benefit can easily be recast as efforts to reduce harm.  
 But this criticism might rely on an uncharitable interpretation of Shiffrin’s 
account of harm, since at various points Shiffrin seems to indicate that harm arises when 
there is a substantial discord between the will and one’s experience (as in the quote used 
in the previous paragraph).  Though Shiffrin does not provide a clear threshold, we might 
think that the discontent arising from unsatisfied desires for non-essential things is not 
severe enough to qualify as harm on this account, and so providing money to people who 
are relatively well off could not be construed as alleviating harm.  Although this is a 
plausible way of interpreting Shiffrin’s view, understanding harm in this manner creates 
substantial conflict with what we normally take to be harms.  For instance, imagine that 
wealthy faculty member Joan has her lunch stolen from the common room fridge by her 
equally wealthy colleague Martha.  Though Joan can quite easily acquire food elsewhere 
on campus at a cost that will have only a trivial impact on her finances, it still seems 
perfectly sensible to say that Joan has harmed Martha.  The harm might be very small and 
not even worth creating a fuss about, but it still seems like a harm.  This is true even if we 
apply Shiffrin’s criteria for determining if a harm has occurred; in her discussion of the 
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Wealthy case, Shiffrin suggests that if we have strong intuitions that an apology and 
compensation are due then there is reason to think that harm has occurred.143  In the case 
of the stolen lunch, it is quite clear that Martha owes Joan both.  The analysis of the 
stolen lunch suggests that for Shiffrin’s account to be compatible with our commonsense 
judgments about harm (and her own criteria), the threshold for the degree of discord 
between one’s will and experience that constitutes harm must in fact be quite low.   
Unfulfilled desires for inessential things can cause as much distress as having 
one’s lunch stolen by a colleague (which I take to be quite little), and in many cases may 
be even more distressing.  Consider the distress of a child who has access to good food, 
shelter and education but whose parents cannot afford to send her on the class ski trip, or 
that of a university student who spends her summers working a menial job to afford 
tuition and so cannot join her classmates on a backpacking tour of Europe.  In both these 
cases the unfulfilled desire causes non-negligible amounts of psychological distress.  
Given that most people on the island have some unfulfilled desire that is causing them 
some degree of mental anguish that money could help alleviate (paying off a mortgage, 
getting time off of work to pursue personal projects etc.), Wealthy’s actions can be 
described as an attempt to reduce harm.   
Shiffrin’s account of harm and pure benefits therefore faces a dilemma: either the 
distinction between the two fails, or the account of harm is overly narrow.  Neither bodes 
well for her argument.  If the distinction fails, then Shiffrin cannot adequately explain our 
different intuitions in the rescue case and the Wealthy case.  On the other hand, if the 
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distinction is preserved by use of an overly narrow definition of harm, then we have 
reason to reject the argument outright since it fails to accord with our basic intuitions.   
A less problematic issue with Shiffrin’s account concerns the relationship she 
relies on among unconsented harm, wrongdoing, and the obligation to compensate.  In 
her discussion of Wealthy, Shiffrin argues that he has behaved wrongly by physically 
harming Unlucky (and putting him at risk of even greater physical harm than he actually 
suffered) without his consent, and the wrongness of his actions provides the basis for the 
compensation he owes.  This example relies heavily on the intuition that harming 
someone without consent constitutes a wrong.  Though in the case of physical harm this 
seems rather uncontroversial, there are many other cases where we harm people without 
their consent yet do not think we have acted wrongly or owe any compensation.  For 
instance, say I develop a way of transporting people great distances in half the time of 
conventional flights, using half the people required in the airline industry.  This 
discovery, though perhaps good for a large number of people, will undoubtedly cause 
many people working in the airline industry to lose their jobs.  It is reasonable to assume 
that loss of employment will cause non-trivial amounts of harm to a significant subset of 
the affected people.  Despite the harm caused to unconsenting people, I do not seem to 
have acted wrongly, nor do I have a responsibility to compensate the unemployed 
workers.  This example demonstrates that: (1) I can harm people nonconsensually 
without acting wrongly, and (2) I can harm people nonconsensually without acquiring a 
duty to compensate them.  This potentially weakens the analogy between our assessment 
of Wealthy’s actions, which relied on an intuition about wrongness, and procreation.  
Even if procreation is harmful, this alone is insufficient to show that it is wrong, or that 
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compensation is owed.  This conclusion is problematic for Shiffrin because she is hesitant 
to consider procreation wrong144, and so needs to say something more to show that 
compensation is owed.  However, for anti-natalists who are inclined to think that 
procreation always results in a moral wrong145, no problem arises and the analogy 
between Wealthy and reproduction holds. 
I do not think that the lack of clarity with respect to the relationship between 
harms, wrongs and compensation is necessarily devastating for Shiffrin’s view, but it 
does show that there is a challenging and central theoretical question about her argument 
that needs to be resolved for such an extreme position to be fully convincing.  Shiffrin’s 
argument also does have a fair bit of intuitive appeal; given the extent of the burdens 
individuals face over a lifetime, Shiffrin seems quite right in pointing out that procreation 
“is in tension with the foundational liberal, anti-paternalist principle that forbids the 
imposition of significant burdens and risks upon a person without the person’s 
consent”.146  In many circumstances impacting a person in this way is grounds for owing 
them some form of compensation.   I also am inclined to agree that procreation is a 
“special case”147 that might not fit well with our usual framework for determining 
wrongfulness and when restitution is owed, but I think this should lead us to reject the 
extensive liability proposed by Shiffrin.  Though I am skeptical that a liability approach 
is appropriate in all cases of reproduction, it is worth noting that adopting Shiffrin’s 
conclusion about what procreators owe their offspring does not require us to accept that 
procreation is wrong – for although wrongness is sufficient for restitution it is not 
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necessary.  One clear example from tort law is liability in cases where the defense of 
necessity succeeds.148  Consider a couple trapped in the countryside during a severe 
snowstorm, and their only means of survival is to seek shelter in an empty cabin.149  
Unfortunately, the only way to gain entry into the cabin is to break a window.  In this 
circumstance the risk faced by the couple is greater than the harm done to the property by 
breaking a window, so the defense of necessity is applicable.  However, even though the 
law (and our intuitions) dictate that the couple does not act wrongly by breaking the 
window and entering the cabin, they are still liable to pay for the damage done to the 
window.  This is not to suggest that the doctrine of necessity is applicable in gamete 
provision, but to show that tort law does sometimes recognize liability in the absence of 
wrongdoing.  This means there is space within current the theoretical framework for the 
conclusion Shiffrin wants to draw. 
Shiffrin provides a very thorough analysis of the concept of harm, and teases out 
conflicting intuitions we have about its relationship to restitution.  However, I do not 
think the conclusion she draws with respect to what procreators owe their biological 
offspring is adequately supported by the arguments she provides.  Her explanation of our 
differing intuitions in the Wealthy case and the rescue case rests on a distinction between 
harm and ‘pure benefit’ that either is inconsistent with more fundamental intuitions or 
collapses.  Shiffrin’s argument also lacks principles that distinguish the kinds of harms 
that bring about a duty of restitution from the kinds of harms that do not.  Shiffrin’s 
conclusion, which requires procreators to compensate their offspring for all the harms 
they suffer over a lifetime, thus on a problematic distinction between harm and benefit, 
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and an incomplete account of when restitution is owed.  Because of these weaknesses in 
her argument, and the unintuitiveness of her conclusions, we should reject Shiffrin’s very 
extreme view in favor of the more moderate view that I propose.   
Conclusion  
 Over the course of this chapter I have argued for two primary conclusions.  First, I 
showed that though gamete providers have care-taking responsibilities for their biological 
offspring, these responsibilities to not require them to perform the ‘nitty-gritty’ of 
parenting themselves.  This is because no current theory of parenthood requires gamete 
providers to become social parents.  Secondly, I argued that gamete providers have the 
responsibility to ensure that their biological offspring have a reasonable chance at a 
desirable life.  This framework contains both an absolute and societally relative standard 
of care, and I think best captures what is minimally owed to children.  I also defended 
this view against two possible competing views: (1) that gamete providers owe nothing 
because providing gametes under circumstances where continued support is not possible 
does not harm children150, and (2) that procreators have a duty to compensate their 
offspring for the harms they suffer over the course of their life.  The view I have 
defended, that gamete providers must ensure that their biological offspring have 
reasonable chance at a desirable existence, is a more plausible middle position between 
these two extremes.  
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Chapter 4 Applications to Specific Duties  
In the preceding chapters, I argued that gamete providers have a special 
responsibility to ensure that their genetic offspring have a reasonable chance at a 
desirable life.  In this chapter, I discuss specific responsibilities that are implied by this        
general principle.  First, I discuss gamete providers’ pre-provision responsibilities.  I take 
these responsibilities to include screening commissioning parents, and ensuring that there 
exists a reliable state system for monitoring whether the welfare needs of their biological 
offspring are being met.  Second, I cover post-provision responsibilities, that is, 
responsibilities gamete providers have once their gametes have been used to produce a 
child.  Here I argue that in some cases, gamete providers may have a responsibility to 
play an active role, either through financial support or personal intervention, in the lives 
of their biological offspring.   
When assessing the implications of my view about pre- and post-provision 
responsibilities, it is important the keep a few key things in mind.  First, the minimum 
welfare standard defended in chapter three – a reasonable chance at a desirable life –  is 
an account of what gamete providers must ensure for offspring that they do not intend to 
parent.  It is compatible with my view, and it is likely true, that social and moral parents 
have weightier responsibilities towards their children.  Second, this argument establishes 
the minimum that gamete providers owe to their biological offspring in order to satisfy 
their care-taking responsibilities.  However, gamete providers who merely meet their 
minimum care-taking responsibilities could still be faulted for failing to do more in 
certain circumstances, depending on one’s background moral framework.  For instance, 
one might think on Kantian grounds that gamete providers who are in a position to 
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provide additional benefits to their biological offspring at little cost to themselves, but do 
not, have failed to be appropriately beneficent.  Similarly, one might think on utilitarian 
grounds that gamete providers act wrongly when failing to provide more for their 
biological offspring if doing so would increase the overall happiness of these children.  In 
both of these cases, although gamete providers might fail to fulfill other moral 
responsibilities, they have not necessarily failed to fulfill their specific care-taking 
responsibilities.   
 This claim that gamete providers could fulfill their care-taking responsibilities but 
at the same time fail in their general responsibilities to the same child might seem odd; 
we might think that having care-taking responsibility for a child also intensifies the other 
responsibilities we might have to act in that child’s interests.  For instance, we might 
think that an individual who fails in her duty of beneficence by ignoring a school’s plea 
for much-needed resources also fails in her care-taking responsibilities if her child attends 
the school that has made the plea for much-needed resources.  However, it is possible that 
one’s care-taking responsibilities do not amount to be partial generally to certain 
individuals, but rather require only the fulfillment of certain well-defined responsibilities.  
Consider the following example.  A physician might have a special responsibility to 
prioritize the healthcare needs of her existing patients over new patients with whom she 
has no established relationship.  However, this does not mean that the physician has a 
responsibility to prioritize all of the interests of her existing patients over the interests of 
strangers.  A miserly physician who fails to be appropriately beneficent does not also fail 
in her special obligations to her patient by ignoring the patient’s very deserving pet 
charity.  Similarly, the special responsibilities gamete providers have towards their 
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biological offspring that I outline here are restricted in scope to the care-taking 
responsibilities they acquire qua gamete provider.  Someone could nevertheless argue 
that gamete providers have a duty to be partial towards their biological offspring more 
broadly because of their genetic relatedness, and thus think that the responsibilities I 
outline are inadequate.151  However, given the weaknesses of genetic accounts of 
responsibility discussed in chapters one and three, I think it is unlikely that genetic 
relatedness alone would ground any substantial duties of partiality.   Thus, the focus of 
this chapter is the care-taking responsibilities that gamete providers have towards their 
genetic offspring. 
 The view I outline in this chapter is different from others who have similar views 
about responsibility following gamete provision.  Though Archard accepts that gamete 
providers have inalienable responsibilities towards their biological offspring, he thinks 
that these are fully discharged when gametes are provided in circumstances where it is 
reasonable to think that the resulting children will be well cared for.  Archard states that, 
in the context of a system that has consistently proven to place children with competent 
parents, “[a] gamete provider does not alienate the obligation incurred by causing a child 
to exist.  Rather he has discharged it by ensuring that the willing others will take on the 
responsibilities of acting as the children’s parents”.152  This view implies that 
responsibilities do not continue once certain pre-provision responsibilities are fulfilled.  
Conversely, Porter thinks that post-provision responsibilities do arise, but does not give a 
detailed account of what these responsibilities might look like, or what implications post- 
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provision responsibilities have for pre-provision responsibilities, and vice versa.153 In 
contrast to Archard, I think that even when pre-provision responsibilities are satisfied, 
gamete providers still have post-provision responsibilities.  And, unlike Porter, I give a 
detailed account of both pre-provision and post-provision responsibilities.  First, I will 
turn to pre-provision responsibilities.  
1. Pre-provision Responsibilities 
 As noted in chapter one, pre-provision responsibilities are much less controversial 
than post-provision responsibilities, since the former are accepted even by authors who 
deny that gamete providers have post-donation responsibilities.  For instance, though 
Bayne finds post-provision responsibilities highly implausible, he thinks that gamete 
providers are ethically required to take certain precautions prior to engaging in gamete 
provision in order to prevent harm to their biological offspring.154  Similarly, Fuscaldo 
thinks that post-provision responsibilities can be alienated, but only if pre-provision 
responsibilities are fulfilled first.155  The general consensus regarding pre-provision 
responsibilities is that gamete providers must take steps to ensure that intending parents 
can reasonably be expected to adequately care for the children they plan to parent.  I 
accept this view, and argue that pre-provision responsibilities require gamete providers to 
ensure that the proper screening of intending parents has taken place.  I further the 
discussion on parental screening, however, by arguing that this requirement does not give 
rise to the problem of discrimination that others have identified with the current practice 
of screening some parents (most notably adoptive parents), but not other parents.  Briefly, 
some have argued that the status quo, which requires parental screening for individuals 
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who wish to become parents through adoption but not individuals who wish to become 
parents through other means, is problematically discriminatory.156  I argue that a 
screening requirement for gamete recipients does not succumb to this problem, even in 
the absence of universal parental screening.  
 I additionally argue that for gamete provision to be ethical, it must occur within a 
jurisdiction that has a trustworthy child welfare system in place.  The child welfare 
system must have the power to intervene into the private life of families in order to 
protect children, and must have the authority to adjudicate disputes between individuals 
regarding whether a child’s welfare needs are being appropriately satisfied.  I argue that 
this system is required for two principal reasons: (1) given that multiple individuals have 
a responsibility to ensure that a child’s welfare needs are met, some method of resolving 
disputes amongst these individuals needs to be in place, and (2) in many circumstances 
gamete providers will not be able to directly check up on their genetic offspring and so 
they will need to rely on a trustworthy third party to ensure that their genetic offspring are 
faring well. 
1.1 Theoretical Concerns about Pre-Provision Responsibilities 
 Before discussing the specific pre-provision responsibilities that gamete providers 
have, I first want to address a worry about the possibility of pre-provision 
responsibilities.  Since no children yet exist when gametes are initially provided, 
someone might think that gamete providers could not have pre-provision care-taking 
responsibilities towards their biological offspring. There are however two ways that I can 
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address this problem, at least for the purposes of the argument I am presenting in this 
thesis.  First, Feinberg provides an example that suggests quite convincingly that we can 
have responsibilities in the present towards future persons.157  He asks us to consider a 
person who hides a bomb in a kindergarten class that is timed to go off in ten years.  At 
the time that the bomb is set, no one that is endangered by it exists and hence, the 
bomber’s actions do not put at risk any presently identifiable people. Despite the fact that 
no person’s rights are violated at the time that the bomb is planted, we still think the 
bomber has done something wrong in the present by endangering the lives of future 
persons.  This suggests that individuals have a duty to avoid harming future persons, and 
quite plausibly a similar responsibility could extend to gamete providers.  This analogy is 
not perfect however, since the bomber’s duty is negative, but care-taking responsibilities 
are positive.  Even if we think that some positive responsibilities towards future persons 
exist, which itself is a contested idea, it remains unclear whether these are strong enough 
to support the kind of care-taking responsibilities I outlined in the previous chapter. 
 If, for reasons of this disanalogy or otherwise, Feinberg’s example is not 
convincing, a second possible way to ground pre-provision responsibilities is to note that 
it is generally wrong to willingly put oneself in a position where one will likely be unable 
to fulfill future responsibilities.  For instance, suppose that I wager my bicycle on the 
outcome of a Toronto Maple Leafs game, betting that they will lose to the Vancouver 
Canucks.  In the third period, with seconds to go, the Toronto Maple Leafs shockingly 
have a solid 5-0 lead.  Out of spite for the person I am betting against, I immediately give 
my bicycle to the bartender, making it impossible for me to fulfill my end of the wager.  
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Even though at the time I gave the bicycle away, I was not failing to fulfill my 
responsibility, it seems that I still acted wrongly.  Given that (as will be shown) certain 
conditions likely must be in place early on for gamete providers to fulfill their care-taking 
responsibilities, we could similarly argue that by failing to ensure that these conditions 
are indeed in place prior to the existence of child, gamete providers act wrongly.158   
1.2 Parental Screening 
The clearest pre-provision responsibility of gamete providers is to ensure that the 
individuals intending to become parents by use of the provisioned gametes are able to 
provide enough emotional and material support to their biological children so that these 
children will have a reasonable chance at a desirable life.  As mentioned in earlier 
chapters, many authors have accepted that gamete providers have this kind of pre-
provision responsibility; however, relatively little has been said about what this means for 
current gamete provision practices.  My view is that given the crucial role that intending 
parents will play in determining the quality of the lives of the children that they will 
parent, gamete providers must ensure that these prospective parents go through a rigorous 
screening process. This marks a stark change from the status quo where much provision 
is done in the absence of extensive screening of would-be parents.159  Given my argument 
that gamete providers are responsible for ensuring a reasonable chance at a desirable life 
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for their biological offspring, I am inclined to agree with Benatar that, in its current form, 
gamete provision is predominantly done unethically.160   
Importantly, requiring parental screening does not necessarily mean condemning 
all anonymous gamete provision.  Gamete providers could be given anonymized 
background information about prospective parents and be given an active role in 
determining which person or people will have access to their gametes.  Alternatively, 
clinics that provide gametes could do the screening themselves, make available the 
standards they use and provide audits to prove that they meet this standard.  In either 
case, screening procedures might include home visits and parenting classes.  A proposal 
of this sort is not unprecedented for certain prospective parents.  Similar requirements 
exist for individuals wishing to adopt children to whom they are not related.161 
A possible criticism of this view might be that it is discriminatory to single out 
individuals making use of provided gametes for parental screening.  This worry has been 
raised with respect to mandatory screening for adoptive parents.162  By reasons of parity, 
someone may argue that if individuals who seek to become parents through gamete 
provision (or adoption for that matter) should be screened, then so should individuals 
who seek to become parents using the more traditional method of sexual intercourse.  
After all, what is at stake in both cases is the wellbeing of children.  To treat the two 
cases differently amounts to either an unjustified skepticism about people who use 
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provided gametes to become parents, or the neglect of children created through sexual 
intercourse by failing to adequately ensure their parents’ ability to care for them.  Since I 
approve of parental screening in the case of gamete provision, it might seem that the 
demands of fairness towards both parents and children require that I also approve of 
parental screening in all (or at least many other) reproductive contexts.163 
Though compelling, there is an important disanalogy between the parity 
arguments made on behalf of adoptive parents (if there is screening for them, there 
should be screening for everyone) and the case for parental screening that I am making 
here.  The parity concerns raised on behalf of adoptive parents arise when the state 
requires parental screening for only one subset of intending parents but not others.  Since 
state-enforced mandatory screening is generally defended on the basis of the state’s 
parens patriae164 obligations, and these obligations apply equally to all children within 
the state’s mandate165, then it is problematic if screening occurs only for certain classes of 
parents.  If the state has an equal obligation to ensure that child A and child B are 
parented properly, then barring any empirical justification to screen in one case and not 
the other, it seems wrong only to screen A’s parent(s).  Given that there is no evidence to 
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suggest that parents who use provisioned gametes (or adopt) are less capable than other 
parents166, the disparity in screening requirements is unjust. 
Although I am inclined to accept this argument – that it is unjust for the state to 
require parental screening for individuals who use provided gametes (or adoption) but not 
require screening for individuals who reproduce through sexual intercourse or forms of 
assisted reproduction that do not involve provided gametes167  – my argument does not 
succumb to the same criticism.  My argument is not that the state has a special duty to 
ensure that parents who use provided gametes are screened, but that only those who 
provide the gametes have this responsibility.  The important difference in the gamete 
provider case is that the responsibility to screen does not arise from some general duty to 
ensure that all children are well taken care of, but instead arises from a special duty on 
the part of gamete providers to ensure that the children they help create have a reasonable 
chance at a desirable life.  The parity problem arises only at the level of state 
intervention, where there is no special responsibility or special risk that would justify 
screening in gamete provision cases but not in procreation more broadly.  However, as I 
have argued, gamete providers do have a special responsibility towards their progeny, 
and this both demands and justifies that gamete providers ensure some screening of those 
who wish to parent the children created using their gametes. 
In order to clarify the difference in permissibility between state-mandated 
screening and screening initiated by an individual with care-taking responsibilities, 
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consider the following example.  Imagine two recent childhood friends, Sally and Jane.  
Sally is going on a four-week camping trip with her family to a provincial park that is 
very remote, making reliable communication back home impossible.  Sally invites Jane to 
go along on the trip, and so Jane asks her parents for permission.  Since Sally and Jane 
have only recently become friends, their parents hardly know each other.  Jane’s parents 
think a camping trip would be a great experience for their child, but since they do not 
know Sally’s family very well, they are concerned about sending Jane off to a remote and 
potentially dangerous environment with people who are essentially strangers.  In order to 
properly determine whether the trip is a good idea, they decide to ‘screen’ Sally’s parents 
by meeting with them to discuss their experience with camping, find out what 
preparations they have made for the trip, etc.  After learning that Sally’s parents are both 
professional guides and have made ample preparations, Jane’s parents decide that the trip 
is a great idea. 
 In this example, Jane’s parents behaved completely appropriately.  Furthermore, 
if they had decided at the outset that there were too many unknowns and that they did not 
want to find out all of the details, they could have justifiably prevented Jane from going 
on the camping trip, without conducting any kind of screening.  Notice that if Jane’s 
parents had chosen the second option and not looked into the details of the trip, then 
barring any reasonable grounds to suspect Sally’s parents were seriously putting Sally in 
harm’s way, they would not have had a responsibility to press Sally’s parents for details 
in order to ensure Sally’s safety on the trip.  The reason why this particular disparity is 
justifiable is that Jane’s parents have a special responsibility to ensure Jane’s safety, but 
not Sally’s.  Given that gamete providers have a special responsibility to ensure the 
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wellbeing of their biological offspring, they similarly act justly when they take steps to 
ensure that the individuals who will be parenting them are up to the task, even where 
screening is not the norm for all potential parents. 
 It is worth noting that the argument made here, defending the appropriateness of 
parental screening done at the request of gamete providers, is different from another 
similar argument sometimes given in defense of asymmetries in parental screening.  
Some people argue that though the state has no business screening people who become 
parents through sexual intercourse, transferring (delegating according to the argument 
made in chapter 2) parental responsibility from one person to another ought to be treated 
differently.  The reason given is that handing to someone the responsibility to raise a 
child that one would otherwise have a duty to raise is a morally weighty decision that 
must be taken seriously.  The only way for this kind of transaction to be ethical is if the 
individuals handing over this responsibility have reasonable assurances that the 
individual(s) who will raise the child will be able to provide the child with an acceptable 
future.  Given what is at stake, the state has an interest in regulating these kinds of 
transactions.168 However, as McLeod and Botterell argue, there seems to be little 
justification for why the state should treat transfers (delegations on my account) of 
parental responsibilities differently than acquisitions of parental responsibilities.169  It is 
unclear why the state ought to scrutinize the delegation of parental responsibilities, any 
more than the original acquisition of these responsibilities.  Presumably, the state ought 
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to have equal concern for the wellbeing of children, regardless of how their parents 
acquired their parental responsibilities. 
 I accept the preceding argument against state-mandated asymmetrical parental 
screening, but it does not show that the screening I advocate for rests on a similar 
inequitable intrusion into the lives of some parents.  Returning to the camping example, 
though we do not think that the screening done by Jane’s parents is wrong, we would be 
skeptical of a regulatory policy that permitted Sally’s parents to take their child camping 
without any state interference, but required Jane’s parents to seek state approval if they 
wanted her to join Sally’s family on the trip.   It is the state’s requirement that screening 
take place in one case but not the other that makes the asymmetry problematic.  
Similarly, in the case of reproduction, it is that the state only forces adoptive parents 
alone to prove their suitability that makes screening problematic.  This is because, as 
stated above, the state has the same parens patriae responsibility to all children under its 
jurisdiction; it invokes it in an unjustifiably discriminatory fashion when screening only 
adoptive parents.   
 It is important to note that I have neither endorsed nor opposed state-mandated 
universal parental screening.  I agree that the current regulatory framework that imposes 
screening on adoptive parents but not others is unjust, but have argued that the private 
responsibility of gamete providers to ensure the parental competency of intending parents 
does not result in a similar injustice.  The argument that gamete providers have a 
responsibility to screen (either directly or indirectly) the individuals who will be using 
their gametes to create a child is neutral as to whether universal screening ought to be 
mandated and/or regulated by the state.  Screening procedures are possible without state 
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intervention; pre-provision responsibilities can thus be fulfilled by gamete providers 
themselves or through the use of third-party agencies.  However, following McLeod and 
Botterell170, I think that if the state were to require mandatory screening for individuals 
making use of others’ gametes, then the state would also have to require screening for 
other parents as well; to do otherwise would be unjust. 
One possible objection to my view, that gamete providers ought to ensure 
intending parents are screened, is the discriminatory effect it might have on single people 
wishing to become parents, as well as on gay and lesbian couples.  Since these 
individuals cannot reproduce without the use of third-party gametes, screening may 
disproportionately impact them.  Also, since these individuals are already stigmatized 
with respect to parenting, the additional burden of screening might add to the social 
perception that they are not fit to be parents.  Though this might be an unintended 
consequence of my view, I do not think that these secondary effects make it defensible 
for gamete providers to ignore the responsibilities they incur when choosing to allow 
others to create another human being using their gametes.  The current reality – that 
reproduction requires two individuals of different sexes – is not ideal, but this fact does 
not alter any individual’s personal responsibility for the free actions that they undertake.  
The stigma associated with being a single or homosexual parent is better resolved by 
addressing the underlying social attitudes that perpetuate these ideas than by ignoring the 
weighty responsibilities individuals acquire when they help to bring a new life into the 
world. 
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What I have shown up to this point is that the responsibility to screen intending 
parents follows from gamete providers’ responsibility to ensure that their biological 
offspring will have a reasonable chance at a desirable life.  I have also shown that this 
responsibility does not require us to accept universal parental screening.  Next I will 
outline why gamete providers must also ensure that there is a reliable child-welfare 
system in place. 
1.3 Requirement for a Trustworthy Child-Welfare System 
 The second pre-provision responsibility that I argue exists for gamete providers is 
to provide gametes only when there is a trustworthy child-welfare system in place that 
can reliably monitor the wellbeing of gamete providers’ offspring, and can make support 
and custody decisions.  There are two main reasons why I think that this kind of child 
welfare system is required.  The first reason is that, in cases where there is little or no 
contact between gamete providers and their offspring or their offspring’s family, gamete 
providers will not be able fulfill their post-provision responsibilities without the 
presences of a child welfare system to alert them that their intervention is required.  The 
second reason is that even in circumstances where gamete providers have the requisite 
knowledge to intervene on their own accord, there will likely be disagreements between 
the different individuals who have caretaking responsibilities for the child in question – 
most importantly the child’s social parent(s) – about whether intervention is warranted, 
and the extent of the intervention that is appropriate.  A well-functioning child welfare 
system will be able to resolve these conflicts by dictating what kind of intervention is 
required or is permissible.   
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I will now turn to the first reason for why gamete providers need to ensure there is 
a trustworthy child welfare system in place.  In many cases of gamete provision, there is 
little or no relationship between gamete providers and their offspring, or their offspring’s 
parents. Consequently, many gamete providers will not be in a position to determine 
whether their biological offspring are being adequately raised by their social parents, or 
be in a position to provide any required assistance to their biological offspring.  In these 
cases, without having some trustworthy third party they can rely on to inform them when 
their intervention is required, gamete providers put themselves in a position where they 
are ignorant of their responsibilities.  As argued at the beginning of this chapter, putting 
oneself in a position where it will not be possible to fulfill one’s future responsibilities is 
morally problematic.  In order to avoid this morally problematic outcome, some agency 
must keep records about the identity of gamete providers and their biological offspring, 
and contact gamete providers when their offspring need support. 
 Though this argument implies that state agencies keep records identifying gamete 
providers and their biological offspring, this does not mean that gamete provision cannot 
be done in a manner that preserves anonymity, at least in many cases, between the 
intending parents and their children, and gamete providers.  The identifying information 
would only need to be accessed if the welfare agency determined that intervention by a 
gamete provider was potentially warranted.   Furthermore, anonymity would only need to 
be breached in cases where the required intervention could not be performed without 
revealing the identities of the relevant parties.   
 Someone might disagree that a child welfare system that tracks connections 
between gamete providers and their biological offspring would always be required in 
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order for gamete providers to ensure that their responsibilities are being fulfilled.  For 
instance, we could imagine a child welfare agency so competent that that it would be 
reasonable for gamete providers to trust it with ensuring that their biological offspring 
have a reasonable chance at a desirable life, without ever needing to rely on them for any 
intervention.  Perhaps the child welfare agency would itself take care of any needs not 
properly fulfilled by the child’s social parents.  If this were the case, one might think that 
it would be permissible to provide gametes in the absence of a system that tracks the 
identities of individuals involved in reproduction by use of provided gametes.  However, 
I think that even in this case, a system that keeps records of gamete providers and their 
biological offspring is necessary for gamete provision to be ethical.  Consider the 
following analogy. 
A parent is called away overseas for a project of great importance, and must put 
her child in boarding school for two years.  The parent has a choice between two schools 
both with equally good track records at providing their boarders with excellent care.  
School A has a rule stipulating that as a condition of accepting the boarder, the parent 
cannot contact the school to see how things are going, nor will the school contact the 
parent if problems arise, preferring instead to handle any problems that arise on its own.  
School B has no such rule and allows for open communication between the parent, the 
child, and the school.  Without an overriding reason to put the child in school A, it seems 
that doing so would be irresponsible, given school B is equally available.  We would 
rightfully think, in other words, that a parent who chooses school A does not take her 
responsibility to ensure her child’s welfare seriously enough.  This case shows that even 
if there are good reasons to think that a child will be well cared for by others, individuals 
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with persisting care-taking responsibilities cannot permissibly place themselves in a 
position where they remain ignorant of their potential responsibilities, if another option is 
available.  In the case of gamete provision, providers have the option of declining to 
provide their gametes if no agency exists that is willing to keep track of their biological 
offspring’s welfare.    
A possible counter-example might arise in the context of adoption.  We could 
imagine a distressed parent171 who is certain that he will be unable to adequately provide 
for his child and so opts to put her child up for adoption.  The only adoption agency 
available has an excellent track record at placing children in good homes, but only 
arranges closed adoptions and does not keep records about the identity of children’s 
biological parents.  In this case it seems permissible for the father to put his child up for 
adoption, and it seems that it would be wrong to blame the father if, due to some 
misfortune, the adoptive family ended up unable to provide adequately for the adopted 
child.  There is however an important difference between this case and that of the gamete 
provider.  The parent is placed in the unfortunate position of choosing between being 
unable to adequately provide for the well-being of his child, and giving the child a better 
prospect of a desirable life, but losing contact with the child.  In this circumstance, if the 
interests of the child are likely best served through adoption, then this choice is a 
permissible.  In the gamete provision case, however, since the provider does not 
jeopardize the well-being of a child by refraining from entering into an agreement for 
anonymous gamete provision, there is no pressing harm that justifies entering into an 
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agreement that would make it impossible for him ensure that his child’s needs are 
adequately provided for.  
 Turning now to the second argument, we can imagine circumstances where a 
gamete provider has a meaningful but non-parental relationship with his biological 
offspring that gives him knowledge about the parental decisions made for his offspring.  
We could think of this relationship like that of an involved uncle or a close family friend.  
Furthermore, we could imagine that the gamete provider believes that a decision made by 
his offspring’s parents puts his offspring at risk of significant harm.  For example, 
imagine that the child suffers from a serious but non-acute health condition that requires a 
blood transfusion as part of the treatment.  The parents believe, on religious grounds, that 
a blood transfusion would consign their child to an eternity of suffering and so refuse to 
permit the child to receive treatment on the grounds that the treatment is not in the child’s 
best interest.  However, the gamete provider does not share these religious beliefs.  
Despite his best efforts, the gamete provider cannot convince the parents of his offspring 
to permit the child to undergo the necessary treatment.  
 This case highlights the possibility of conflicts arising between individuals who 
each have a responsibility to ensure the child’s welfare needs are met, and raises the 
problem of how these conflicts are to be resolved.  A natural inclination might be that the 
final decision in these kinds of conflicts ought to always reside with the child’s parents.  
However, if this were the case, then it would raise moral problems for gamete providers 
because it would provide them with no means of fulfilling their responsibility to ensure 
the wellbeing of their offspring.  Furthermore, as has been noted by other authors, some 
authority to fulfill one’s responsibilities seems to follow naturally from having those 
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responsibilities in the first place.172  If gamete providers have the care-taking 
responsibilities I have outlined, then they need to be able to fulfill them.  
One possibility is that they do so by simply intervening in the lives of their 
biological offspring whenever they deem that their offspring’s parents are not adequately 
discharging their care-taking responsibilities.  However, this suggestion is problematic 
for two important reasons. First, many of the duties and privileges of parenthood simply 
are not capable of being fulfilled by others, since they depend on a pre-existing intimate 
relationship.  For instance, consider a hospitalized child who is distressed and wants her 
social parents to comfort her.  A gamete provider with no social relationship with the 
child is simply incapable of stepping in and fulfilling this role, because the child is 
seeking the attention not of just any adult, but of his parent. Attention, support and 
nurturing clearly have a different meaning and importance when they come from 
different people. Additionally, some authors have justified the special authority that 
parents have for making choices for their children by appealing to the special knowledge 
and trusting bonds that arise from the intimate nature of the parent-child relationship.173  
Since gamete providers will in general lack this kind of intimate relationship, many kinds 
of intervention will simply not be possible for gamete providers because they lack the 
special knowledge and special bonds that ground parental duties and authority.  
Permitting gamete providers to intervene in these cases would presumably cause more 
harm than good.     
 Secondly, the intimacy of the parent-child relationship is important for the 
wellbeing of children, and this relationship requires a certain degree of privacy and 
                                                 
172
 Kant 6:282; Blustein op. cit. p. 43. 
173
 See Austin’s stewardship account of parental right.  Austin, op. cit., p. 82. 
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autonomy.174  Interference from outside parties thus poses a risk of harm to children by 
jeopardizing this relationship; it threatens both the privacy and autonomy that are 
essential to it.  This means that in cases where intervention by a gamete provider into the 
private life of her biological offspring might otherwise be justified – that is even in light 
the constraints mentioned in the preceding paragraph – the potential benefits in doing so 
must outweigh the potential harms.  Determining where this threshold lies is not 
straightforward.  
 Given that (1) it is foreseeable for disagreements to arise between gamete 
providers and the parent(s) of their offspring about what is required for ensuring the 
wellbeing of the child in question, and that (2) determining when intervention by gamete 
providers is warranted is fraught with difficulty, some system that both gamete providers 
and parents have confidence in must be in place to resolve conflicts.  The purpose of such 
a system is to ensure that gamete providers are able to fulfill their responsibilities by 
intervening when appropriate, but also protect the welfare interests of children by only 
allowing such interventions when they are warranted by the circumstances.  I propose 
that a well-functioning state-run child welfare system is most appropriate to perform this 
task because it would have the ability to make legally binding custody and support 
decisions.  On my view, gamete providers would have to seek authorization from the 
state prior to intervening in the private life of their biological offspring, without the 
consent of the child’s parent(s).  Importantly, the need for a third party to adjudicate 
disputes need not rest on anticipating that either gamete providers or parents will 
sometimes act maliciously, but can instead rest on the recognition that parents and 
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gamete providers may have different views about where the minimum welfare standard 
lies, and when intervention is warranted.175   
 So far I have argued that gamete providers need some avenue for fulfilling their 
post-provision repsonsibilites, but because of the possibility of disagreements between 
gamete providers and parents over the need for intervention, and the potential for harm 
caused by over-zealous intrusion into the parent-child relationship, any such action ought 
to be vetted through a state-run child-welfare agency.  I take this conclusion to ground the 
need for prospective gamete providers to ensure that a trustworthy child-welfare agency 
is in place prior to engaging in gamete provision.  In cases of open gamete provision, 
there would be no reliable way for gamete providers and parents, who both have care-
taking responsibilities for the same child, to resolve the aforementioned conflicts, unless 
some child welfare system was in place. 
 I have thus argued that gamete provider have the two following pre-provision 
responsibilities.  Gamete providers ought to only make their gametes available after (1) 
ensuring that indenting parents are properly screened, and (2) ensuring that a reliable 
child welfare agency is in place.  I have provided two arguments for why gamete 
provision is only permissible when there is a reliable child-welfare system in place.  In 
cases where there is a relationship between gamete providers and their biological 
offspring, disagreements might arise between the gamete provider(s) and the child’s 
parents about whether intervention is warranted.  Without some third party to adjudicate 
disputes between individuals who each have care-taking responsibilities, there is a risk of 
individuals failing to fulfill their responsibilities, or intervening obtrusively.  
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Additionally, in cases where gamete providers do not have direct contact with their 
biological offspring, they will have to rely on a trustworthy child welfare system to alert 
them to when their intervention may be required.  In the absence of some body that is 
tasked to fulfill this role, gamete providers would put themselves in a situation where 
they are unable to fulfill their moral responsibilities, and this is problematic.   
2 Post-Provision Responsibilities 
 Ideally, the screening procedure used for evaluating the suitability of intending 
parents would ensure that the children created using provided gametes would be properly 
cared for by their intending parents.  However, in practice there is always the possibility 
of screening errors that might result in the placement of children with unfit parents.  
Additionally, unpredictable changes in the circumstances of parents caused by sudden 
illness, accident, economic depressions, etc. might make individuals who were initially 
ideal parents no longer able to fulfill their responsibilities unaided, or at all.  Since 
gamete providers retain care-taking responsibilities, they have a duty to ensure that the 
welfare needs of their biological offspring continue to be met.  In this section, I will 
discuss two kinds of interventions that might be required of gamete providers, depending 
on the particular circumstances: material support and personal intervention.176  I will also 
discuss how the required kinds of interventions differ depending on the relationship that 
exists between gamete providers and their offspring’s families. 
2.1 Material Support 
 As noted previously is this chapter, interventions that interfere with the autonomy 
and privacy of the parent-child relationship risk disrupting the intimacy that is important 
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for the wellbeing of both children and their parents.  Given this potential harm, it seems 
prudent to prefer less intrusive interventions over more intrusive ones when the 
circumstances only require the former.  One avenue of minimally-intrusive intervention 
that gamete providers could employ is providing material support to assist their biological 
offspring if they risk no longer having a reasonable chance at a desirable life.  Though 
this support could potentially take the form of monthly payments if the circumstances 
were dire, it could also involve paying for uninsured medical costs, extra tutoring, or 
other specific goods that the gamete providers’ biological offspring require. 
Consider the following example.  The social parents of a child created through 
gamete provision are emotionally competent caregivers who love and support their child. 
However, due to an unforeseen economic crisis, the parents’ income becomes reduced 
and they are no longer able to afford an expensive medication that is not covered by their 
insurance.  Though the family has to make do with less, this is the only area where their 
lack of resources places their child at risk of no longer having a reasonable chance at a 
desirable life.  In this case, there is no need to interfere in the relationship between the 
social parents and their children since merely providing the resources that are lacking 
would suffice.  Assuming the gamete provider was able, in this case he would have a 
responsibility to pay for the medicine or otherwise provide it.177 
Depending on the relationship between the gamete provider and his offspring’s 
family, there are different ways that he could fulfill this responsibility.  If the gamete 
provider is involved in the family’s life and is aware of need for the medication, he would 
have a responsibility to offer to pay for the medications, and make the arrangements to do 
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 Porter similarly thinks this kind of responsibility can arise for gamete providers.  Porter (2012), op. cit. 
p. 72. 
138 
 
 
 
so.  In cases where the gamete provider does not provide for the child’s need, either 
because he was no relationship with the family and thus is unaware of the need, or simply 
refuses to voluntarily fulfill his responsibilities, the child welfare system would be 
required to make an order for payment and enforce it. 
 Importantly, the responsibility to provide the material support outlined here is 
substantially different from the child support model imposed by the legal system.  
Currently, child support obligations are not determined by whether the child’s needs 
would be unsatisfied without financial support, but are determined by the financial means 
of the individuals who have the obligation to provide support.178  On my view however, 
gamete providers are only required to provide material support if their offspring risk no 
longer having a reasonable chance at a desirable life in the absence of such support.179  
This means that if the social parents can get sufficient support from other sources, such as 
the state, gamete providers would not have to provide the material support themselves.  In 
societies with robust social safety nets, providers might never be required to provide 
material support, because the state would adequately provide for the care of all children 
in need.     
The second problem that someone might have with this argument is that it 
imposes on gamete providers the requirement to provide material support to their 
offspring, but does not provide them with any decision making authority over the child 
they are obliged to help support.  Returning to the previous example, under my view the 
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 For instance, see the child support calculation formulas of the various provinces available here: 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/fl-df/child-enfant/fcsg-lfpae/2011/index.html.  Though special need may 
increase the amount owed, lack of need does not reduce what is owed.   
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 This is similar to the traditional English common law approach to child support, in which the child is 
entitled to reasonable support, but not a share of her parents’ wealth.  See: Wikeley, Nick. Child Support: 
Law and Policy. Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006. p.13. 
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requirement to subsidize the costs of medication alone does not empower the gamete 
provider to have his offspring undergo a second medical examination to ensure that the 
medication is necessary, or otherwise challenge the parents’ decision to use that 
particular medication.  Someone might think that this state of affairs is unjust, and argue 
that the responsibility to help support a child should always come with some authority in 
parenting decisions.  Archard calls this view the ‘parental package view’, and dismisses it 
because, on reflection, it seems that there are many circumstances where individuals can 
have responsibilities without rights.180  First, consider a person who is injured due to the 
negligence of another.  In this case, the negligent party has a responsibility to cover the 
injured party’s medical expenses, but this does not entail that the negligent party has a 
right to determine which physician the injured party uses or which treatment plan the 
injured party must follow.  In the reproductive context, there are also circumstances in 
which individuals have responsibilities to support children but have no parental rights.  
For instance, as Archard highlights, we do not think that people should be able to gain 
authority in parental decision making if they create a child through sexual assault; 
however we still think that these individuals have an obligation to help support the child 
that they participated in creating.  This shows that the features that ground the 
responsibility to provide certain kinds of support to children need not also ground 
authority in decision making.  If one thinks that the social parenthood relationship is what 
grounds parental authority181, which I take to be a plausible view, then it seems perfectly 
sensible that gamete providers could have the responsibilities to provide material support 
to their biological offspring without having any authority to make parenting decisions. 
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 Archard (2010) op. cit. 107-109. 
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 So far I have argued that gamete providers have the responsibility to provide 
material support to their biological offspring if, in the absence of that support, their 
offspring risk no longer having a reasonable chance at a desirable existence.  This 
responsibility is importantly different from the current legal child support framework, 
since the gamete provider’s responsibility to provide support is determined entirely by 
needs of their offspring, and not their financial means.  Next I will look at what kinds of 
personal interventions gamete providers might be required to make into the family life of 
their offspring. 
2.2 Personal Support 
 In addition to circumstances where material support would suffice, we can 
imagine circumstances where personal intervention in the family life of a child is 
required in order to ensure that a child has a reasonable chance at a desirable existence.  
For instance, consider again the case where a parent decides that certain biblical passages 
prohibit the consumption of blood, and on this basis refuses to permit his child to receive 
treatment that involves a blood transfusion.182  In this case, there is no way to intervene to 
protect the child from harm without interfering in the private parent-child relationship.  
Insisting on providing the blood transfusion would necessarily interfere with the parent’s 
ability to involve his child in a life lived together in accordance with the religious beliefs 
the parent holds sacred.  At least according to some authors, the ability of parents to 
involve their children in their religious beliefs is an important part of the intimate parent-
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 This situation has arisen several times with Jehovah’s Witnesses, who believe that blood transfusions are 
impermissible.  The courts have ruled that in these cases, the state is authorized to take temporary custody 
of the child, so that the procedure can be performed.  See B(R) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan 
Toronto. 
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child relationship (though this does not mean that the right to do so is absolute and 
indefeasible).183 
 Like in the case of material support discussed previously, we can distinguish 
between cases where the gamete provider has an involved ongoing relationship with his 
biological offspring through which he becomes aware of the pressing need, and cases 
where there is minimal or no contact whatsoever.  First consider cases where the gamete 
provider has an ongoing relationship with his offspring and has first-hand knowledge that 
the child is at risk.  Here the gamete provider would have a responsibility to try and 
persuade the parent to reconsider his decision about the medical treatment.  If this form of 
intervention proves unsuccessful, the gamete provider would then have a responsibility to 
challenge the parenting decision formally by contacting the child welfare agency and 
raising concerns about the appropriateness of the parent’s medical decision.  The 
responsibility to seek state intervention rather than act unilaterally arises for the reasons 
discussed in the section on pre-provision responsibility: most importantly the need for an 
agreed-upon method for resolving conflicts between individuals who each have a 
responsibility to ensure that the child’s welfare needs are met.  However, in cases where 
the harm is imminent, for instance the parent was about to attempt an extremely 
dangerous and unscientific ‘alternative’ therapy, the gamete provider would have the 
responsibility to remove the child from the dangerous circumstances (if able), and then 
contact the appropriate authorities to determine how to proceed.   
 Note that gamete providers of course do not have the authority to make unilateral 
determinations about the overall suitability of their biological offspring’s parents.  Even 
                                                 
183
 Mills, Claudia. "The Child's Right to an Open Future?" Journal of Social Philosophy. 34.4 (2003): 499-
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in cases where temporary removal of their biological offspring is warranted, or when the 
child welfare agency agrees that a particular parental decision ought to be challenged, it 
might be appropriate overall for parental responsibility and authority to remain with the 
child’s existing parent(s).  For instance, in the case of the blood transfusion, the state 
might decide to temporarily remove the child from the custody of his parent in order to 
perform the medical procedure, then return the child back to the care of his parent.184  
In extreme cases, the child welfare authority might determine that the child should 
not be returned to the custody of his parent.  However, since gamete providers are not 
under an obligation to necessarily parent their biological offspring themselves (as 
discussed in chapter 3), so long as a competent person can be found to do so, there is no 
need for gamete providers to parent themselves.  However, in cases where gamete 
providers are able to parent competently, and no other competent person can be found, 
then gamete providers would have a responsibility to parent their biological offspring.185  
I further think that in cases where there is a meaningful relationship between a gamete 
provider and his biological offspring, and the child’s parent(s) are deemed no longer fit, 
parental claims made by the gamete provider ought to be given preferred status.  
However, giving a complete account of how to respond to such claims is beyond the 
scope of this work. 
It is worth noting that cases where it seems appropriate for involved gamete 
providers to become their offspring’s parents are not distant theoretical possibilities.  In a 
recent case in California, In Re M.C., the court lamented that because there was no 
special legal recognition of non-parental progenitors, a young child would have to be 
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 This conclusion is also endorsed by Lindsay Porter.  Porter (2014). p. 194. 
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placed in foster care rather than with a genetic progenitor who had displayed interest in 
helping raise her.186  This case involved a lesbian couple who, due to a series of 
unpleasant and unfortunate events, became unable to care for M.C..  M.C. was conceived 
during a previous relationship between M.C.’s mother, Melissa, and her then partner, 
Jesus.  Jesus had helped care for Melissa while she was pregnant, and had voluntarily 
provided child support to Melissa and M.C. at various times.  However, since Jesus was 
not a legal parent187, he had no standing to request custody when M.C.’s parents were no 
longer able to care for her.  Consequently, M.C. was placed in the far-from-ideal foster-
care system.  In response to this case, California passed legislation permitting the 
recognition of more than two legal parents, so that situations like this could be avoided in 
the future.188  Though not a gamete provision case, it is not a significant departure from 
the relevant facts to imagine Jesus as a willing gamete provider who had limited 
involvement in the life of his genetic offspring. 
According to my view then, gamete providers who have some meaningful 
involvement in the lives of their biological offspring have a responsibility to try and 
convince their offspring’s parents to reconsider parenting decisions that they think are 
deeply problematic.  In cases where this intervention is not successful, gamete providers 
have a responsibility to contact child welfare authorities and formally challenge the 
parenting decisions that they deem problematic.  In extreme cases where parents pose an 
immediate danger to the child, gamete providers have the responsibility to remove their 
offspring from these situations, but then must contact the child welfare authorities about 
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 In Re M.C. 
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 Jesus had no legal standing because, at the time, the law only permitted a child to have two legal 
parents, and MC already had two legal parents: Melissa and her partner. 
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 California Bill 274 – it specifically cites this case as a motivating factor behind the law. 
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how to proceed.  Furthermore, in cases where their offspring’s parents are deemed no 
longer competent to parent, and no other competent person can be found, gamete 
providers have the responsibility to parent their biological offspring.  Let me now briefly 
turn to cases where there is little or no contact between gamete providers and their 
offspring. 
In cases where there is no meaningful relationship between gamete providers and 
their offspring, gamete providers will generally not have first-hand information about the 
well-being of their biological offspring.  This is especially true in cases where anonymity 
is maintained between gamete providers and intending parents.  In these kinds of cases, 
gamete providers’ responsibility would be limited to responding to requests from the state 
to care for their biological offspring, either temporarily or permanently.  In the event that 
no other person was willing and capable to provide this care, on my view gamete 
providers would have the responsibility to do so. 
 
 
3. Effect on Gamete Provision 
 A possible criticism of my view is that the weighty pre and post-provision 
responsibilities I defend will make individuals less inclined to provide gametes for other 
people’s reproductive use.  For instance, my view requires a competent child welfare 
system in order for gamete provision to be morally permissible.  Given the flaws in the 
current Canadian system189, it is not even certain whether our current system meets the 
threshold necessary for gamete provision to be morally permissible.  Furthermore, the 
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 For instance, see Alaggia, Ramona, et al. "In Whose Best Interest? A Canadian Case Study of the 
Impact of Child Welfare Policies in Cases of Domestic Violence." Brief Treatment and Crisis 
Intervention Vol. 7 No. 275 -290. 
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possibility of potentially significant post-provision responsibilities might people from 
providing gametes, resulting in a shortage of gametes.  However, I do not think that this 
unintended side effect suffices to undermine the plausibility that gamete providers do in 
fact have these responsibilities.  It seems wrong to suggest that A does not acquire 
responsibilities as a result of engaging in a morally weighty activity X, because the 
possibility of acquiring this responsibility might prevent A from doing X, which then 
might negatively impact B.  Furthermore, if encouraging gamete provision is deemed an 
important enough social good, there are steps the state could take to minimize the 
potential costs to gamete providers. For instance, the state could simply decline to 
enforce gamete providers’ post-provision responsibilities and fulfill them itself, or insist 
that clinics take out insurance policies sufficient to cover costs that might arise as a result 
of the responsibilities I have outlined here.  Though none of these measures would impact 
the moral responsibilities gamete providers have towards their biological offspring, they 
would reduce the actual burdens they might face. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined gamete providers’ pre and post provision 
responsibilities.  According to my view, prior to engaging in gamete provision, gamete 
providers must ensure two things: (1) that the individuals who wish to parent the children 
resulting from those gametes have been adequately screened, and (2) that there is a 
competent child-welfare agency in place that is able to monitor their biological offspring 
and act if the children are at risk of no longer having a reasonable chance at a desirable 
existence.  Following the provision of gametes, providers have the responsibility to 
provide material support in cases where such support is necessary for meeting the welfare 
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needs of their biological offspring.  However, in circumstances where their offspring’s 
material needs can be met by others, they do not need to provide any monetary support.  
Hence, this post-provision responsibility is different from child support, as it is manifests 
itself.  Lastly, in certain rare cases gamete providers might have the responsibility to 
parent their offspring, though this would only occur in circumstances where no other 
competent person was willing and available to perform this role.   
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Conclusion 
 Over the course of this thesis I have shown that gamete provision is an activity 
that carries with it very weighty responsibilities.  I have argued that because gamete 
providers willfully and knowingly engage in an activity where the desired outcome is a 
vulnerable child, they acquire care-taking responsibilities towards whatever children they 
help to create.  Importantly, the presence of foreknowledge about the intended use of the 
gametes makes responsibility clearer in the case of gamete provision than in one-night-
stand cases.  This conclusion distinguishes my view from that of other authors who have 
argued for a similar conclusion by relying heavily on analogies to accidental pregnancy.  
My view also avoids the pitfalls that plague the accounts offered by Nelson, Archard and 
Porter.  Their accounts rely on overly broad principles for determining which causally 
implicated individuals acquire care-taking responsibilities.   
 I have further shown that discussions about the transfer of responsibility in the 
literature on gamete provision have frequently failed to properly distinguish between the 
transfer and delegation of responsibility.  Once this distinction is examined and taken into 
account, it becomes clear that the examples other authors offer in support of the 
permissibility of transfer are in fact examples of delegation.  In addition, in becomes clear 
that transfer of responsibility it is not possible in the context of gamete provision.  Thus, I 
have shown that although gamete providers can delegate their responsibilities, they 
cannot transfer them.  Consequently, gamete providers acquire inalienable 
responsibilities towards their biological offspring.  
 In addition to arguing that gamete providers have inalienable responsibilities 
towards their biological offspring, I have also shown that these responsibilities are not 
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parental.  In other words, gamete providers do not have a responsibility to parent their 
biological offspring themselves.  Instead, I have argued that gamete providers have a 
responsibility to ensure that their biological offspring have a reasonable chance at a 
desirable existence.  This entails that gamete providers must ensure that some competent 
individual does parent their offspring, and continues to provide them with both the 
emotional and material resources necessary to have a reasonable chance at a desirable 
existence. 
 Gamete provider responsibilities, though not parental, are far from trivial.  I have 
argued that gamete providers have a responsibility to screen intending parents, or ensure 
that they are screened.  Furthermore, gamete providers ought to ensure that some state 
agency capable of adequately monitoring the welfare of children is in place.  Even after 
these pre-provision responsibilities are fulfilled, gamete providers might be responsible 
for providing material support or other kinds of care to their biological offspring, should 
their welfare be at stake.  For gamete providers to be able to fulfill these later 
responsibilities if the appropriate circumstances arise, some system must be in place for 
gamete providers to be made aware that their intervention is required.  Consequently, on 
my view, records must be kept identifying which gamete providers have responsibilities 
for which children.  This conclusion does not entail that anonymous gamete provision is 
impermissible; in most cases, anonymity could still be preserved between gamete 
providers, and their biological offspring and parents.  However, some intermediary would 
have to be able to locate the appropriate gamete providers and seek support from them on 
behalf of the provider’s biological offspring.    
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 The conclusions from my thesis do not show that gamete provision is itself 
morally problematic, but that in its current form much of it is morally problematic.  This 
is because gamete providers often show little concern for who will end up parenting their 
biological offspring190, and also do not provide gametes within a system that will contact 
them if their biological offspring are in need of their assistance.  The former is a kind of 
recklessness, while the latter is kind of wilful blindness to one’s responsibilities. 
The conclusions drawn from this thesis have some important consequences for 
policy and law governing gamete provision.  For gamete providers to be able to ensure 
that their pre-provision responsibilities the following are required.  First, either gamete 
providers must be given the ability to screen the intending parents who will be making 
use of their gametes, or clinics must adopt rigorous screening procedures that are 
acceptable to gamete providers.  Second, records needs to be kept that identify which 
gamete providers are connected with which children, and courts must have access to 
these records.  Without such a system in place, gamete providers act irresponsibly by 
putting themselves in a position where they will be unlikely to fulfill their post-provision 
responsibilities, if their biological offspring end up needing assistance. 
 Finally, some work must be done to update the legal framework pertaining to 
procreation so that progenitors who have non-parental responsibilities can be given some 
form of legal standing.  As it stands, the only way for the law to recognize gamete 
providers’ responsibilities is to broaden the category of ‘parent’ to include gamete 
providers, as was done in California in response to In Re M.C.191 and in a case in 
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Ontario.192  However, this solution is far from ideal because, as I have argued, gamete 
providers ought not to have the same rights to intervene in the rearing of their offspring, 
or the same responsibility to provide support, as the child’s parent(s).  The practice of 
including gamete providers as legal parents leaves open the possibility that gamete 
providers could be found liable for standard child support payments, which, on my view, 
would be inappropriate.  I further speculate that developing a legal framework for non-
parental progenitors would be helpful in resolving questions about custody and support 
that arise in other reproductive scenarios.  For instance, responsibilities arising from 
pregnancies in one-night-stand cases might be more appropriately treated like gamete 
provision cases than parenthood cases. Developing a detailed account of these legal 
responsibilities is a project I hope to take on in the future.  
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